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In 1985, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher declared publicity to be the ‘oxygen’ of 
terrorism. Speaking from within a climate of domestic terrorism, such a statement 
draws into question the nature of contemporary media coverage.  
The British Broadcasting Corporation, existing as a public sector broadcaster, 
occupies a unique position in the context of 20th and 21st century mass media. The 
BBC is central to the creation and direction of national and international news 
agendas, in the formation of worldwide public opinion, and the brand name and 
reputation hold connotations of honesty, accuracy and impartiality. It can therefore 
be positioned as a ‘a microcosm of some larger system or a whole society' (Gomm et 
al., 2000, p.99).  
Yet, the historical visual output of the organisation in relation to domestic terrorism 
emanating from the environment of the Troubles — a significant period in social, 
cultural, political, and media history — has never been subject to rigorous academic 
scrutiny. 
Grounded in the field of media and cultural studies, and drawing upon extensive 
archival research, this thesis investigates the representation of domestic terror by 
the BBC in news and documentary format over the three-decade period of 
1968-1998 through two interpretive modes of textual analysis: content analysis and 
semiotics. Throughout, the representation of events is contextualised in relation to 
media theory, with the words and pictures broadcast by the BBC analysed. The 
framing of acts of terror as image events is considered, as well as the visual aesthetic, 
codes, and values, of news reports.  
Ultimately, this work argues that BBC coverage of the Troubles has clear and 
identifiable patterns and symbols. Initial outbreaks of violence, where no 
corresponding representational referents existed, trended towards the vivid and 
graphic. Gradually, however, there was an overt movement away from this form; 
with the notable exception of moments where a method of perception created a 
disjuncture to established means, coverage was dominated by generic media 
templates, the rhetoric of euphemism, a concerted lack of contextualisation, and 
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You will see that this little clicking contraption with the revolving handle will 
make a revolution in our life…It is a direct attack on the old methods of 
literary art. We shall have to adapt ourselves to the shadowy screen and to the 
cold machine. 
But I rather like it. This swift change of scene, this blending of emotion and 
experience — it is much better than the heavy, long-drawn-out kind of writing 
to which we are accustomed.  
 
It is closer to life.  
Leo Tolstoy 







I see terrorism as violence for effect.  
Terrorists choreograph dramatic incidents.…  
Terrorism is theatre. 
Brian Jenkins  





At 15:25 on Friday, July 22nd 2011, a car bomb exploded in the executive 
government quarter of Norway’s capital city Oslo. Eight people were killed 
and twenty-six wounded. 
Two hours later, at 17:30, police in Oslo were informed of shootings on the 
island of Utøya, some 40 kilometres northwest of Oslo and the location of the 
Norwegian Labour Party's annual youth summer camp. Initial reports 
suggested ten fatalities; overnight this became eighty-five (later revised to 
68).  
International news media immediately covered the incident, broadcasting 
footage from the two locations, and interviews with members of the police 
and government. Leading Western print organisations — both European and 
American and including The Guardian, The Financial Times, The New York 
Times, The Wall Street Journal and The Washington Post — along with 
broadcasters on television, radio and online, sought to identity the 
perpetrators as Muslim extremists and explicitly, Al Qaeda.  
As the weekend progressed however, eyewitness accounts revealed that the 
perpetrator was a lone ‘Norwegian-looking man, tall and blonde, dressed in 
 Hashtags are user-created ‘groupings’ on Twitter (a form of metadata tag) used to identify 1
keywords or topics. #blamethemuslims was created by student Sanum Ghafoor following the 
July 22nd events in Norway where ‘the default [response] was to blame Muslims’. Topsy.com 
(a tweet monitoring site) records more than 165,000 tweets using the tag, for example ‘my 
phones running out of battery #blamethemuslims’.
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what appeared to be a police uniform’ (BBC 23.07.11). The attacks were 
homegrown, a domestic act of terror by a right-wing ideologue.  
(Domestic) Terror 
The shift from Islamic fundamentalism to white supremacist was marked by 
a change in language.  The original moniker of terrorism — replete with 
political charge and inherently problematic definition — shifted to the even 
more problematic “domestic terror”. Domestic terrorism occupies a unique 
position in the discourse of global terror; in the United Kingdom, such 
terrorism has been dominated by the liberation movement of the 
(Provisional) Irish Republican Army (IRA).  
Whilst the notion of domestic then — and ideas of inside/outside and “home-
grown” — are complicated by the identification of those in, and supporting of, 
the IRA as Irish (and not British), the Troubles are fundamentally identified 
as a period of domestic terror. After 9/11 there has been a renewed approach 
to international terror, with a rising focus on Islamic terrorism as the global 
threat. Yet there remains a continued threat of violence from the two main 
Republican groups, the Continuity IRA (CIRA) and the Real IRA (RIRA), who 
both reject the 1998 Belfast agreement. An overall development has 
accompanied this passage of time, from violence to dialogue. Simultaneously, 
there has been an associated (and ongoing) shift of terrorist to interlocutor, 
opening up complex questions of framing.  
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The Troubles 
The origins of the IRA (in its modern sense) can be traced to its predecessor, 
the Irish Volunteers, the April 1916 Easter Rising in Dublin, and the 
formation of the Irish State in 1919. Seeking the reunification of Ireland, 
through the incorporation of the six counties of Northern Ireland, the IRA as 
an organisation became increasingly fractured, marginalised and essentially 
ceased to exist in the post-World War II period. Increased violence (on 
Catholics by the Loyalist Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) in 1966), and the 
growing civil rights movement in 1968 — centred on the Northern Ireland 
Civil Rights Association (NICRA) and demanding an end to discrimination 
(in housing and employment) and gerrymandering — ultimately led to 
intense political and sectarian rioting across Northern Ireland in August 
1969. More nationalist members of the Republican movement, dissatisfied 
with the IRA’s strategy, split in December 1969, and the Provisional IRA were 
formed. They would kill some 1,780 people between 1969 and 2001. 
Euro-Terror 
The Irish Civil Rights organisation, drawing on the tactics and symbolism of 
the American Civil Rights movement, occurred at a period of protest and 
social change on a global level. 'There has never been a year like 1968, and it 
is unlikely there will ever be again', according to Mark Kurlansky in 1968: 
The Year That Rocked the World; 'at a time when nations and cultures were 
still very different…there occurred a spontaneous combustion of rebellious 
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spirits around the world’ (Kurlansky, 2004, p.xv). Yet the resultant effect was 
one of violence and domestic terrorism: the birth of what Yonah Alexander 
terms Fighting Communist Organizations (FCO) (1992). Alongside the IRA’s 
resurgence, the roots of the Baader-Meinhof cells in West Germany and the 
Red Brigades in Italy can be traced to the turbulent events of 1968. The idea 
of international terrorism was established at this point:  
The actions of the Red Army Faction (Baader-Meinhof gang) in West 
Germany, the Red Army in Italy, the Angry Brigade and the IRA in Britain, 
Euzkadi Ta Akatasuna (ETA) in Spain, the Palestine Liberation         
Organisation in various places, the Tupamaros in Uruguay                                  
and the Montoneros in Argentina all fed the view that a new era of                
terror had dawned (Schlesinger et al., 1983, p.3) 
As Sean O’Hagan notes, the catalyst for these events was the advent of 
television: 
In 1968 two technological innovations transformed the nightly news reports: 
the use of videotape, which was cheap and reusable, instead of film, and the 
same-day broadcast, which meant that often unedited images of rebellion 
were disseminated across continents almost as they happened…Indeed, the 
radicals had a much better grasp of the galvanising power of television            
than the politicians they were trying to overthrow (2008) . 
Bruce Hoffman, identifying the printing press as the first, suggests the launch 
of a television satellite in 1968 can be recognised as the ‘second great 
revolution in mass communication’ (2006, p.178). Both Kurlansky and 
O’Hagan quote Abbie Hoffman (no relation), co-founder of the Youth 
International Party, on the subsequent increased importance of a visual 
narrative: ‘A modern revolutionary group headed for the television, not for 
the factory’ (Kurlansky, 2004, p.98). Pierre Bourdieu echoes this sentiment, 
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highlighting the fact ‘that fifty clever folk…can have as much political effect as 
half a million’ (cited by Hobsbawm, 1994, p.320).  
The Media and Terrorism 
The entire world has then indeed taken, to use W.J.T Mitchell’s phrase, a 
pictorial turn, where the ‘era of video…the age of electronic reproduction, has 
developed new forms of visual simulation and illusionism with 
unprecedented powers’ (Mitchell, 1994, p.15). Superseding the linguistic turn, 
images and their representation, now resonate across ‘every level of culture, 
from the most refined philosophical speculations, to the most vulgar 
productions of the mass media’ (ibid, p. 16). 
 These “powers” have been harnessed by terrorists and there exists what Jean 
Baudrillard terms the ‘spectacle of terrorism’ (2001b). Graphic depictions of 
death, destruction and despair highlight this visual fascination, and 
terrorists, their violent acts, and the mass media are entwined in a mutually 
assured symbiotic relationship.  Media and terrorism (domestic or 2
international) are therefore inextricably linked; terrorism is by its very 
nature, a psychological weapon. It relies on the communication of a threat, or 
representation of the actual act of violence and/or its aftermath, to a wider 
society (either in a communal, national or international sense) in order to 
 Such a relationship similarly exists between governments, the military and the media. 2
Western warfare has been diluted towards hyper-terrorism and “shock and awe”, where 
virtual victories, the event-instant and pure spectacle dominate the visual spectrum. As 
Mitchell emphasises in Picture Theory, ‘CNN has shown us that a supposedly alert, educated 
population can witness the destruction of an Arab nation as little more than a spectacular 
television melodrama’ (1994, p.16).
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function. The modern warfare of terrorism then, involves ‘the telegenic 
qualities of such atrocities constantly reinforcing their evocative 
power’ (Virilio, 2000a, p.23). Those involved quickly learnt the importance of 
the spectacle, exploiting the ‘real time of images [and] their instantaneous 
global diffusion,’ just as civil rights revolutionaries did in 1968 (Baudrillard, 
2001a). It also instigated an escalation, where limited resources sought to 
maximise the resultant representation and visual impact. As real time 
surpassed real space, reportage of acts of terrorism could be replicated 
quickly (and eventually instantly) across borders, framing a single atrocity 
and transforming it into an individual, or sequence of, images causing 
widespread fear and panic. Joseph Tuman points to the central difference 
between murder/assault and an act of terrorism being the ‘intent of the latter 
to communicate a message to a larger set of audiences than those targeted in 
the attack itself’ (cited by Huxford, 2004, p.9). For Huxford, as the 
importance of the visual increased, images would become:  
as much a weapon as a bullet or a bomb, with news coverage serving                   
as a frighteningly effective delivery system. In a world of relentless             
images and instant media, the signifier has become even                                  
more potent an instrument of war than the acts it signifies (2004, p.2).  
Analysis of the nature of representation then, including how such signifiers 
have been deployed, is a vital component of the media ecology meta-
discipline. At its simplest, this refers to the study of communications 
technologies, including the mass media, as a cultural environment (or more 
precisely environments). Just as ecology as a term corresponds to 
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environment, we can here identify a connection to the forefather of media 
study, Marshall McLuhan (1992; 2001; 2008). McLuhan’s famous phrase, the 
medium is the message, similarly contains this link in its very makeup, with 
the dictionary definition of medium as a noun “an environment”. McLuhan’s 
second famous analogy — the global village — points toward the connected 
world, where media systems change culture, and change us, over time.  
Allied to media ecology, and McLuhan himself, can be positioned mediation; 
what the ‘media do, and to what we do with the media’ (Silverstone, 2006). 
Used across education, psychology, sociology and media studies, the central 
mediating factor is the medium itself; within the media then, this two way 
process is  through selection, organisation, framing and focusing.  
In contrast to this term is mediatisation, developed principally by Friedrich 
Krotz, Winfried Schulz and Stig Hjarvard (cited by Couldry, 2008, p.4). Ben 
O’Loughlin quotes Hjarvard, who seeks to emphasise the clear distinction 
that exists between mediatisation and simple “mediation”:  
Mediation describes the concrete act of communication by  
means of a medium in a specific social context. By contrast,  
mediatisation  refers to a more long-lasting process, whereby  
social and cultural institutions and modes of interaction are changed  
as a consequence of the growth of media’s influence (2015, p. 169) 
With terrorism (alongside war and conflict) now culturally and socially 
dependent upon media (Awan et al., 2011, p. 5), it is important to investigate 
these through their mediation and mediatisation; with the BBC central to the 
media ecology of the United Kingdom, it is important to subject her 
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broadcasting to analysis; with the Troubles of Northern Ireland central to our 
historical relationship with terrorism, it is important to study this period as a 
tool to illuminate the present.  
Semantically, both terrorism in general, and the Troubles present significant 
terminological problems. ‘Even before you begin to mention political 
violence,’ according to BBC television reporter Peter Taylor, ‘the words you 
use may betray the political path you seem to be treading’: 
At the most basic level, where is the conflict taking place?  
Is it in Ulster? Northern Ireland? The Province? The North of Ireland?  
Or the Six Counties?…And once you've sorted out the names, what’s  
actually going on there? Is it a conflict? Is it a war? A rebellion?  
A revolution? A criminal conspiracy? Or a liberation struggle?… 
Lastly, and probably most important, how do we describe those involved? Are 
they terrorists? Criminals? The Mafia? Murderers? Or freedom fighters? It 
depends on your perception of the conflict, and who you happen to be 
working for at the time…(cited by Curtis, 1998, p.133).  
The British army and the RUC were invariably detailed under the rubric of 
“security forces” by the media (and initially politicians). Such words carry 
significant connotations and cannot be used passively. The most 
controversial rhetoric, as detailed, involves terrorist and terrorism 
phraseology. Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman would undoubtably 
endorse the thesis of Schlesinger, Murdock and Elliot, arguing such words 
have become semantic tools of the powerful in the West (1994). They suggest 
deployment of the terms has, and continues, to generally be confined to the 
use of violence by individuals/marginal groups and not official/state violence. 
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The importance of considering usage of these terms is due to the implication 
that one form of violence (and terrorism) is more reprehensible than others.  
A 1974 BBC internal memorandum, entitled Guerrillas and Terrorists 
detailed ‘terrorist’ to be 
the appropriate description for people who engage in acts of terrorism, and in 
particular, acts of violence against civilians, that is operations not directed  
at military targets or military personnel. Guerrilla is acceptable for leaders 
and members of the various Palestine organisations of this kind, but they too 
become terrorists when they engage in terrorist acts(unless raiders, hijackers 
or gunmen is more appropriate) (cited by Taylor, 1996, p.335).  
Even relatively “simple” terms, for example “force” and “violence”, are 
suggestive towards a degree of justification. Therefore, 
to prefer ‘Northern Ireland’ is to grind one axe, the ‘north of Ireland’, quite 
another. Each negates, and, at root, seeks to dispossess the opposing 
allegiance. A deadly result of this inability to communicate, Maurice Goldring 
observes is that the necessary words have gone rusty,                                             
and the only language left is that of violence (Butler, 1995, p.101).  
In fact, every aspect of coverage was subject to controversy, particularly 
amongst the immediate community being broadcast to. Even beyond (or 
more precisely before) word choice, pronunciation (for example of the h in H 
Block) could reveal a reporter’s religious origins, inculcate a stance, and 
garner critique. 
The BBC 
To now further John Huxford’s phrase, mass mediated terrorism moves 
toward an (the) image rendering bullet and bomb redundant (see Roger, 
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2013, p.48). In 1985, at the height of the Troubles, Prime Minster Margaret 
Thatcher would state ‘we must try to find ways to starve the terrorist and the 
hijacker of the oxygen of publicity on which they depend’ (1985). 
With the consolidation of power in the 20th Century by the Western mass 
media, where a tendency towards extreme partiality and complicity between 
government and corporate conglomerates arises, the British Broadcasting 
Corporation (BBC) occupies a unique position. Existing as a public sector 
broadcaster — funded by a licence fee — the BBC is free from a reliance on 
commercial revenue. With its mission of “collecting news and information in 
any part of the world” (as set forth in the Royal Charter) the BBC is the 
largest broadcast news organisation in the world, with 44 news-gathering 
bureau (3 in the UK and 41 abroad) producing 120 hours of daily content. Its 
brand name and reputation hold remarkable connotations of honesty, 
accuracy and impartiality, and its tri-media journalism — on television, radio 
and online — grants unprecedented dissemination on a global scale. Director 
Wim Wenders explains that ‘the most political decision you make [as a 
filmmaker] is where you direct people’s eyes. In other words, what you show 
people, day in and day out, is political’ (cited by Levi Strauss, 2003, p.1). The 
coverage of the BBC then, with the importance and influence it holds, was 
(and remains) crucial across the media ecology of the United Kingdom, in the 
formation of public opinion, the creation of myth, and the direction of 
national and international news agenda(s).  
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Prior to the explosion of violence in 1968, Northern Ireland was, for 
mainstream British culture, ‘an obscure and unknown periphery, little 
acknowledged and rarely featured’ (McLoone, 1996b, p.80). This echoes the 
words of Philip Schlesinger, who, in his sociological exploration of BBC 
newsroom operations Putting Reality Together, writes,  
until 1968 the situation in the Province was ignored by the national  
BBC…[it was only] with violent clashes between Catholics and  
Protestants, and the involvement of the police, attention became  
focused on Northern Ireland…Violence has been the dominant  
theme of news from the Province since’ (Schlesinger, 1978, pp.206-209).  
The role of the BBC as a public service broadcaster must also be considered 
and it is in this role ‘first and foremost that the BBC has understood and 
defined its mission ever since 1927’ (cited by Scannell, 1996, p.80). Yet the 
notion of the BBC as a British Broadcasting Corporation can be immediately 
tempered in exploring its national presence. An initial presumption is then 
the unity of the culture and identity of the United Kingdom, that which the 
BBC (re)presents. This is problematised by two nations within a nation — 
Wales and Scotland — with each instead defined as a regional adjunct. 
Further, the relationship between all regional varieties, is not simply with 
England, but rather London. This then highlights the incongruous issue of 
Northern Ireland; what Rex Cathcart terms “the most contrary 
region” (1984).  
The relationship, particularly regarding autonomy, between the BBC in 
Belfast and headquarters in London, can be recognised as problematic from 
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the BBC’s inception in the region. The Belfast station was managed and run 
by non-Irish personnel; the role of local input and local knowledge can be 
clearly read through criticism of BBC London offered by the Irish Radio 
Journal:  
The announcer at the London station caused great amusement  
to Northern listeners recently by the attempts which he made to  
pronounce Fermanagh. Lectures from Irish stations on the orthoepy  
of Irish names should be given for the benefit of officials of English  
stations. It is hoped that these lectures will be given before Doagh  
qualifies for a place in the news bulletins (McLoone, 1996a, p.25). 
In suggesting the 1994 ceasefire led to an outcome of uncertainty, Des 
Cranston seeks to draw a parallel with the conclusion of World War Two, 
where the social, political, economic and cultural shifts affected the dominant 
media source (radio):  
as the BBC Yearbook noted at the time, War reporting had one thing about it 
that spelt simplicity. There was seldom much difference of opinion on any 
given week, as to what was the right lead for the news’ (1996, p.35). 
Television news itself, through the very nature of its construction, is 
dominated by uncertainty, and the ultimate desire to form some sort of order 
within. Disparate stories and the order of construction is carefully crafted to 
draw the audience from one to the next, built to ‘hold and build the 
viewership rather than place events in context or explain issues in 
depth’ (Postman, 2008, p.113). The nature of uncertainty has changed, but 
the previous twenty-five years, as portrayed through the media, can be 
recognised as awash with uncertainty; with framing, with representation, 
with language, with visuals.  
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Since 1969, British police, armed forces and politicians were engaged in a 
continuous and evolving counter-insurgency campaign with propaganda a 
key component. Events within this conflict called into question the very 
integrity of the state itself. In Televising Terrorism, Schlesinger, Murdock 
and Elliot argue that the representation of terrorism is entwined with the 
exercise of definitional power, where the media are central to the propaganda 
war. According to the authors, 
television as the medium with the largest news audiences and the highest 
credibility, has been regarded by all sides as of particular importance. 
Without doubt, in the debate about censorship, broadcasting has figured far 
more centrally than press. This is because broadcasting, particularly the BBC, 
is legitimised by an ideology of public service under which it is seen as owing 
obligations to the community as a whole (1983, p.121)  
Rationale 
Kenneth Jarecke’s “Incinerated Iraqi, Gulf War, Iraq,” taken on February 26, 
1991, exists as one of the most visceral images of conflict photography. 
Centrally framed by the windshield, and backlit by harsh, bright daylight, it 
shows, in close up, the charred, deformed remains of a soldier, attempting to 
lift himself out of a destroyed vehicle. A distorted expression of pain and 
panic is imprinted on his face, and he is almost staring directly at the camera, 
and in turn the audience. Rejected by the American press, it was printed by 
The Observer in the United Kingdom under the headline “The real face of 
War” (01.03.91). The image directly addressed the idea ‘war is real and war is 
terrible’ (Taylor 1998, p.75), simultaneously confronting the notion of high-
tech bloodless warfare as prompted through the military and media; it would 
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later become an iconic (and award winning) photo, its iconicity ‘rendered in 
universal terms’ (Kennedy, 2016, p. 110) of humanity and the desire to live. 
Jarecke’s remark — ‘if I don’t take pictures like these, people like my mom 
will think war is what they see in movies’ — served as the direct impetus for 
this study (Deghett, 2014). As David Perlmutter notes, ‘history becomes 
telescoped over time. Great, long-drawn-out events are now recalled in 
collective memory by a few images, facts, and phrases’ (2005, p. 119). 
Jarecke’s image, as a vision of war, is now a part of society’s collective 
memory regarding the Gulf War; within a personal and British context, the 
image of Father Edward Daly — clad in black, waving a blood stained white 
handkerchief, crouched and leading four men who carry the slender body of a 
teenager — is one of the dominant images of Bloody Sunday that 
simultaneously define this idea of a “great, long-drawn out event”.  
Across media studies and conflict, much attention is directed at 
contemporary events, particularly in the post 9/11 period. There is a 
reluctance to probe deeply into the past; instead a (to be expected) 
fascination with the present exists, where a surfeit of images are produced 
and disseminated immediately across the globe. As McQueen notes, ‘The 
literature exploring British and US media coverage of major armed conflicts 
is enormous and has grown significantly in recent years, particularly in the 
aftermath of the controversial invasion of Iraq in 2003’ (2010, p. 117).  
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Yet, in seeking an understanding of the representation of conflict and 
terrorism in the 21st Century, the overlooked past can provide a unique 
insight. Furthermore, when issues of domestic (and home-grown) terrorism 
are central to current security concerns within the United Kingdom, the 
Troubles of Northern Ireland offer an intriguing parallel. Writing prior to our 
current mediatised climate, Alan Bairner suggests ‘it is doubtful if any other 
part of the world has attracted as much sustained media attention as 
Northern Ireland has done since the late 1960s’ (1996, p.173). This study 
seeks to probe BBC’s coverage of the Troubles, investigate the representation 
of domestic terrorism, and discover the nature — and value — of such 
“sustained media attention”.  
No other academic media research exclusively related to the reportage of the 
BBC and the “long-drawn out” Troubles has been conducted.  Yet, as David 3
Butler eloquently states,  
Media studies is politics by another name…the purpose is to investigate 
representation — with a view to interpreting the impact of  
these upon the popular mind. This is the study of symbolic power;  
the power of media forms to influence, shape and perhaps define,  
commonly held belief (Butler, 1996, p.127). 
 A limited field exists concerned with general media issues, predominantly propaganda and 3
censorship; see primarily the work of David Miller (1990; 1994a; 1994b), David Butler (1996; 
1997), Philip Schlesinger (1979; 1983; 1992), Rex Cathcart (1984) and Liz Curtis (1998). 
Cathcart’s study of the BBC in Northern Ireland is an invaluable source of factual 
information from the organisation’s establishment until the early 1970s. The BBC have been 
accused of both anti-republican (Curtis) and anti-loyalist (Parkinson, 1998) bias. Asa Briggs 
wrote a five volume text on UK broadcasting from 1922 to 1974; these were essentially a 
history of the BBC who commissioned the work. 
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He is here endorsing the words of John Fiske: ‘Communication is too often 
taken for granted when it should be taken to pieces' (cited by Hartley, 1982, 
p.xiii) 
A detailed examination of the nature and evolution of BBC news coverage of 
domestic terrorism, so crucial to the shaping and dynamics of contemporary 
British history, politics and social contestation, is therefore a critical element 
of our media discourse. This work will focus on actuality television: news 
bulletins, news magazines, current affairs and documentary programming. 
Television represents the primary sources of imagery (in general) for the 
public, commanding ‘large audiences and is widely seen as having 
considerable potential influence on public opinion’ (Schlesinger et al., 1983, 
p.35). As communication develops and history progresses, a visual and 
semiotic vocabulary has been created and codified, with recurrent motifs, 
symbols and themes established. The representation of an event is never 
straightforward, with the critical position of visuals shown in relation to 
terrorism (and the spectacle of modern war) requiring interrogation 
accordingly. 
For Schlesinger et al., 
news bulletins tend to be rendered in a style that conceals the  
process of selection and decision which lies behind the reporting, and which 
allow little room for comment or argumentation. The opinions presented are                 
often confined to the holders of power. As a result news is one of                         
the more closed forms of presentation (1983, p.36). 
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Using this classification, they then divide up the four actuality criteria, 
categorising the cross-cutting dimensions of the terrorism media landscape. 
News bulletins (BBC News) and news magazines (Newsnight, Nationwide), 
typically occurring daily, institutionally authorised and event based, are 
labelled “closed”, operating from and within the terms of reference of an 
official governing perspective. Current affairs programming (Panorama, 
Spotlight) and particularly documentaries (Peter Taylor’s trilogy Provos: The 
IRA and Sinn Féin, Loyalists, and Brits: The War against the IRA), are 
conversely individually authored, occurring weekly or infrequently and 
utilising filmed reports, studio discussion, and cinematic/stylistic techniques. 
These are “relatively open”, offering a space in which ‘core assumptions of the 
official perspective can be interrogated and contested and in which other 
perspectives can be presented and examined’ (Schlesinger et al., 1983, p.32). 
An “event”, in both broadcasting and philosophical concepts, is typically the 
focus of daily news broadcasts and magazine shows, whilst wider (but 
generic) “topics” are explored through the documentary medium. 
Schlesinger’s proposal of an official dominant perspective echoes the mass 
communication theories of Stuart Hall, and the notion of decoding and 
interpreting through the prevailing ideology and preferred meaning of a 
dominant-hegemonic code (Hall, 1981). 
Television news then, allegedly stylistically neutral, in fact moves beyond 
denotation and approaches strict limits of connotation. As Richard Hoggart 
and the Glasgow University Media Group argued in 1976, ‘what its 
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practitioners call objective news is in reality a highly selected interpretation 
of events’ (2009, p.x). There is a preponderance of drama, privileging of 
imagery and overt fetishisation of violence.  
The coverage of Northern Irish affairs in the British media  
has tended to simplify violent incidents and to avoid historical  
background…the story has been permanently one of violence, and of 
irrational, inexplicable violence at that (Schlesinger et al., 1983, p.37). 
BBC broadcasting, across news, current affairs, and documentary, during the 
1968-1998 period reflected national concerns. Footage from this three decade 
period are the main research focus for this thesis. These dates serve as the 
popularly accepted dates for the Troubles in Northern Ireland and represent 
a period where visuals of domestic terrorism dominated. Before the twenty-
first century of instantaneous global diffusion, digital warfare, and the 
international terrorism of Daesh, the Troubles in Northern Ireland exist as a 
unique situation: homegrown terrorism being broadcast daily directly to the 
citizens involved, separated only (initially) by a body of water. This thesis will 
address itself to identifying precisely how the armed conflict in Northern 
Ireland (and subsequently on mainland Britain) was covered. A full 
qualitative analysis of every news report and act of terrorism is almost an 
impossibility; this is not an exhaustive study of all broadcast output over the 
period concerned. Rather, specific moments will receive sustained attention 
throughout, arranged largely chronologically, and utilised to consider trends 
and thematic developments. The most detailed attention will be paid to these 
incidences where “images, facts, and phrases” have entered “collective 
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memory” as these offer the opportunity for qualitative analysis and detailed 
semiotic study.  4
This analysis, in combination with research of existing literature across 
media theory and analysis, will be used to chart the nature of coverage and 
how it evolved. The focus on a single network will allow an investigation of 
why coverage of the Troubles took a particular form at various identifiable 
moments. How the BBC represented, and how it coped with representing, 
(perspectives of) conflict, violence and terrorism is of importance because it 
will illuminate the institutions role within culture, identify the visuals it 
selected to embody these acts of violence, and help provide an understanding 
of the many interconnecting macro and micro processes that shaped 
broadcast journalism at a time of perpetual domestic terrorism. 
Indeed visual imagery can in fact highlight that which certain words — the 
euphemistic vocabulary of terrorism and war — cannot express, or fail to 
convey. Friendly fire. Abuse. Rendition. Collateral Damage. Surgical Strike. 
Ethnic cleansing. Precision Weapon. Black Site. Would the events of Abu 
Ghraib have received widespread attention and condemnation without the 
visual documentation? With only Donald Rumsfeld’s proclamation it was 
simply ‘the excesses of human nature that humanity suffers?’ For artist 
Trevor Paglen, it is visuals that ‘show you something that can never be 
captured in words’ (2010). Body bags evolved into human remains pouches 
 For further clarification on the selection process see chapter two, which contains a detailed 4
overview of the corpus and associated methodology. 
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and now transfer tubes. At each stages, there is a further distancing involved 
in the concrete physicality of the body (to the “human”; to the “transfer”) and 
here the concept of sanitisation (explored further in chapters two and five) is 
invoked. 
Drawing on original research for a Masters study, and following the 
conducting of preliminary archival work, a hypothesis, or ‘inference that is 
formulated and provisionally adopted to explain observed facts or conditions 
and guide in further investigation’ (cited by Singh and Bajpai, 2008, p.93) 
was developed. This is expressed simply as  
BBC coverage of the Troubles has clear and  
identifiable patterns and symbols of visual representation.  
This hypothesis emerged from initial observation of BBC footage concerning 
the early and sporadic outbreaks of violence and was reflected in the 
conclusions reached within a small number of journalistic articles critiquing 
coverage of the conflict throughout the mid-80s. A main research question 
lies at the heart of this study:  
How did BBC television news represent  
the “Troubles” over the three decade period of 1968—1998?  
Related to this then are overlapping questions: 
More specifically, what images did the BBC use to report the Troubles? 
What patterns, changes and symbols can be discerned in the nature of the 
visuals deployed to represent acts (and associated acts) of terrorism? 
Why did these changes take place?  
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Whilst there is a substantial body of research employing textual and/or 
content analysis based on news and current affairs coverage of conflict, 
warfare and contemporary terrorism, there is remarkably little focusing 
exclusively on the BBC and the Troubles; a significant period in social, 
cultural, political, and media history. This thesis seeks to go some way 
towards redressing this imbalance, presenting a volume that future 
scholarship can profitably draw on.  
Chapter Summary 
Chapter one provides an overview of key theoretical concepts that will appear 
throughout this study, including televisuality, liveness, news values, 
compassion fatigue and sanitisation. Chapter two, focusing directly on the 
methodology, includes discussion of the textual analysis methodological 
purposes selected, providing explanation of how these processes were 
applied. The sourcing and selection of the corpus is detailed.  
The first analytical chapter of this thesis — Origins — features a historical 
overview of the divided society, and traces coverage of initial events towards 
the point in which sporadic acts of violence translated into “domestic 
terrorism”. A first case study shall concern the astonishing footage broadcast 
— in both black and white and visceral colour — of the “Battle of the Bogside” 
in 1969. The framing and determination of the event, alongside the politics of 
image ambiguity, immediately question purported notions of neutrality and 
objectivity. Television quickly became the central medium of reportage, with 
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pictures ‘always a better medium for conveying violence and death than the 
written word’ (Winsby, 1970). It also represented the first instance of the 
television war (alongside Vietnam) where  
the people in whose name the war is being conducted are able to see in their 
own homes the incidents of battle night after night. There is a sharpness of 
impact that goes beyond the reporting of all previous wars. The horrors of 
war do not come distilled through the refined judgment of a trained observer. 
They come harsh and straight (The Times, 18.11.71). 
Chapter 4 — Trouble — advances chronologically to the 1970s and the 
openings of “the propaganda war”. Conflict with governmental departments 
would establish significant divisions in the BBC-state relationship, whilst 
what Mary Holland calls ‘the British way of censorship’ further impacted 
representation (1981). The visuals afforded to coverage of what is known as 
“Bloody Sunday” are central to the chapter and will exist as the second 
significant case study. Its position as an iconic event, and the nature of this 
footage — with graphic visuals that would be heavily sanitised if shown 
regarding a similar act today — is also of note. Coverage of the remainder of 
this period is permeated with generic images of conflict and terrorism, 
including riots, shootings, bombings, protests and the military. Reporting 
contained little explanation of the historical origins of the conflict, and few 
alternative perspectives were offered (Schlesinger’s closed category). 
Chapter 5, Hunger, involves a detailed examination of the coverage of the 
1981 Hunger Strikes. Initially confined within the prison system (the “blanket 
protest”, which received minimal coverage), the protest escalated with a 
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series of Hunger Strikes, notably that of Bobby Sands.  The problem of 5
propaganda — from both republican and government/army sources — 
presented significant difficulties for journalists, whilst the election of Bobby 
Sands (during the strikes) to the Westminster parliament dramatically 
increased reportage and news values. There was though, an overall failing 
(including by the print media) to fully contextualise events, resulting in 
confusion, ‘conditioned by government policy’ (Tangen Page, 1996, p.170). 
The BBC dramatisation Elephant is particularly enlightening and is 
considered here, consciously adopting the aesthetics of the broadcast news, 
whilst BBC coverage of Sands’ funeral, alongside riots after his death, is also 
surveyed. The Remembrance Day bombing in Enniskillen in 1987, and the 
prominence afforded to amateur footage captured in the immediate 
aftermath, is the chapter’s second major case study.  
Chapter 6 – Ceasefire – moves into the 90s and includes analysis of a crucial 
rhetorical weapon, the 1988-1994 broadcasting ban. Also of importance is the 
series of large bombings throughout the decade including London Docklands 
and Manchester (1996). There was a distinct familiarity to coverage of these 
events with similar footage being broadcast of each; images of damaged 
buildings dominated proceedings with a media emphasis placed on the 
associated monetary value. Such images were ideal for the increasingly 
spectacle driven media, as there was an overall absence of graphic content 
 Whilst Robert A. Pape,who has conducted extensive research on terrorism and particularly 5
suicide bombings, quotes Niebuhr and the notion ‘Hunger Strikes are not ordinarily 
considered acts of terrorism’, they are included in this work as indicative of an “event” 
occurring within a terrorism discourse. (2011, 286)
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and human fatalities. The chapter ends with coverage of the 1998 Omagh 
bombing; despite extensive casualties, the reportage was again dominated by 
footage of damaged buildings, rubble and ruin; however, again, an amateur 
video significantly altered reportage. 
In David Miller’s Don’t Mention The War, he writes 
alongside, but intimately connected with the bombings and shootings, the 
torture and the beatings, runs another conflict. It is waged from the offices of 
the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland at Stormont Castle to the 
Republican Press Centre on the Falls Road; from the offices of the Irish 
Times in Dublin, the London Times to the New York Times in the USA;  
From living rooms in Protestant East Belfast and Catholic West Belfast  
to the English home counties; And from the offices of the British  
government in Whitehall to diplomatic missions around the world.  
This is the propaganda war (1994, p.12). 
This was the BBC.  
The rhetoric and representation of their reportage — what was and was not 
covered, what was and was not said, what was and was not shown — 
incredibly influenced public opinion in mainland Britain. It continues to do 
so today in relation to global terrorism. Through an examination of the past, 








the history of broadcasting in the twentieth century  
is in a sense…  








John Corner, in seeking to identify the ‘conceptual schemes which might help 
to explain its nature, operation and consequences’, divides theories about 
television into ‘four types — theories of representation, theories of medium, 
theories of institution and theories of process’ (1998, p.147). Corner identifies 
the work of Stuart Hall as central to questions of representation. For Hall, 
’representation is an essential part of a process by which meaning is 
produced and exchanged’ (1997, p.15, italics in original). This constructionist 
approach, the perspective with the greatest impact on cultural studies, 
recognises that meaning is not inherent within an object; rather meaning is 
constructed, using concepts and signs as systems of representation. Use of 
the term “construction” is of particular relevance here, suggestive of the 
constructed nature of television news as stories created within a specific 
narrative frame, then arranged and placed in particular context. The news 
constantly presents and represents verbal and visual images based on what is 
identified as newsworthy using concepts of codes, televisuality and liveness.  
In a similar vein, Joshua Meyrowitz (1993) has identified a typology of 
metaphorical constructs that identify the main ways of seeing and conceiving 
the nature of television (and wider visual media field). The three metaphors 
are medium as vessel/conduit, medium as language, and medium as 
environment. The former is the most common in collective perception, and 
Meyrowitz notes that study of media content is often “medium-free” in that 
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‘the focus on media content tends to minimize the attention given to the 
nature of the particular medium that holds or sends the message’ (ibid, p.57). 
Whilst the latter recalls the media theory of Marshall McLuhan and Harold 
Innis, and medium as language is essentially a focus on media grammar 
(expressive variables such as camera angles, or production techniques), study 
across all three allows for complex and explorative media analysis to occur, 
building common bridges across critical traditions. Individually these provide 
‘one clear way of seeing’ together they ‘flesh-out our understanding of mass 
media’ (Meyrowitz, 1980).  
In his 1998 article, where he refers to the ‘multi-faceted’ and ‘multifarious 
nature of television’ as an object of critical study, Corner further identifies 
five different aspects of television, ‘each one of which can receive varying 
levels of emphasis in a study, or perhaps none at all’ (1998, p.148). These 
have similarly influenced the thinking of this work and it is useful to highlight 
each (in an abridged form) here:  
First of all, there is television as institution, an industry and its  
organisations, framed by policy and corporate management.  
Second, there is television as making, the focus on  
professional culture and professional practice…  
Third, there is television as representation and form, an aesthetic framing…
Fourth, there is television as a sociocultural phenomenon,  
deeply interconnected with high politics, with the shifting  
circumstances of the public sphere and civil society, with popular  
culture and with the changing character of the home and of domestic values.  
Finally, there is television as technology, a scientific experiment  
 becoming both a household item and the increasingly powerful  
resource for a changing social aesthetic. 
(1998, pp.151-159) 
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This research — essentially a chronological exploration of BBC coverage of 
the Troubles ultimately producing a comprehensive but dynamic overview of 
three decades of broadcasting history — will journey across all five aspects 
but directs greatest prominence to the primary texts themselves as they 
pertain to the issue of representation. Representation will be dealt with 
directly in relation to the source materials, shaped by a consideration and 
understanding of the content, grammar and wider media environment.  
As Halloran has argued:  
Over the years there has been a growing appreciation that  
the whole communication process needs to be studied, and that  
includes those who provide (including their institutions) as well as  
the nature of what is provided…[the] intentions, aims, purposes,  
policies organisation frameworks, modes of operation, professional  
values, funding, general circumscriptions, external pressures and  
ideological considerations all need to be taken into account’ (1998, p.19).  
This checklist serves a useful purpose and indicates a methodological 
pluralism must be adopted. In so doing, a multiperspectivist approach has 
been adopted. Douglas Kellner is a strong proponent of such a focus, 
deploying ‘a multitude of theories and methods of interpretation to provide 
more many-sided readings and critiques’ (2003, p.58). As he argues, ‘the 
more interpretive perspectives one can bring to a cultural artefact, the more 
comprehensive and stronger one's reading may be’ (ibid, p.98). In accordance 
with these ideals, the evidence gathered for this study will be closely read 
through two interpretive modes of textual analysis, content analysis and 
semiotics, that draw on established techniques of media and cultural studies 
 51
and combine to offer a developed and nuanced close reading. The use of such 
methods initially provide a body of evidence to draw upon before permitting 
detailed expiration in relation to the research questions proposed.  
Collier (2001) outlines a basic structural model for working with image based 
media that was adhered to throughout research. His four stage circular 
process advocates commencing and concluding with open ended analysis, 
while a more analytical focus should occur during the middle phases. This 
approach then provides the ‘opportunity to respond to larger patterns within 
the whole that may reveal the new and unforeseen, that provide significant 
meaning to otherwise chaotic details’ and a complex corpus (ibid, p.39) 
During the initial stages, a ‘thorough familiarity with the character and 
content of the visual records’ was sought, with an initial aim being an 
understanding of what patterns emerge in BBC reporting of the Troubles and 
an identification of ‘recurrent and contrastive elements’ (ibid, p.40). The 
content analysis that occurred was recorded in a detailed database — Collier’s 
“inventory” — before being subjected to semiotic analysis in the final phase 
with a search for meaning, symbolism and significance.  
In line, with the above, it is to be stressed again that this is an archival based 
research project and the audio-visual television archives form the foundation 
of this inquiry. To quote Corner, such ‘work is often an intensive, indeed 
laborious, kind of empirical study, a search for and then a processing of data’; 
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yet, as he then states, these moments, ‘properly explored and interpreted, can 
turn contingency and the circumstantial into pattern’ (Corner, 2003, p.274).  
Clear patterns were discerned in the broadcasting analysed.  
These are then supported by a wider body of secondary text literature 
relevant to the research across the following areas: image/visuals; the media/
news; the BBC and the broader political and institutional framework it 
occupies; conflict reporting; and terrorism. This literature includes academic 
study, books and journal articles, material written by journalists (including 
memoirs), material written about the BBC, material written by the BBC 
(official documents/letters/minutes/transcripts/reports), and additional 
relevant newspaper cuttings from local and national press. 
Visual Theories 
For many theorists, it is the visual sense that dominates. Fyfe and Law claim 
that ‘depiction, picturing and seeing are ubiquitous features of the process by 
which most human beings come to know the world as it really is for 
them’ (cited by Rose, 2016, p.3) and for John Berger, this is because ‘seeing 
comes before words’ (2008, p.7). Martin Jay (cited by Rose, 2016, p.3) uses 
the term ocular-centrism to describe the increasing centrality of the visual to 
Western society, and is here echoing the saturation notion of Asa Burger: ‘we 
have moved from a logocentric (word centred) to an occulocentric (image 
centred) world, with sight exercising hegemony or domination over our other 
senses’ (1995, p.79). According to Kress and van Leeuwen ‘the dominant 
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visual language is now controlled by the global cultural/technological 
empires of the mass media’ (1996, p.4) and despite suggestions, or what Rose 
terms assumptions, ‘that in premodern societies, visual images were not 
especially important, partly because there were so few of them in circulation’, 
the power of the image can be traced back to ancient civilisation (Rose, 2016, 
p.3).  
Even when modern humans first started using base pictorial and written 
systems, messages were created by one for another to view directly. For most 
of recorded history, communication was conducted without the benefit of 
mass media of any kind. Early empires, however, desired to distribute 
messages and promote matters of state and foreign affairs via images to large 
numbers of illiterate people. David Perlmutter suggests two main remedies 
for this technological gap; first, pictures could simply be shown to massed 
groups of people. When the emperors of Rome, for example, conducted 
triumphal parades, slaves walked the route displaying elaborate paintings 
showing scenes of battle or foreign lands. Second, most ancient rulers 
resorted to commemorating and immortalising their position and prestige 
through mass(ive) communication. Ramses II, the thirteenth-century BCE 
Egyptian pharaoh, portrayed his actions at the battle of Kadesh on the 100 
foot walls of a temple, whilst, the helical relief frieze of Trajan’s column 
shows the Emperor’s victorious military campaigns against the Dacians. The 
Assyrians employed similar images and epigraphs, decorating palaces with 
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reliefs illustrating the cruelty dispensed to enemy prisoners of war and 
intended to awe Bronze Age ambassadors (2014).  
Perlmutter has identified central developments as the fifteenth-century era of 
printmaking, facilitating ‘the mass production and distribution of identical 
images’ and then ‘the invention of photography in the 1840s [that] allowed 
the “capturing" of an event’ (2006, p.52). Rose traces visual developments 
across multiple fields, from scientific knowledge, to philosophy and tourism, 
granting particular prominence to Michel Foucault (regarding power and 
knowledge), Paul Virilio (regarding speed and the vision machine), and Jean 
Baudrillard (regarding simulacrum and spectacle). All three signify the 
centrality of the visual to postmodernity and Rose quotes the proclamation of 
Mirzoeff that ‘the postmodern is a visual culture’ (2016, p.4).   6
As part of the major points identified regarding current visual culture 
discourse, Rose foregrounds the importance of looking carefully at images. 
The work of John Berger is used to support this analytic stance, advocating a 
careful look at what is shown, how it is shown, and with what effects (2008). 
Berger uses art paintings of the female nude in Western art to exemplify this 
“way of seeing”, referring to the fact ‘we never look just at one thing; we are 
always looking at the relation between things and ourselves’ (ibid, p.9). It is 
then the ‘specificities of practice’ (Rose, 2016, p.21) that are crucial in gaining 
 Rose in fact details Mirzoeff’s argument that because of the constructed nature of visual 6
experiences in contemporary culture, ‘the modern relation between seeing and true knowing 
has been broken’ (2016, p.4) A particularly ripe area of future study beyond the historical 
period of this text, would focus on the BBC moving into the hyper-visual (to borrow from 
Baudrillard) era of 24 hour rolling news, digital technologies and the online sphere, amidst 
the elimination of global boundaries in a post-9/11 mediatised world. 
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an understanding of an image and Rose accordingly interprets three sites at 
where meaning is made — the production of the image, the site of the image, 
and the audience of the image (2016). Three further aspects, termed 
“modalities” by Rose, can be found in each site and, to quote in full, these 
‘contribute to a critical understanding of images: 
Technological: Mirzoeff defines a visual technology as “any  
form of apparatus designed either to be looked at or to enhance natural 
vision, from oil paintings to television and the Internet”. 
Compositional: Compositionality refers to the specific material qualities of an 
image or visual object. When an image is made, it draws on a number of 
formal strategies: content, colour and spatial organisation, for example. 
Often, particular forms of these strategies tend to occur together…  
Social: This is very much a shorthand term. What I mean it to refer to are the 
range of economic, social and political relations, institutions and practices 
that surround an image and through which it is seen and used (2016, p.25). 
It is useful to pursue these “modalities” and relate them to the context of 
broadcast news, and “specificities of practice”.  
Within the production of an image, aspects of form, meaning, and effect are 
important. These are the technical qualities influencing, and enabling, 
recording, and impacting directly on output. The compositionally of an image 
allows classification into a genre, which features shared objects, locations, 
codes and elements, which will often recur repeatedly in other related 
images. This allows a visual thesaurus and catalogue to be traced and 
identified. The social aspect of production are ‘the economic processes in 
which cultural production is embedded that shape visual imagery’ (Rose, 
2016, p.29). Within broadcast news, and the public service broadcasting of 
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the BBC, a number of economic and cultural aspects drive production and 
direct the visual ideology.  
Rose’s second aspect is the site of the image itself and there are significant 
parallels here with the previous production aspect, particularly across the 
formal components of an image in the technological and compositional 
modalities (such as focus, spatiality and subject gaze). This sits neatly with a 
semiotic approach that probes into the mise-en-scène of an image and 
identifies “myths” or “codes” that seek to pull the viewer ‘into 
complicity’ (2016, p.33). Social practices of the (broadcasting) institution — 
how they present and embody particularly connotations of their own — can 
profoundly alter the representation of an image (and video).  
Finally, Rose draws on John Fiske, who believes the site of the audience (his 
“audiencing,”) is central to the meaning of an image, and how these are 
‘renegotiated, or even rejected, by particular audiences watching in specific 
circumstances’ (2016, p.38). The composition of an image, including its 
formal and technical properties, seek to dictate how it is viewed. Within the 
news, the accompanying interpretation offered by the reporter/journalist 
seeks to drive understanding through provision of key factual information. 
The social site of the television in the home, through which the image is 
disseminated, carries particular ways of seeing, whilst the technological 
presentation of the news, allied to the serious, important context promoted 
through codes (discussed below) further impacts how images are looked at.  
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In adopting qualitative content analysis and semiotic study, there is a strong 
interpretive approach to this work. Future research, incorporating interviews 
and ethnographic study, would develop understanding of “audiencing” and 
“ways of seeing” in relation to the Troubles in greater depth, however, it is 
beyond the scope of this work. Despite this, Rose’s conclusion to her journey 
through these methodological tools is appropriate, since  
it is possible and necessary to consider the viewing practices of one spectator 
without using such techniques because that spectator is you (ibid, p.46). 
News: Televisuality 
With the image occupying this privileged position, an intrinsic value of 
modern journalism — across both print and television — is the need for news 
to be visual. News correspondent Jim Lederman has asserted that ‘television 
news is enslaved to images’, interestingly declaring that ‘if an idea cannot be 
recorded in the form of an image, it will rarely, if ever, be given extensive 
time on a nightly network newscast’ (cited by Perlmutter, 2014 emphasis my 
own). These newscasts, ‘constitute a highly ordered regime that directs, 
shapes and controls meaning’ (Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2007, p.16). Citing 
Roland Barthes, Neil Postman wrote that ‘television has achieved the status 
of “myth”…a way of thinking so deeply embedded in our consciousness that it 
is invisible. That is now the way of television’ (2005, p.79). Postman is here 
suggesting that television exits as (more than) the dominant epistemology, 
with society unaware of its dominion. The reality (represented by television) 
is natural, and television is in turn, the natural format for representation.  
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Caldwell’s theory of televisuality argues everything is explicitly designed to be 
viewed on television; nothing has meaning or context or a basis in reality 
unless it can be represented through the medium. His conceptual and 
ideological framework indeed sees the subject of television to be television 
itself, in line with the thinking of Postman; the style of television ‘long seen as 
a mere signifier and vessel for content, issues, and ideas, has now itself 
become one of televisions most privileged and showcased signifieds’ (1995, p.
5). Caldwell was himself responding to the theoretical work of John Fiske and 
Henry Jenkins; their audience studies and ethnography focused on 
deciphering reception/text interactions that moved agency away from the 
production aspect of television. Caldwell viewed television, ‘in several 
important programming and institutional areas’ as moving from a ‘word-
based rhetoric and transmission’ to one of a ‘a visually based mythology, 
framework, and aesthetic based on an extreme self-consciousness of 
style’ (ibid, p.4). His discussion is based around various case studies of the 
visual excesses of American mass market television throughout the 1980s, 
which he proclaims to be a function of market conditions (an economic crisis) 
forcing broadcasters to compete for audience share through a ‘self-
consciousness of style…a performance of style…television has come to flaunt 
and display style’ (ibid, p.5). Televisuality is then ultimately, for Caldwell, ‘a 
phenomenon of communicative and semiotic over-abundance’ (1995, p.362, 
n35, emphasis in original).  
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Caldwell focuses throughout on the visual elements on television, and whilst 
based on a range of genres, rather than directly focusing on news, the six 
guiding principles he details develop his critique.  Televisuality firstly offers a 7
stylising performance, where ‘specific visual looks and stylisations could be 
marshalled for the spectacle’ (1995, p.5). This can include the graphic 
elements that make up a programme and is particularly evident in the codes 
utilised to connote authority, immediacy and professionalism in television 
news, refreshed periodically to reinvent the ‘stylistic wheel’ (ibid, p.6). In 
addition, it offers a programming phenomenon; a function of audience; a 
product of economic crisis; a structural inversion, where the ‘presentational 
status of style changed’; and an industrial product, where the production is ‘a 
product of shifting cultural and economic needs’ that requires ‘striking 
visuals and high-tech graphics’ (1995, p.7). Within television news, these are 
ultimately provided by dominant codes and liveness.  
News: Liveness 
Throughout Televisuality, Caldwell dismisses the ideology of liveness as 
myth. He argues that, ‘in high theory’ — across phenomenology in the 1960s, 
prescriptive aesthetics in the 1970s and poststructuralist analyses of the 
1980s — ‘the liveness paradigm will not die’ (1995, p.27). Neil Postman can 
here again be situated alongside Caldwell, similarly critiquing the 
phenomenon:  
 He does address the increasingly stylistic excesses of television news in a short aside, 7
stating such tendencies ‘continued to rear its ostensibly ugly head — even in the ethically 
pure confines of Peter Jennings's network news division’ (1995, p.4).
 60
We are by now so thoroughly adjusted to the ‘Now…this’ world  
of news — a world of fragments, where events stand alone, stripped of any 
connection to the past, or to the future, or to other events — that all 
assumptions of coherence have vanished (2005, p.110).  
Following the invention of television, broadcasting was a truly live medium 
where the time of transmission coincided with its inception (Auslander, 1999, 
p.12). Modelled on the aesthetics of live theatre, early television offered a 
temporal connection for the viewer, and Auslander foregrounds these 
theatrical origins of liveness as a search for intimacy. After the advent of 
recording technologies, the televisual practice evolved, however the principle 
of liveness as part of the ontology of television was retained (Marriott, 1995; 
Feuer, 1983). The term “live” was itself altered in its reference; ‘it is broadcast 
and received in the same moment and so always appears as 
“immediate”’ (Ellis, 1992, p.132). Caldwell notes the influence of McLuhan on 
the theory, with transmission and reception over distance breaking down 
boundaries of time and space and moving towards an ‘all at onceness’ (1995, 
p.28), and the idea of global village; Hoskins similarly identifies this debt 
owed to McLuhan. He, however, seeks to stress the fundamental importance 
of liveness as part of the 
attraction of the live “experience” [which] has led to its appropriation  
by television news…highly  constructed through news scripts,  
broadcast talk, and a whole range of visual cues (2004, p.50).  
As a code, liveness does not require the programme to actually be broadcast 
live; television news of course features live components (granted authority 
through specific codes and “cues”) and supported by pre-recorded packages 
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broadcast as if live. Bourdon identifies four types of live television, locating 
news reports, edited after shooting, inherently factual, and recorded in real 
life, within the “edited” sphere (2000). Yet with television news seeking to 
connote relevance, significance, factuality, and reliability, liveness persists as 
‘the dominant mode of orientation by broadcast news to events’ (Hoskins and 
O’Loughlin, 2007, p.34). The content of a news broadcast — the language, the 
facts, the images presented as bearing witness (of the aftermath initially; 
increasingly of the act itself in the 21st Century) — foreground an air of 
immediacy through their technological transmission across the airwaves. As a 
medium, television enhances intimacy by detailing what is going on, to who, 
where and when. The latter points towards the concept of time, a defining 
characteristic of the nature of television news, with the basic rhythmic self-
renewal cycle focusing on recapping events of the preceding hours.  Time 8
itself, through the “when” of a story, is a primary element of a journalist’s 
reporting rubric, and liveness then manifests itself through the visual and 
aural style of television, and through the apparatus itself.  Indeed even when 9
television is not broadcasting genuinely live (as in the recorded segments of 
news), it mythologises the act in order to access reality.  
 This cycle has of course diminished over the last two decades to the extent liveness entails 8
‘the decreasing of the temporal distance between event, recording, transmission, and 
reception’ to a point where such moments now ‘become simultaneous’; Hoskins and 
O'Loughlin further identify problems caused by this relationship as leading television 
towards ‘exploitation as a tool of terrorism’, citing the example of the second plane hitting 
the World Trade Centre Towers in 2001 (2007, p.25).  
 ‘The spoken mode of television news narrative usually carries the answers to the factual 9
questions of five Ws (who, what, when, where, why) and one H (how) in the story. These so-
called facts and figures fulfil the role of narrative…television news narrative does not display 
ambiguities or uncertainties, and this makes television news appear both authoritative and 
omniscient’ (Tomaščíková 2010, p.265). Further discussion of codes utilised in television 
news features later in this chapter. 
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Paul Virilio has drawn extensive parallels between visual technologies and 
military developments (1989, 2002); a shared metaphor between the camera 
and gun exists and Paul Landau states ‘the technologies of the gun and the 
camera themselves evolved in lockstep’, pointing to George Eastman of 
Kodak as a pivotal figure (2002, p.147). Stephanie Marriott, in her 
phenomenological study on live television, instead draws comparisons 
between live television and advancements in transportation (alongside 
communication); the two have compressed ‘distance through increased 
velocity’ and ‘places the one with the other’ (2007, p.33). Her case study 
analysis of ten live television events, from the Kennedy assassination of 1963 
to the London bombings of 2005, ultimately argues live television construct a 
simulacrum of liveness, dependent upon the presenter, images and sounds, 
and pre-recorded elements that, citing Tolson, are ‘embedded within and 
subordinate to this overarching live framing’ (ibid, p.44).  
Liveness for Jane Feuer is a model of how television continually (re)presents 
itself to an audience, and ‘positions the spectator into its “imaginary” of 
presence and immediacy’ (1983, p.14). This imaginary discourse is what 
allows programming to construct an effect of continuity and coherence — a 
‘temporal ordering on events’ (Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2007, p.24) — 
amidst a multiplicity of discreet elements. This is the paradox of television 
news; in order to connote order, and hold the values it desperately seeks, it 
must be broadcast live, yet (much of) the actuality it utilises (depends on) has 
been recorded (Bourdon, 2000, pp.544-545). Crisell points towards the codes 
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relied upon to sustain “liveness” when he identifies the components that 
television news programmes are characterised by:  
that of the film clips they contain, which were shot in the recent  
past, and the live context and simultaneous commentary provided  
by the newsreader or correspondent. The effect is to absorb the past  
into a kind of expanded present, the images seeming to be part of the  
same moment as the live asseverations of the news staff (2012, p.45).  
News: Codes 
Television news constructs, promotes and performs liveness through a 
number of codes, Bourdon’s ‘textual indices of liveness’ (2000, p.53). This 
includes aspects of televisuality, camerawork, editing, and broadcast talk that 
combine to establish authority over time and space. The latter has received 
significant attention on a sociolinguist level and its importance to liveness is 
stressed by Marriott (2007) and Hoskins and O’Loughlin: 
often it is the manner of telling that further dramatises news stories. Changes 
in pace, tone, and fluency of talk, for example, all contribute to the 
immediacy and urgency of reporting (2007, p.39).  
During the early experimental phases of television news broadcasting, ‘there 
were no guidelines’ as to the nature of the broadcast; 
Should television try to cover the significant news of the day comprehensively 
like first-class daily newspapers? Or should it restrict itself to reporting 
events for which it had film or other illustrative materials? When film or 
graphics were not available should they use the 'talking head' format and read 
the story straight into the camera? (Mickelson, 1998, p.8) 
Sig Mickelson was the first producer of CBS News, and, in identifying ‘the 
pre-war news show [as] not much more than radio dressed up with a few 
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stills and maps and some scratchy film’ (ibid), he sets forth what became 
persistent and dominant codes. These visual conventions derived from radio 
and theatre (as Auslander previously notes) and central to this is the seated 
anchor, directly addressing viewers and securing continuity. This serves the 
function of ritual, with news providing ‘variation’ alongside this requisite 
‘continuity’ (Hjarvard, 1994, p.314). Continuity exists in the fixed, privileged 
status of the news broadcast in the daily schedule, marking ‘the transitions 
from one type of aggregated audience to another’; whilst variety is provided 
by ‘new stories…perpetually introduced and pointing ahead to the next news 
slot’ (cited by Allan, 2010, p.135).  Indeed ‘even the pre-scripted historical 10
coverage of pre-recorded actuality footage involves the newsreader in the 
production of talk at the emergent now of the live transmission’ and live news 
reports, in addition, involve a 'constantly moving out to and speaking from 
the space of unfolding events' (Hjarvard, 1994, p.316). These two modes 
exemplify the discourse space and a story space of Morse as invoked by 
Marriott: 
Story and discourse ... are two planes of language, the former suppressing 
subjectivity in order to refer to an objective and separate realm of space and 
time inhabited by others (he, she and it), the latter a plane of subjectivity in 
which a person, “I,” adopts responsibility for an utterance and calls for 
intersubjective relations with a “you” in the here and now (2007, p.66).  
This up-to-the minute narrative (the now) projects a particular place (here) 
where, as Hall et al. explain:  
 Allan uses Morse to further elaborate on the dynamics of scheduling; news broadcasts 10
‘occur at key thresholds in the day between work and leisure…which aid the transition 
between one reality and another’ (2010, p. 135). 
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The facts must be arranged, in the course of programming, so as to  
present an intelligible “story”: hence the process of presentation will reflect 
the explanations and interpretations which appear most plausible, credible or 
adequate to the broadcaster, his [or her] editorial team and the expert 
commentators he [or she] consults. Above all, the known facts of a situation 
must be translated into intelligible audio-visual signs, organised as a 
discourse. TV cannot transmit “raw historical” events as such, to its 
audiences: it can only transmit pictures of, stories, informative talk or 
discussion about, the events it selectively treats (2007, p.339). 
The process of presentation uses codified linguistic and visual definitions of 
reality, and myths of immediacy and authority (and liveness), designed, on an 
ideological plane, to promote a process of representation. A viewer must 
recognise and understand such codes and conventions in order to participate 
in the construction of sense and reality.  
Within the discourse space, then, exists the news presenter, who adopts a 
formal dress code and is thus coded as professional and authoritative. These 
individuals avoid ‘gestural signs which might connote emotion or 
involvement in the news stories they present…the mythic meaning that news 
presenters are neutral and authoritative is constructed from these 
connotations’ (Bignell, 2002, p.110). Steadily addressing the camera 
(constructing liveness and demanding attention of the viewer) head-on, in 
medium/close up, and neutrally lit, signifies the presenter's role in mediating 
between the viewer and the other components of the programme’ (ibid, p.
111). The presenter, as omniscient narrator, exists as a physical 
representation of the broadcasting ‘institution which, in ideological terms, is 
to be preserved and reaffirmed by the “personality” of the newsreader’ (Allan, 
2010, p.115); This ‘institutional voice’ (Hartley 1982, p.110) speaks resolutely 
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with  solemnity (and with received pronunciation on the BBC for the three 
decade period of this study). Invariably there will be a familiar (and expected) 
greeting or opening remark — “good evening” — and the language is always 
in the present tense; even when providing a bridge towards pre-recorded 
segments, it remains so — “Mark Devenport reports from Belfast.” Further 
deictic features serve to anchor the articulation of time and space, supporting 
and enhancing liveness.  
Authority is marked by the televisuality of the title sequence, both loud and 
dramatic; dominated by major brass and percussive chords, it is an urgent 
demand for attention connoting the importance and drama of what will 
follow and this then is a ‘syntagms of signs’ (Bignell, 2002, p.110). The 
sequence further establishes the mythic status of news (through sophisticated 
computer graphics, ticking clocks, spinning globes, and constant movement) 
that provide a ‘recognisable “brand image” which differentiates it from its 
competitors’ (ibid, p.113). As noted above, such sequences are refreshed and 
updated, maintaining Caldwell’s stylistic wheel.  
Early BBC news reports were initiated by a static shot of a communications 
mast with a repeated multitude of radiating rings extending far out into the 
sky, signifying the transmission reaching a vast audience. Circling this was 
the title “BBC NEWS” in bold, capital letters, here signifying the importance 
of the organisation and the broadcast. This would soon evolve into a static 
shot of a particular area on a map, indicative of the headline story which was 
to follow. Across the lower third of the screen the titular letters “BBC NEWS” 
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were displayed and repeated, akin to a typewriter or teletype moving across 
the screen with constantly updated information. This gradually fades to be 
replaced by a large “NEWS” which is accompanied by the presenter (in voice 
over) providing summaries of key headlines. Further updates led to inception 
of a constantly ticking clock, shaped akin to a globe. As this fades, a studio 
shot dominates showing the presenter(s) gathering scripts and ready for 
imminent duty.  
Such visual updates were initially infrequent; as the BBC moved through the 
1980s, updates occurred more regularly and there was a preponderance of 
fast moving digital graphics. In the 1990s for example, the nine o'clock news 
featured a revolving globe ‘connoting worldwide coverage, and as the camera 
pulled back and panned to the right the globe was revealed as the centrepiece 
of a huge shield set in a coat of arms, connoting authority and 
tradition’ (Bignell, 2002, p.115) As the camera continues moving, revealing 
the sheer scale of the set (a spectacular theatrical space approaching excess 
and hyperbole), the dim outline of presenters can be seen, lit by a warm blue 
light, connoting control and authority (the police), eminence (blue blood) and 
quality (blue ribbon) (Feisner and Reed, 2014, p.187).   
All the above sits within the studio mode of John Corner (1985), where 
broadcasting is live and located within the studio itself. This contrasts with 
his location mode where the focus is on actuality film, edited to create a 
coherent entity. Altering between modes engages the viewer and encourages 
them to ‘actively assemble these segments for himself or herself’ (Bignell, 
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2002, p.126). For Fiske, the codes that aid in this entire process have been 
shaped, shared, and formulated through culture over time. He proposes three 
social levels of encoding a television event that are used to generate and 
disseminate meaning: 
Level 1: Reality: appearance, dress, make-up, environment,  
behaviour, speech, gesture, expression, sound, etc.  
 
These are encoded electronically by technical codes such as those of:  
 
Level 2: Representation: the camera, lighting, editing, music,  
sound which transmit the conventional representation codes  
which shape the representation of narrative, conflict,  
character, actor, dialogue, setting, casting, etc.  
 
Level 3: Ideology: aspects which are organised into  
a coherent and socially acceptable form by such  
ideological codes as individuality, patriarchy,  
class, race, materialism, capitalism, etc.  
(Fiske, 1987, p.4-6). 
 News: Values 
Simultaneously with the encoding that takes place across these levels, every 
story covered as part of television news has been judged using a criterion of 
newsworthiness. Hoskins and O’Loughlin advocate a ‘medium-specific 
alternative to Johan Galtung and Mari Holmboe Ruge’s (1965) “news values” 
paradigm’ (2007, p.23); this paradigm, based on a seminal article exploring 
the selectivity criteria of three major international crisis in four Norwegian 
newspapers, remains an important concept in journalism, media studies and 
communication studies today. Suggesting these disciplines have failed to 
‘think outside of this framework or to comprehensively challenge it,’ Hoskins 
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and O’Loughlin instead position ‘liveness’ as central to the nature and impact 
of contemporary television news (ibid, p.31). Their challenge focuses on the 
first of Galtung & Ruge’s eight main (“culture-free,” a profoundly problematic 
phraseology) and four supplementary (“culture-bound”) hypotheses. Using 
an extended radio metaphor throughout their paper, Galtung & Ruge position 
frequency as the: 
time-span needed for the event to unfold itself and acquire  
meaning…the more similar the frequency of the event is to the  
frequency of the news medium, the more probable that it will be  
recorded as news by that news medium (1965, p.66).  
Writing forty years after Galtung and Ruge, during which time ‘the media 
world has changed from one of scarcity to one of abundance’ (Meissner, 
2015), it is the transformation of production and presentation (what can be 
identified as media convergence; see (Jenkins, 2006) that leads Hoskins and 
O’Loughlin to argue immediacy reigns and liveness dominates.  It is useful to 11
note here, that, despite their work being accepted and validated by empirical 
research, Galtung and Ruge actually critique the news practices of Western 
media and sought to ultimately use their article as impetus for change; ‘The 
policy implications of this article are rather obvious: try and counteract all 
twelve factors’ (1965, p.84).  
 Further issue with Galtung and Ruge is taken by Harcup and O’Neill: ‘Galtung and Ruge 11
began by suggesting a list of factors and then put forward hypotheses—rather than beginning 
with an empirical study of what actually appeared in newspapers’. Harcup and O’Neill sought 
to test the initial supposition of 12 news value factors through close examination of some 
1,200 UK news stories, identifying a number of issues and proposing an alternate ten 
requirements. Of particular note is ‘when dealing with something as “opaque” as news values 
(to use Hall’s term), it appears there can be little escape from subjective 
interpretation’ (2001, p.8, emphasis my own). 
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Regarding frequency, and with the focus on newspapers, Galtung and Ruge 
suggest a murder sits neatly into the daily news cycle; a number of deaths in a 
prolonged battle, however, would be framed in the context of the battle and 
not the individual life (a preliminary removal of the body from combat). 
Watson similarly uses the example of a murder, stating it is more 
‘newsworthy than the slow progress to prosperity of a Third World 
country' (2008, p.134) and it is here possible to identify early parallels with 
the nature of BBC coverage of the Troubles.  
With this first factor, Galtung and Ruge identify threshold, unambiguity, 
meaningfulness, consonance, unexpectedness, continuity, and composition, 
along with reference to elite nations, reference to elite people, reference to 
persons, reference to something negative.  These are cumulative and 12
compensatory; a story is more newsworthy if it meets multiple factors, whilst 
the absence of one can be compensated by the presence of another. Reports 
with a high news value will therefore generally appear near the beginning of a 
news bulletin. After presenting these factors, three hypotheses are declared:  
 1. The more events satisfy the criteria mentioned,  
the more likely that they will be registered as news (selection).  
2. Once a news item has been selected what makes it newsworthy 
according to the factors will be accentuated (distortion).  
 3. Both the process of selection and the process of distortion 
will take place at all steps in the chain from event  
to reader (replication)  
(Galtung and Ruge, 1965, p. 71). 
 As Charlotte Ryan states, ‘there is no end to lists of news criteria’ (1991, p.31). Caple and 12
Bednarek provide a useful overview survey of the similarities and differences across theories 
concerning the news value concept (2013). 
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In drawing on theoretical foundations based on principles of human 
behavioural research, Galtung and Ruge claim the first eight news value 
factors  of their taxonomy are general aspects of perception psychology; they, 
by extension, propose journalists use the same logic, employing these 
selective and distortive behaviours in identifying and “tuning into” the news 
“phenomena” by virtue of human nature. The analogy is concluded by 
suggesting the newspaper reader replicates this process at the final stage in 
the chain. The overarching factors have faced a range of contestation, 
particularly in the overlapping nature of several binaries (a point coincided in 
the original article), and in the oppositional nature of others. Palmer (1998) 
relates continuity with consequence (the latter can lead to a story being 
extended into the former); McQuail points to the fact events involving elite 
nations or elite persons often fulfil the threshold category, whilst the 
negativity of a natural disaster allows frequency, lacks ambiguity and 
produces many examples of personification; he similarly suggests that truly 
unexpected events will by their very nature be a central news event due to 
their lack of consonance (2010, pp.259-283). Watson believes questions of 
unexpectedness and consonance sit together in unresolved opposition (2008, 
p. 136-137).  
Jeremy Tunstall’s Journalists at Work was one of the first texts to 
comprehensively address Galtung & Ruge. He stressed the limitations of the 
original study, pointing towards the impact of news agencies on the news 
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items examined, and an absence of consideration for the ‘regional element’ of 
the ‘editionizing phenomenon’ (1971, p.21, italics in original). Yet, whilst 
critiquing an ignorance of the visual aspect of news, Tunstall also identified a 
strength, in that the ‘coherent set of hypotheses’ could be applied across other 
news contexts, including ‘local coverage in weekly newspapers’ and television 
news itself (ibid, p.21-22).   
Transposing this taxonomy on to television news, Tunstell identifies four 
points of difference:  
1. In TV the visual is given pre-eminence.  
The possession of film footage of an event will often  
increase the prominence given to a news story.  
2. News items which include film of “our own reporters” interviewing or 
commentating on a story are preferred.  
3. TV makes use of a smaller fraction of the number of stories the newspapers 
carry, and even major items are short compared with newspaper coverage.  
4. There is a strong preference for “hard” stories or actuality on TV news.  
(ibid, p.22)  
For the determinist view of Conley & Lamble, news values exist in the 
‘chemistry of an event, comment or circumstance that combine to produce 
news… 
….News values will determine whether stories are to be pursued.  
They will determine whether, if pursued, they will then be published.  
They will determine, if published, where the stories will be  
placed in news presentation (Conley & Lamble, 2006, p.42) 
Stuart Allan has identified the wider concepts of gatekeeping and agenda 
setting as overlapping with news values, and acknowledges that whilst these 
‘are always changing over time and are inflected differently from one news 
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organisation to the next’, they have remained ‘relatively consistent 
criteria’ (Allan 2010, p.74). It is therefore possible to append a final 
determination to Conley and Lamble: visualisations are central to news 
values in the broadcasting sphere. In utilising carefully composed, edited, 
and presented visuals, reporters can provide a sphere of understanding to 
events, and as Gaye Tuchman succinctly states, ‘routinize the 
unexpected’ (1973). This idea was reiterated by Bell who 
identifies homogeneity in the format of all news stories and  
writes generally about the similarity of the use of the lead  
or the lead paragraph and its structure, the use of headlines,  
the use of news sources, and journalistic devices such as the  
who, what, when, where, why and how, which ensure that  
all news stories basically contain a certain type of information  
(cited by Harrison, 2000 p.109).  
This homogeneity is a step towards the mythologising of news, where a 
certain type of information is replicated across all stories and each has 
therefore achieved the magical minimum standards of news value. Herbert 
Gans, states ‘the values in the news are not necessarily those of 
journalists’ (2004 p.39) and indeed what is important to a reporter on the 
ground (for example the Falls Road) may be different to what is important to 
the editor and producer in the newsroom (for example in Belfast). This may 
in turn differ from the controllers and directors (for example in London) who 
are operating at the discretion of Governors and a board (for example 
ensconced in Broadcasting House). This then leads to a fundamental problem 
for the concept of news values: that of ideology. Bell attributes these news 
values to the ‘ideologies and priorities held in society’ (1991, p.156) which 
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echoes the views of Stuart Hall who sees a professional ideology within 
television news operating on two levels of signification.  
For images, this involves the formal news value of the visual sign itself and 
the second level of signification is then the ideological level of connoted 
themes and interpretations. For Hall,  
news values appear as a set of neutral, routine practices:  
but we need, also, to see formal news values as an  
ideological  structure — to examine these rules as the  
 formalization and operationalization of an ideology of news  
(1973, p.182, italics in original).  
Curran and Seaton identify a different ideology operating within the news; 
some stories that meet the value criteria of an important event are rather 
created and staged solely for the benefit of the news media; these ‘items of 
news are not events at all, that is in the sense of occurrences in the real world 
which take place independently of the media’ (Curran and Seaton, 1997, p.
330). Whilst primarily referring to the public relations ‘organisations, 
professions and skills aimed at manipulating the media’ (ibid, p.330), here 
we can observe a link to terrorism and its symbiotic relationship with mass 
media.   
Hoge, implicitly identifying terrorism as satisfying the news media factors of  
Galtung and Ruge, argues the mass media cover terrorism because 
it is different, dramatic, and potentially violent. It frequently  
develops over a period of time, occurs in exotic locations, offers a clear 
confrontation, involves bizarre characters, and is politically noteworthy. 
Finally it is of concern to the public (cited by Farnen, 1990, p.103).  
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Whilst perhaps presenting a rather romantic description of the act, terrorism 
is inherently newsworthy; because a hierarchy of broadcasting must exist by 
the very nature of the medium (and the BBC present stories in top to bottom 
hierarchy) all events cannot be covered equally and some such events must be 
more significant than others. Shoemaker sees news values as varying in 
intensity from one event to another and, whilst terrorism events as media 
events approaches a tautology, an event being newsworthy does not equate to 
it being guaranteed coverage by the media (2006). Daniel Schorr astutely 
observes that ‘many people have found the royal road to identity is to do 
something violent,’ (cited by Farnen, 1990, p.103), foregrounding the 
religious and political motivations of the Troubles in Ireland. Amidst the 
three decades of violence, higher levels of human and infrastructure damage 
(both in numerical sense of threshold and meaningfulness and in relation to 
elite persons and elite locations) resulted in greater news coverage.  
Peter Vasterman, in seeking to move from media events to “media hypes,” 
ultimately takes issue with the use of such news value criterion: 
This approach is based on the presumption that  
journalists actually report events. But news is not out there,  
journalists do not report news, they produce news.  
They construct it, they construct facts,  
they construct statements and  they construct a  
context in which these facts make sense.  
They reconstruct “a” reality (1995). 
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This constructed reality of violence, terrorism, conflict and war — that results 
in a product called “news” being formed through signs, codes, and ideologies 
— is complicated by issues of framing, sanitisation, and compassion fatigue. 
News: Framing 
The notion of media events — the embodiment of liveness, occurring in real 
time, and pre-planned around personality — as conceived by Katz and Dayan 
neatly sets forth three categories: coronation, contest, and conquest (1994). 
Coronations include monarchic events, funerals and commemorations; 
contests are sporting and political ceremonies where identifiable parties 
compete; conquests are rare but consequential, dramatising major political or 
diplomatic initiatives. All embody the ‘transformative function’ (ibid, p.20) of 
television. Stephanie Marriott modifies these categories slightly, proposing 
the alternatives of ‘ceremonial occasions, sporting matches, catastrophes, 
one-off spectaculars…’ (Marriott, 2007, p.41). The common element between 
these classifications are the implicit use of Erving Goffman’s framing theory.  
Broadly, framing analysis addresses cognitive structures, using elements of 
organisation and analysis of human experience (from a sociological 
background) that guide representation and perceptions of reality (Goffman, 
1974). Within the field of communications, the application of concepts of 
framing to the mass media seeks to understand what is included within the 
text, and what interpretation the creator (individually or institutionally, 
consciously or unconsciously) is seeking to promote. This promotion can be 
 77
by a process and identification of inclusion, emphasis or exclusion — who to 
quote, what to quote and where to quote for example — with the frame 
providing  
analytic resources to address the important distinction  
between what is said and what is meant. Frames could be  
said to provide the appropriate context to make  
appropriate sense of what is said (Smith, 2006). 
A media frame is then what can usefully be deemed a dynamic organising 
mechanism, and, across literature, Entman’s definition of a media frame is 
widely cited. Identifying selection and salience as central, Entman declares 
the act of framing is to 
select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a 
communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem 
definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment 
recommendation for the item described. (1993, p.52, italics in original).  
Notions of subjectivity, objectivity, persuasion and bias thus apply, in this 
desire to delimit a news event. At this stage, news values can be invoked as 
contributing directly to media frames in the determination of what and how 
stories are covered. Pan and Kosicki have focused on news discourses as 
verbal texts (yet acknowledge the ‘commonalities between visual and verbal 
languages’ (1993, p.71.n1) and identify four categories of framing devices, 
representing four ‘structural dimensions…syntactical structure, script 
structure, thematic structure, and rhetorical structure’ (ibid, p.59). Reese 
seeks to move beyond this, proclaiming frames to be more than just phrases; 
they are rather the ‘organizing principles that are socially shared and 
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persistent over time, that work symbolically to meaningfully structure the 
social world’ (2001, p.9).  
These frames — the angle, or “lens” of the story — are vital in media, and in 
the reporting of terrorism, conflict, and war. How a story is covered is shaped 
by the aforementioned news values, by ideology, by previous incidences and 
future intentions, through the available visuals (including use of iconic 
images), and ‘the interpretation of events offered by credible sources, to 
convey dominant meanings, to make sense of the facts, to focus the 
headlines, and to structure the story line’ (Norris et al., 2004, p.4). 
Furthermore, cultural associations impact; what can be framed as a “freedom 
of the press” incidence by (much of the) West, is rather viewed in Arabic 
media through a frame of “respect” (cf. coverage of the Mohammed 
cartoons). Norris et al., further suggest ‘that terrorist events are commonly 
understood through news “frames” that simplify, prioritize, and structure the 
narrative flow of events’ (ibid, p.10); the Troubles, as will be detailed, were 
repeatedly presented through a frame that abbreviated and condemned the 
complexity of the background of events. Once this failing had occurred and 
progressed (across the media landscape, print and broadcast) it was 
impossible to rectify. Whilst strictly factual, and stylistically neutral, 
information about an event can be provided (the when and where of a 
shooting or bombing), the meaning and motivation behind an act remains 
complex and contested. The ‘assemblages of words, visual images, and action 
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patterns’ that are utilised to create coherence and frame these events are 
important to consider (Levin, 2003, p.28, italics in original). 
Related to Goffman’s framing is the agenda setting theory refined by Cohen; 
this is in turn tied to news values and notions of “gatekeepers” where the 
press are ‘stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think 
about’ (Cohen, 1963, p.13). The audience — whether reader or viewer — is, 
and was, invariably presented with a social reality where terrorism, conflict, 
and war are absent of the image of death.  
News: Sanitisation 
The destruction of the Twin Towers in New York City was ‘totally 
unexpected...the unimaginable impossible’ (Zizek, 2002, p.15). Yet the attack 
existed in fantasy; alluded to by the news media, occurring in the “reality” of 
popular cinema. Virilio’s city of the instant emerged on September 11th 2001; 
the second attack and subsequent collapse were watched live — and 
continuously replayed — across the world. In the mass-mediated world of 
modern warfare the spectacle dominates, from the ruin of the World Trade 
Centre, to the “shock and awe” aerial bombardments of Baghdad and 
Belgrade. The currency of terrorism is the manipulation of images and 9/11 
exists as a global media event, Marriot’s “catastrophic event,” staged for its 
visual and symbolic impact. Accompanying this “absolute” event was an ‘even 
more real eruption of death’ (Baudrillard, 2001). However this was entirely 
symbolic; despite the death toll being some 3,000, little was witnessed, 
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visible, or presented. Those that were (the falling bodies; see conclusion) 
were redacted from visual representations, too graphic and unexpected to 
frame.  The dead therefore existed as abstractions in this mediated act of 13
terror, where ‘the telegenic qualities of such atrocities constantly reinforce 
their evocative power’ (Virilio, 2000a, p.21). David Campbell emphasises this 
aspect: 
We saw these tragic victims, small specks against the vast towers, leap from 
their offices, and then disappear into the realm of imagination. People spoke 
of appalling sights, but we did not see them. Witnesses revealed the presence 
of many body parts in the rubble, but television did not show them. Reports 
referred to “streets slick with blood,” but the video did not disclose it (2011). 
Military doctrines of force dominance and pure spectacle have been inverted, 
utilised by the other as a form of weaponry. This was the climax of escalation, 
where limited resources seek to maximise the resultant visualisations. It also 
signified a turning point: ‘a single man may well be able to bring about 
disasters... One man = total war’ (Virilio, 2000b, p.19). In September 2001, 
that man became Osama Bin Laden. Following the invasion of Iraq in 2003, 
reality was further de-realised with Saddam Hussein subjected to treatment 
similar to Bin Laden, his metonymic double. The destruction of a statue in 
Farduz Square Baghdad, occurred, and existed, solely as a media event, 
‘televised live and in a loop, before the eyes of the world’ (Virilio, 2005, p.
 Amidst the English language press of the Western media; the footage was shown live and 13
replayed on Telemundo and Univision, Spanish-language broadcast networks in the United 
States. This opens up significant questions, beyond the scope of this work, of cultural 
relationships with bloody imagery of violence, terror and war. As a further example towards 
this idea, Andrew Hoskins reproduces an extract of Robert Fisk’s Independent article 
concerning images of Uday and Qusay Hussein following their deaths: ‘Arabs have never 
been squeamish about death. They see too much of it. It is we Westerners…who agonise over 
moral sensitivities at the mere sight of a mortuary mugshot’ (Hoskins, 2004, p.103).
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88).  It was the symbolic overthrow of a dictator (and response to the twin 14
towers collapse) utilised in the figurative sense due to his absence. In the 21st 
Century, it is not visions of combat or the dead that dominate; rather these 
individual moments, fleeting instances of non-events, provide the illusion of 
reality and the illusion of war. 
The framing of terrorism and warfare by the media serve as a distance 
technology, removing the body and bloody consequences from the eyes of the 
audience, desensitising and subverting the truth. Graphic footage, such as 
that from the Gulf War is never publicly broadcast; showing men  
like ghostly sheep flushed from a pen — bewildered and terrified, jarred from 
sleep and fleeing their bunkers under a hellish fire. One by one, they were cut 
down by attackers they could not see...blown to bits by bursts of 30mm 
exploding cannon shells (Robins, 1996, p.65). 
During the Falklands War of 1982, the Ministry of Defence were, by nature of 
the island conflict, able to control the entire image environment. Watson runs 
an extended metaphor through this act of gatekeeping, as 
it became near impossible to breach the walls of Fortress Information.  
Press and television were obliged to queue up at a drawbridge manned  
by the Ministry of Defence…It is significant that Don McCullin,  
one of the world's best photographers of war, was gatekept throughout the 
Falklands War. While other reporters and photographers were permitted at 
least into the outer courtyard of Fortress Information, McCullin  
was not even allowed to cross the moat (2008, p.127) 
 Virilio quotes a French foreign correspondent in the vicinity: ‘It was the American’s who 14
knocked it over to start with. At two in the afternoon there were only about twenty Iraqis in 
the square. Two hours later, after a lot of rallying by loudspeaker, there were about a 
hundred — just enough for the television pictures...from the balcony you could see the scenes 
being set up expressly for us’ (Virilio, 2005, p.88-89). 
 82
Watson then summarises the pessimistic view of Phillip Knightley, who 
argues 
that news management by military authorities and the governments they 
serve has created in the public a desire not to know the truth. Seeing the 
actualities of war on TV — its barbarism — is seen as too upsetting  
(ibid, p.127).  
Knightley is here pointing towards the framing and news values imposed by 
an overarching public consciousness, and this presents a moral crisis for 
journalists and a body paradox for television (Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2007, 
p.19). Whilst staged and simulated sex, death ,and destruction are 
permissible (and even promoted), ‘television news is subject to intense 
debates concerning the depiction of graphic scenes from human 
conflict’ (ibid, p.19). Hoskins and O’Loughlin chart this issue through David 
Campbell’s three ‘economies’ of context: indifference, taste and decency, and 
display (ibid, pp.118-137).   
It is in the latter, where ‘the meaning of images is produced by the 
intertextual relationship of captions, titles, surrounding arguments and sites 
for presentation’, that Campbell similarly moves toward Levin’s 
“assemblages” and Goffman’s framing (2004, p.70). Campbell argues that it 
is important to see the body unobstructed and unedited in death; ‘narratives 
that are un-illustrated can struggle to convey the horror evident in many 
circumstances’ (ibid, p.71). The absence of the body — with notable 
exceptions — from the BBC’s representation of the Troubles exemplify the 
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collective (mis)understanding which propagated. A central part of this 
obfuscation is the idea of compassion fatigue.   
News: Compassion Fatigue 
The core component of Red Nose Day, raising funds for the charity Comic 
Relief, is the biennial telethon broadcast on the BBC. It draws an audience of 
millions and has raised over £1 billion in its twenty-seven year history. As 
part of the live event, a number of pre-recorded appeal films packages are 
broadcast, interspersed throughout the “entertainment” proceedings; in 
2015, nineteen films were shown, featuring celebrities visiting various 
locations and endeavours across the United Kingdom and Africa. This 
included Dermot O'Leary spending 24 hours sleeping rough with three boys 
in Kenya, Idris Elba interacting with three volunteers who have survived 
ebola, and Trevor Noah visiting sports clubs helping disadvantaged children 
in Cape Town. The dominant visual discourse is framed around the suffering, 
the malnourished, and the impoverished. Accompanying each ‘conscience-
pricking report’ is a persistent telephone number seeking donations from the 
audience at home (Phillips, 1999). 
The 1995 broadcast, raising some £22 million (2015 was just under £100 
million) remains famous for its film of Billy Connolly in Mozambique. His 
words introduced compassion fatigue to the wider public consciousness: 
Like me you’ve probably read in the newspaper, or heard from some branch 
of the media or other, about compassion fatigue…let me tell you something. 
You have been impressive so far with the money you’ve given, the time and 
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the energy you’ve given to these amazing causes and it isn’t easy — it’s a long-
term commitment — whether it’s because of war or some political 
disturbance or famine or natural disaster. It is a very long-term commitment. 
Even right here, for instance, in Mozambique the water’s very dirty and 
people wash their clothes and animals go in it and all sorts and they used to 
drink it. But now there’s little wells being dug for fresh drinking water and 
this kind of thing goes on and on and on. It’s a long-term project and it’s 
great to stand here and say I’m very proud of you. Don’t listen to talk about 
compassion fatigue (BBC Comic Relief Red Nose Day; 17.03.95)  
Simon Cottle cites the double hermeneutic social processes of Anthony 
Giddens, where academic concepts move beyond the analytic sphere, ‘enter 
into lay knowledge and even inform the thinking and actions of those caught 
up in the phenomenon that such concepts were originally designed to make 
sense of’ (2008, p.132). He firmly positions compassion fatigue within this 
sphere, charging Susan Moeller as central to contemporary popularity of this 
“wooly” movement. Moeller believes 
Compassion fatigue is the unacknowledged cause of much  
of the failure of international reporting today. It is at the base of  
many of the complaints about the public’s short attention span, the  
media’s peripatetic journalism, the public’s boredom with international  
news, the media’s preoccupation with crisis coverage (Moeller, 1999, p.2) 
It is the immediacy of the medium, and the visuals supplied, that are central 
to the success of Red Nose Day and the Comic Relief appeal. French 
philosopher Alain Finkielkraut, who echoes the central thesis of Moeller, 
believes the mass media environment means  
public indifference can no longer be attributed to ignorance as  
it once could… The more suffering that people see on their TV screens, the 
less concerned they feel. Current events demobilize them; images kill the 
feeling of obligation within them (cited by Tester, 2001, p.5). 
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Through study of famine in Ethiopia and Somalia, the death camps of Bosnia, 
and the Rwandan genocide, Moeller argues that a nation failing to act 
decisively (and with haste) is a result of compassion fatigue on behalf of the 
media and public. Imagery is central to her concern — the death and horror 
of ‘threatening and painful images cause people to turn away’ (2002, p.35) — 
with the overwhelming and saturated nature of news coverage 
psychologically numbing an audience. David Campbell has vociferously 
critiqued Moeller and the compassion fatigue myth at length; amidst the 
limited studies supporting the idea, ‘contradictions outweigh [] 
coherence’ (2014, p.118).  
Further, 
We could point to the way these claims necessarily invoke a past golden age 
in which attention spans were supposedly long and nobody was bored. Or we 
could argue that these commonly repeated assumptions about audience 
behaviour are contradicted by Pew Research Centre evidence which shows 
that “people are spending more time with news than ever before.” (ibid, p.17).  
Keith Tester similarly takes issue with the concept, identifying a basic 
problem of logic: ‘what is the “normal” level of compassion that is 
presumably being fatigued?’ (2001, p.2). John Taylor provides a more 
thorough repudiation; directing attention away from the visuals and on to the 
wider framing system surrounding this which  
provides viewers with victims and then presents them as “under”, “outer”, or 
otherwise “marginal” to “normal”, centered society, while punishing them 
either directly or through moral inaction and indifference. The indifference of 
people to the suffering of others is not an effect of photography but a 
condition of viewing it in modern industrialized societies (1998, p.148) 
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Trending towards speculative statement (and as Taylor notes the ‘moral high 
ground’ (ibid)), compassion fatigue as a concept also saw rejection from one 
of its earliest originators, Susan Sontag. Her 1977 polemic On Photography 
famously proclaimed ‘images anaesthetise…in these last decades, 
“concerned” photography had done at least as much to deaden conscience as 
to arouse it (1977, p.21). Sontag herself drew much of the impetus for the idea 
from her discovery as a child of a book of Holocaust victims; limited in her 
comprehension and understanding, she ‘felt irrevocably grieved, wounded, 
but a part of my feelings started to tighten; something went dead’ (ibid, p.20). 
This ‘negative epiphany’ was so strong, Sontag goes so far as to suggest her 
life could (at that point) be divided in two; a before and after (ibid). Notions 
of a ‘first encounter’ are important and Campbell takes further issue here, 
‘not least because each of us will experience our epiphanies on a timescale at 
variance with Sontag’s’ (2014, p.104).  
Almost a quarter of a century after On Photography, Sontag revisited many 
of her initial suppositions, reversing her original stance and declaring 
‘harrowing photographs do not inevitably lose their power to shock’ (2003, p.
89). Whilst she repeats the original assertion ‘as one can become habituated 
to horror in real life, one can become habituated to the horror of certain 
images’ (ibid, p.73), she does concede that the idea of a first encounter no 
longer fixes the relationship:  
there are cases where repeated exposure to what shocks, saddens, appalls 
does not use up a full-hearted response. Habituation is not automatic, for 
images (portable, insertable) obey different rules than real life (ibid, p.82) 
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Succinctly moving away from compassion fatigue, whilst simultaneously 
setting down a preliminary oppositional stance towards sanitisation, Sontag 
states ‘For photographs to accuse, and possible to alter conduct, they must 
shock’ (ibid, p.81). Assisting in so doing, as Campbell notes, is the fact images 
within the mass media do not sit alone. They ‘are made available with an 
intertextual setting — where title, caption and text surround the particular 
content of the photograph — [and] they are read within an [sic] historical, 
political and social context (2004 p.62-63). This framing allows images to 
determine ‘how important conflicts are judged and remembered’ (Sontag, 
2004) and returns our thinking to news values and the BBC.  
News: The “troubles” of today 
The image is evidence, bypassing any rhetorical concerns with truth. This is 
precisely why the Chinese government ban the image of a man standing in 
front of a tank in Tiananmen Square. Images hold a persuasive power — the 
ability to present prima facie evidence — and construct implied propositions, 
that is unrivalled in other mediums. Maxims stressing such significance are 
now cultural cliches; “seeing is believing” and “a picture is worth a thousand 
words”. Indeed in the hyper-visual multi-media age, the proverb one showing 
is worth a hundred sayings is increasingly appropriate. David Levi Strauss, 
in highlighting the role of visuals in the news as ‘evidence…pure “objective” 
truth’ (2003, p.16), is echoing the words of Susan Sontag; ‘Photography 
furnishes evidence. Something we hear about, but doubt, seems proven when 
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we're shown a photograph of it’ (1977, p.5). Sontag preempted the mediatised 
landscape of the late 20th Century and were she writing today, it would 
undoubtably be rephrased as something we hear about, but doubt, seems 
proven when we're shown visual evidence of it. 
The notion of the camera as witness can be regarded as the central tenet of 
broadcast news (and photojournalism). Each is underpinned by, according to 
Philip Gefter, former picture editor at The New York Times, ‘an unwavering 
adherence to fact’ (2009, p.1).  15
As Jean Baudrillard explained in The Transparency of Evil,  
in earlier times an event was something that happened —  
now it is something designed to happen. It occurs,  
therefore, as a virtual artifact, as a reflection of  
pre-existing media-defined forms (1993, p.41). 
Cinema is held as the prime example of these “forms” and Baudrillard 
invokes Apocalypse Now as retrospectively operating on a war that was a 
‘succession of special effects...filming itself as it unfolded’ (1994, p.59). 
Simulacrum and reality implode, where ‘the war becomes film, the film 
becomes war’, resulting in ‘marvellous in-differentiation’; historical reality is 
both erased and deterred in a global victory (ibid). Throughout this period, 
Baudrillard drew inspiration from the work of Elias Canetti and the claim 
that ‘past a certain point in time, history has not been real’ (1990, p.14). That 
 Rigid adherence to truth and fact is the media’s central defence against criticism of bias, 15
slanting and manipulation; ‘The photojournalist will shoot an event as it transpires without 
altering its anatomy with his or her presence’. The camera as witness then is ‘the profession’s 
essential rule of thumb’ (Gefter, 2009, p.1) A breach of this “truth” threatens the notion of 
the camera as evidence, and in turn the objectivity/factuality/reliability of an individual/
institution. 
 89
moment was the fall of the Berlin Wall, the ‘last great “historic” 
event’ (Baudrillard, 2000, p.39). What followed became ‘ghost events’, 
‘phantom-events’ and ‘vanishing events’ (Baudrillard, 2000, p.49-50), 
removed from the real with reality instead a product of simulation. Both 
Baudrillard and Canetti in turn evoke Nietzsche, who predicted in Twilight of 
the Idols (1889) that the epoch of the future would be one in which the “real 
world” would become “a myth” (Merrin, 2005).  
The “War on Terror” was an attempt to produce a response to 9/11, effectively 
erasing one cultural memory with another, crafting a renewed, carefully 
framed, real world myth, ‘where power is as much a function of time and 
space [and] 60/60/24/7/365 are the key coordinates’ of the news media 
landscape (Der Derian, 2009, p.160). The attacks on the WTC in 2001 
marked the effective ‘dawn of a new war’ (Virilio and Lotringer, 2002, p.155). 
The opening of this “pandora’s box” was declared by Virilio as an ‘intercine 
war...that has nothing to do with the Clausewitzian form’ and renders army 
and air force redundant (Virilio, 2002, p.79). With the July 7th 2005 attack on 
London, the British military were similarly impotent.  
Furthermore, just as many of those who watched planes fly into the World 
Trade Centre towers understood it in a cinematic sense (a notion suggested 
by Žižek (2002) amongst others), a visual connection can be made by those 
watching coverage of the London attacks. As Awan, Hoskins and O’Loughlin 
note, BBC  
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television news presented the viewer with news they had  
already seen. In the first decade of the twenty-first century,  
the BBC offered regular drama-documentaries of simulations of security 
situations, with a programme on…terrorist attacks on London(2011, p.67). 
Having just completed a pilot project involving user generated content (in the 
aftermath of the 2004 tsunami) the BBC were growing adept, through their 
online platforms, at harnessing audience input. The nightly news in July 
2005 was then led by amateur camera phone footage recorded by an 
individual aboard a tube train directly behind one of those attacked. It 
initiates in darkness, gradually moving out of the wrecked tube train and 
along the tunnels towards safety (07.07.05). Shaky, grainy video — identical 
in style to the reportage of the Enniskillen and Omagh bombings — carried a 
strong immediacy. The audio fades in and out, picking up fragments of 
conversation and dialogue and the frame is frequently dominated by the rear 
of the individual walking in front. Bright fluorescent lighting overhead 
reveals a harsh contrast to the black tunnel ahead. For John Berger, ‘people 
underground are both sheltered and helpless. Tunnels are ways of escape and 
terrible traps (2008, p.101). There exists a marked contrast here with the 
events of September 11th; in that instance, there were two elements to the 
attack: the literal death caused by the impact and collapse, and the larger 
symbolic value of this occurring to such a structure live on television. What is 
central here was the magnitude of the event, both the witnessing and the 
destruction.  
Of course the martyr-pilots knew that bringing down the Twin Towers would 
do nothing, or next to nothing, to stop the actual circuits of capital. But 
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circuits of capital are bound up, in the longer term, with circuits of sociability 
— patterns of belief and desire, levels of confidence, degrees of identification 
with the good life of the commodity. And these, said the terrorists, thinking 
strategically, are aspects of the social imaginary still (always, interminably) 
being put together by the perpetual emotion machines. Supposing those 
machines could be captured for a moment? (Boal et al., 2005, p.26)  
In London, however, what occurred was both hidden and public, attacking 
the iconic transport system of London, yet doing so unseen, deep 
underground.  Here the obscured is key, with this absence of visuals forcing 16
a public contemplation and consideration of the horror committed below. 
Just like news on the radio, as Tarantino does in cinema, a lack of visuality 
forces the imagination. In attacking the underground, there was a deliberate 
attempt to cause confusion and fear, invoking humanity’s worst fears.  The 17
amateur footage from within this environment dominated the media 
discourse.  
In utilising reportage in this way, harnessing public modes of perception and 
representation, traditional media are then better referred to as “renewed 
media,” a term deployed by Hoskins and O’Loughlin to signify ‘mainstream 
news organisations harnessing citizen or participatory journalism to enhance 
their news provision (2010b, p.84). Analysis of three decades of traditional 
BBC reporting on the terrorism of Northern Ireland provide a lens for the 
 Regarding the iconic, note the attempted humour recorded on the amateur video — 16
“literally mind the gap please”, by one of the underground train staff assisting with the 
evacuation of passengers from the carriage to the tracks below. 
 It is interesting to highlight here that Hasib Hussain, who detonated his bomb on the No. 17
30 bus that exploded in Tavistock Square, was ‘originally supposed to hit a Northern line 
Train, but on the morning of 7 July 2005, the Northern Line was temporarily suspended. 
Instead, he hit a number 30 red double-decker bus’ (Roger, 2013, p.90). The image of this 
destroyed bus — a symbol of London culture and British identity — became a powerful visual 
signifier of the attack, an iconic signifier of both the attack and resolve. 
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As Andrew Hoskins recently noted, in a general critique of the two primary 
paradigms impacting study of the relationship between contemporary media 
and warfare, ‘the mediation of war is a matter of an ongoing set of dynamics: 
remediation, translation, connectivity, temporality, reflexivity, across and 
between media and their multiple modalities’ (2013, p.4). Tracing 
developments back to the pioneering studies of scholars in the 1970s, 
including the work of Greg Philo and the Glasgow University Media Group 
(GUMG), Hoskins suggests the ‘seductiveness of volume’ leads to issues 
regarding ‘validity, reliability and generalizability’ (ibid). In this study, 
however, a ‘certain fullness of data’ (ibid) can be claimed.  
The Glasgow University Media Group were able to coherently analyse 
television news coverage of industrial relations in 1976’s Bad News because 
their data set was limited to television in the UK which, at that point, 
consisted of only three channels. Channel 4 began broadcasting in 1982, and 
this updated grouping was further explored by the GUMG, in relation to 
coverage of the Falklands War in War & Peace News (1985). Jackie Harrison 
would later focus on the context of the production of broadcast news through 
an analysis of television news across the output of the four channels (BBC1, 
BBC2, ITV and Channel 4) during a single week in April 1993 (2000). This 
narrow focus was again necessary to avoid an overly large, and entirely 
unmanageable, corpus, identified as one of the key dangers in content 
analysis (see Stokes, 2012). In restricting the focus of this study to a singular, 
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pre-eminent news organisation, similar criterion applied; as Wilson notes, 
‘Broadcast news in the UK is dominated by television, which, in itself, is 
dominated by the BBC’ (Wilson, p.18). Whilst it inevitably opens up further 
questions and future areas for analysis and comparison (suggested in the 
conclusion), focusing directly on a single institution and broadcasting 
framework allows a limited but definable data set to be collated, analysed and 
deconstructed.  
The primary research for this thesis is largely confined to the years 1968 — 
1998 and this is for both historical and methodological reasons. 1968, as 
detailed later in chapter three, was a period of significant political, social and 
cultural unrest across the world; The Times declared it "this lunatic year”. 
The year is also popularly accepted as the start of the Troubles in Northern 
Ireland (see Bew and Gillespie 1999; Coogan, 2002; Prince 2007; Prince and 
Warner 2011; McKittrick and McVea 2012) and has been commemorated on 
several anniversary occasions since.  The conflict was formally ended with 18
the Belfast (Good Friday Agreement) of 1998, a year that also saw the single 
worst incident of the conflict on Northern Irish soil, the Omagh bombing.  In 19
addition, the introduction of Newsroom, early in 1968, marked a significant 
step for BBC TV and exists as the first half hour bulletin, broadcast on BBC at 
half past seven each evening. Methodologically, the video holdings of the 
 Indeed the history section of the BBC’s own website identifies the 5th October 1968 as the 18
“day the Troubles began”; the Derry Housing Action Committee (DHAC) and Northern 
Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) commemorated the 40th anniversary in 2008. 
 An incident identified by Rose as the first time an image of every victim of a single event 19
was collated and pictured in the press (2009, p.50). 
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various archive collections consulted, including the Northern Ireland Political 
Collection (NIPC), combined to present a comprehensive catalogue of this 
period.  
Methodology: Corpus 
A neutral space, the NIPC is self described as a ‘unique resource. No other 
institution in a localised conflict has systematically collected material from all 
sides’ (Murphy et al., 2001, p.10). Allied to their literary (books, pamphlets, 
manifestos) and ephemeral (stickers, leaflets, posters and Christmas cards) 
holdings the collection is home to the Police Service of Northern Ireland 
(PSNI; successor of the defunct Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC)) audio-
visual archive consisting of some 2,000 documentaries and news bulletins 
covering the early 1980s to 1997.  
The NIPC operates a simple paper based cataloguing of the PSNI video 
archive, however, prior to accessing materials, the “Peter Heathwood 
Collection” database was utilised to identify relevant programmes.  Part of 20
the Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN, a joint project of the United 
Nations University and Ulster University and based within the International 
Conflict Research Institute), the Peter Heathwood Collection is a searchable 
database collated by the author. Heathwood was ‘shot and paralysed in a gun 
attack on his home in 1979. Since 1981 he has recorded daily television news 
items, documentary programmes, history programmes, and current affairs 
 For further details regarding the selection process see below.  20
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programmes, about Northern Ireland’ (Heathwood, 2015). His database, 
whilst not comprehensive, contains:  
Details of news programmes (4,348) broadcast between May 1981 and 
January 2005, including most of the major British and Irish documentaries 
(479), history programmes (51) and current affairs programmes (693) about 
Northern Ireland networked between 1981 and November 2008 (ibid). 
The searchable digital catalogue contains tabular data about each 
programme, including the series/programme title (for example RTE News, 
UTV News, BBC News), date of broadcast, a short description (for example: 
report by Jon Snow on Armagh blast in which five British soldiers killed) 
along with a duration for the programme or news report.  
With both covering a similar time-period, there was an overlap of data and 
this proved invaluable in identifying relevant footage to then be sourced from 
the NIPC. Yet, with the NIPC archive focusing on the post 1981 period, it was 
necessary to obtain material for the preceding decade. With 1968, as detailed, 
historically identified as the start of the Troubles, and with newspaper 
cuttings suggesting initial coverage included particularly graphic imagery, 
this absence required addressing. A further archive was therefore consulted 
to eliminate this anomaly.  
CAIN contains a searchable database focusing on television programmes 
related to the Troubles and originally part of the Film and Sound Resource 
Unit (FSRU) at The University of Ulster. Now stored at the Centre of Media 
Research (CMR), and based at the Coleraine campus of the University, the 
holdings of this archive begin in 1968 and furnished the additional footage 
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necessary. This was supplemented by use of “The Belfast Bulletin's list of 
British television programmes about the conflict 1968 to 1978”, similarly 
archived on CAIN, which features a (non-exhaustive) list of television 
programmes devoted wholly or primarily to the conflict, networked between 
October 1968 and December 1978. It is based on research compiled by the 
Belfast Workers Research Unit and published in the now-defunct Belfast 
Bulletin.  
In cross referencing details and data from the various sources and archives, 
there was an attempt to negate any institutional bias which may have existed 
in each. However, in functioning as repositories of information, and seeking 
to present their documents in a neutral manner, there are overt attempts by 
each to function as apolitical social history.  
Materials from these sources were supplemented by footage obtained from 
additional private collections. Furthermore, there is a range of BBC news 
broadcasts, bulletins and documentaries available through various online 
resources, including YouTube, the preeminent video sharing website that has 
‘revolutionized the archiving of audiovisual material’ (McKee, 2011, p.155). 
Much of the content on YouTube has been uploaded by individuals, however 
there are some instances of media corporations offering their own material. 
This open access policy has allowed it to become a considerable repository of 
information and footage, realising ‘much of the internet’s potential to 
circulate rare, ephemeral and elusive texts’ (Hildebrand 2007, 54). There are 
therefore a number of full length documentaries available, particularly 
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regarding key moments from the Troubles (for example Bloody Sunday), as 
well as shorter clips that function as a synecdoche for wider moments and 
popular memory. However, allied to issues of permanence, longevity and 
copyright, YouTube will often lack the production details (such as 
transmission date) necessary for academic scholarship; as McKee notes, ‘the 
kinds of information about a clip that are presented in YouTube do present a 
problem to researchers of television history’ (ibid, p.169). Where information 
could not be accurately verified through searching additional databases, it 
was excluded from analysis. 
Methodology: Selection 
Due to practicality and time constraint, and even with this sustained focus on 
a single broadcasting institution, it remained necessary to limit the corpus. 
Despite the wealth of content analyses studies focusing on television news, 
‘sampling studies to find valid and efficient sampling methods are practically 
nonexistent’ (Riffe et al., 2014, p.87). There are a number of possible 
approaches, with the choice particularly important when, as Prasad notes, 
‘the body of content is excessive’ (2008, p.183). Krippendorff introduces a 
range of approaches, including random, stratified, systematic, and cluster 
(2004); whilst Riffe, et al. detailed specific examples, for instance, the use of 
constructed week and consecutive day sampling (ibid, p.85-90). As they then 
explain, these variations ‘reflects the absence of guidance from sampling 
studies about television news’ (ibid, p.116). One of the weaknesses identified 
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in many news content analysis is that results are distorted by a major story 
that dominates the sampling period (2011, p.253); the very nature of this 
work — centring around events of enormous historical significance — mean 
this is an unavoidable issue. However, in exploring reportage across three 
decades of the BBC, and seeking to identify the patterns in coverage, through 
a focus on major stories, these wider problem can be negated to some extent. 
In focusing on multiple major news stories, embodying Gamson et al’s 
concept of ‘contested’ content (1992), a small set of texts offer a rich potential 
in identifying patterns, symbols, and meanings. Bent Flyvbjerg espouses the 
power of example, using Aristotelian principles to correct five 
‘misunderstandings or oversimplifications about the nature of the case study 
as a research method’ (2006, p.3). Flyvbjerg’s notion of an information-
oriented selection was followed, with cases selected ‘on the basis of 
expectations about their information content’ (ibid, p.34). Terrorism has long 
been considered a deviant act and Flyvbjerg believes, an extreme case can 
‘often reveal more information…in the situation studied’ since 
when the objective is to achieve the greatest possible amount of information 
on a given problem or phenomenon, a representative case or a random 
sample may not be the most appropriate strategy. This is because the typical 
or average case is often not the richest in information (ibid, p.13) 
This also mirrors the approach of Hoskins and O’Loughlin, who borrow the 
term perspicuous instances from Jalbert in their study of television news and 
security events ‘intersecting in ways that exemplify or point towards 
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regularities that characterise contemporary dynamics of news and 
security’ (2007, p.6).  
Prior to accessing archives, a wealth of literature was examined in order to 
identify what incidents — what “deviant cases”  or “perspicuous instances” — 
featured prominently across texts. This included overview histories of Ireland 
(including Bardon, 2009; Foster, 1990); histories of the Troubles (including 
Dixon, 2011; Edwards, 2011; Edwards and McGrattan, 2010; Feeney, 2014; 
Fraser, 1999; Kennedy-Pipe, 1997; McKittrick and McVea, 2012; Tonge, 
2001); histories of various factions and nationalism (English, 2012; Kee, 
2000; Moloney, 2002; O’Brien, 2007; Taylor, 1998; Taylor, 2000; Taylor, 
2002); and journalistic accounts (Bolton 1990; Devenport, 2000; 
Winchester, 1971). In each text, the incidents earning attention were 
identified; these were then cross referenced across the breadth of this wide 
body, resulting in around a dozen incidents being selected as central to a 
consideration of the Troubles. This was finally followed by keyword searches 
across the archive databases, with an expectation that such instances would 
have correspondingly garnered considerable media attention. Along with 
providing the core corpus, this also pointed further towards  Jalbert’s idea of 
the ‘regularities that characterise contemporary dynamics of news’ (cited by 
Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2007, p.6).  
By collecting all (or rather as many as theoretically possible) bulletins and 
broadcasts related to each event — as opposed to sampling individual 
instances — it was possible to track stories and follow their coverage over 
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consecutive nights, generating data for each entry. Whilst it was then 
necessary to sample within that material for particular purpose, this granted 
considerable research flexibility; Hall’s suggestion of a ‘long preliminary 
soak’, followed by use of this preliminary “reading” ‘to select representative 
examples which can be more intensely analysed’ applied (1975, p.15) 
This was valuable not least because it was difficult to anticipate the volume of 
work which analysis would entail, nor the potential for study which the 
material would reveal. Perhaps most importantly, this decision enabled a 
parallel journey with the journalists (or perhaps more accurately institutions) 
own reportage, tracing ‘the way particularly stories were presented, what 
themes were present…and what visual aspects were evident’ (Eldridge, 2013, 
p.10). 
The “events” selected and examined became the primary log, that is the log of 
all news items: from individual bulletins, to wider news broadcasts and 
documentaries. The research that is reported here is based upon a sub-
sample of the full data, ‘a gigantic empirical archive of human sense-making’ 
ripe for coding and semiotic study (Fiske and Hartley, 2004, p.xviii). 
Content Analysis 
Mirzoeff’s ‘glut’ of imagery, based upon the past as a stable text  disconnected 
from the flux of the present, allows a cumulative effect to be gathered (cited 
by Rose, 2016, p.163) Content analysis, spanning disciplines, fields, and 
subject matter, is a methodological approach and method of textual analysis 
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and empirical investigation, designed to identify, enumerate and analyse 
occurrences of specific messages and characteristics embedded in a text or 
texts (Frey et al., 1999). Systematic analysis of mass communication content 
dates back to the late 19th Century; Speed’s 1893 longitudinal analysis of four 
New York newspapers used a simple metric of measuring column inches to 
devoted to specific topics (Diefenbach, 2001, p.17). It has been applied across 
the evolution of each communication medium, from print to radio to film to 
television, and by 1969, 25% of all content analysis studies were examinations 
of communications media (cited by Diefenbach, 2001, p.18). According to 
Babbie, content analysis can proudly be defined as the ‘study of recorded 
human communications’ (2011, p.356).  
The ultimate goal of content analysis is ‘to provide knowledge and 
understanding of the phenomenon under study’ (Downe-Wamboldt, 1992, p.
314). If the focus is to be television, the starting-point of any study…must be 
with what is actually there on the screen’ (Fiske and Hartley, 2004, p.8). 
Content analysis then seeks to analyse primary data by coding information 
into nominal categories; this is what Ryan and Bernard deem to be the true 
‘heart and soul’ of the process (cited by Packer, 2011, p.58).  
The close relationship that now exists in academia between mass 
communication and content analysis is due to two related aspects: the nature 
of the latter to generate objective data about the former, and because it is 
seen as a method capable of coping with, and addressing, the sheer scale at 
which the mass media operated (Rose, 2016). Coding the complex 
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manifestation that is audio-visual media demands general, yet precise 
definitions. Following identification of the corpus, it is necessary to devise the 
categories to be used in coding and this involves attaching a set of descriptive 
labels or categories to each sample. For Gillian Rose this is a crucial stage in 
the research process; she paraphrases Slater and proclaims that  
much of the rigour of classic content analysis relies on the structure  
of categories used in the coding process, because the categories should be 
apparently objective in a number of ways and therefore only describe  
what is “really” there in the text or image (2016, p.92).  
The coding operation is the ‘process of transforming raw data into a 
standardized form’ (Babbie, 2011, p.361) and in its initial inceptions at least, 
content analysis ‘referred only to those methods that concentrate on directly 
and clearly quantifiable aspects of text content, and as a rule on absolute and 
relative frequencies of words per text or surface unit’ (Titscher et al., 2000, p.
55). Ryan and Bernard echo this formulation; in viewing content analysis as 
comprising ‘techniques for reducing texts to a unit-by-variable matrix and 
analyzing that matrix quantitatively to test hypotheses’ (Ryan and Bernard, 
2000, p.785), they position classical content analysis as essentially a 
quantitative method.  
However, as Rose explains, if the results of content analysis are to be 
interpreted through an understanding of the codes in an image and how they 
connect to the wider context in which they make sense, qualitative skills are 
required (2016). Siegfried Krakauer’s paper The Challenge of Qualitative 
Content Analysis sought to advocate the benefits of a qualitative approach, 
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contending that a purely quantitative, and one-sided orientation neglected 
the particular quality of texts and reduced the accuracy of overall analysis 
(1952, p.631).  According to Krakauer, who still acknowledges the 21
importance of categories, ‘what is relevant are the patterns, the wholes, which 
can be made manifest by qualitative exegesis and which can throw light upon 
a textual characteristic’ (ibid, p.640).  
One of the key strengths of qualitative research is the fact the process is ‘less 
driven by very specific hypotheses and categorical frameworks and more 
concerned with emergent themes and idiographic descriptions’ (Cassell and 
Symon, 1994, p.4). Amidst approaches, it is the sequential case study model 
of Philipp Mayring that ‘has achieved popularity’ (Titscher et al., 2000, p.62). 
Kohlbacher (2006, p.14-16) charts Mayring’s proposal, identifying three 
distinct analytical procedures which may be carried out independently or in 
combination. Moving through a process of summarising to explication 
(explaining, clarifying and annotating the materials), Mayring concludes with 
structuring, a procedure similar to, and derived from, classical content 
analysis. At this stage, the texts can be catalogued according to form and 
content into the identified system of categories. The overall procedure will be 
explanatory in nature; of Yin’s three strategies, the explanatory approach, 
deriving from research questions rooted in the what and how, explore ‘a 
 Krakauer’s text was in itself a response to Bernard Reuben Berelson. Berenson’s book 21
Content Analysis in Communication Research (first published 1952) was the first 
compendium of the methods and goals of quantitative content analysis and initiated a 
controversy ‘about research strategies in content analysis’ Titscher et al. (2000, p.62).
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contemporary set of events, over which the investigator has little or no 
control.” (2003, p.9) 
In regard to the media texts of this study, form is the shape of the text and the 
way it appears onscreen. Content includes what is actually within the frame, 
including the subject and how it is presented; within film parlance, this is 
referred to as the mise-en-scène, or “placing on stage”. Allied to these aspects, 
are the movement of the camera and editing. 
In taking a qualitative approach, there is a desire to uncover the wider 
phenomenon of the nature of BBC broadcast news. Through use of the initial 
data collected, viewed, and catalogued in line with the qualitative procedures 
above, it is the patterns, codes, signs, meanings and emergent themes that 
are of interest, as opposed to a statistical and numerical approach that reveals 
the number of times each variable occurs. Due to the inherently difficult 
nature of classifying content accurately, Casey et al. note that content analysis 
‘tends more often to be used as a starting point or in conjunction with other 
methodologies than as a method standing along’ (cited by Hartley, 2012, p.
45).  Therefore, in the interests of further methodological diversity, the 22
nascent data gathered in the initial phases of Collier’s structural model and 
catalogued in line with Mayring’s analytical procedures was then examined 
through the principle of semiotics, allowing a higher level of interpretive 
analysis to occur. As Fiske and Hartley note, ‘the reading of television must 
 Utilising a second coder, as detailed by Macnamara (2005) would have increased 22
reliability. 
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progress from the manifest content to the latent content’ (2004, p.10). In so 
doing, there is a desire to deconstruct the texts  and fully understand each 
through identification of meaning and pattern.  
Methodology: Coding 
Rose details three overarching criterion for coding categories: exhaustive, 
exclusive, and enlightening; she quotes Slater in regard to the latter, who says 
categories must produce ‘a breakdown of imagery that will be analytically 
interesting and coherent’ (2016, p.92). Working with an ex-BBC producer 
and director, a spreadsheet was created to collate enlightening information, 
complete with coding criterion. 
This included general criteria about the programme itself, including 
information such as channel (BBC One, BBC Two or BBC NI), transmission 
date and time, and the length in minutes and seconds of the programme (if a 
complete documentary) or news item (if a discreet item contained within a 
wider broadcast). The database also contained more detailed information 
about the broadcast, including whether it was a headline or summary story, 
in order to provide a general gauge of the importance and prominence of the 
news item. Given the nature of the key events identified in literature and 
selected for analysis, these were inevitably the lead item for news broadcasts, 
often persisting for a number of bulletins across multiple days.  
As detailed, each story length was also recorded, again to act as an indicator 
of the importance of the story in relation to other news stories. Whilst this 
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was carried through over the course of the archival research, it became clear 
early in the process that this was an area warranting substantive attention in 
and of itself and exists as a possibility for future (quantitive research). 
A numerical story identifier was selected and used as a searchable shorthand 
for the various deviant events identified through literature and the database 
searches as being key to the focus of this study. This was, however, open 
ended, allowing inclusion of any additional moments and events discovered 
and watched whilst conducting research. It also allowed events to be ‘tagged’ 
with numerous identifiers; for example a BBC News Report (09/02/96) 
directly concerned with the Canary Wharf bombing is also identified as 
referencing the (end of the) IRA ceasefire. 
The core of the analysis was then contained in the visuals field (and 
supported by a rhetoric field capturing the associated dialogue, interviews 
and commentary). Whilst it is the images disseminated by the BBC as part of 
its actuality programming that are the central focus, the associated text and 
aural elements that accompanied these will also feature throughout. This 
invokes the stance of Barthes (that an understanding of imagery requires a 
consideration of their associated text) yet simultaneously moves beyond this 
and towards the multimodal semiotic process of Kress and van Leeuwen 
(1996; 2001). Four types of sound were identified in the audio portion, in line 
with Lacey’s framework: dialogue; sound effects; ambient sounds; non-
diegetic sounds (including voiceover and (rarely) music) (Lacey, 1998, pp.
52-53).  
 113
Entries in this visual field quickly became verbose and complex, however, as a 
method of gathering information on the imagery and allowing semiological 
analysis to take place, it ensured full information was transcribed. This 
included a break down of what was shown, how it was shown (camera angles, 
camera position, shot types, edits) and for how long (both of individual shots 
and the item). Allied to this was information on the reporter, along with 
description of any graphic specification and visual intertextuality.  
A wealth of replicable data was collated, charting what signs appear when, 
and how these change and evolve over time. Allied to a chronological 
historical framework, patterns were seen to emerge. Whilst precisely how 
material was categorised may not cohere with the choices of another 
researcher, a pilot process was undertaken and in adopting an inductive 
approach, categories were allowed to develop directly out of the materials. 
During this phase textual materials were processed recursively, ensuring 
codes were ‘revised and tried again until they are exhaustive and 
exclusive’ (Rose, 2016, p.94). This marks a small step to negate (some of) the 
impact of an absence of a second coder.  
Semiotics 
In the posthumous publication A Course in General Linguistics, Swiss 
linguist Ferdinand de Saussure sets forth what can be read as the foundation 
stone for semiology: 
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Language is a system of signs that express ideas, and is therefore comparable 
to a system of writing, the alphabet of deaf-mutes, military signals, etc. But it 
is the most important of all these systems. A science that studies the life of 
signs within society is conceivable it would be part of social psychology and 
consequently of general psychology; I shall call it semiology (from Greek, 
semeion "sign") Semiology would show what constitutes signs (1983, p.15-16) 
Semiology, simply defined, is the science of signs; how they work and the 
ways in which we use them. The need for such a science was predicted both 
by Saussure, with whose work the term semiology is associated, and by the 
American philosopher C. S  Peirce (1931–58), who coined the term semiotics. 
Whilst the two are now popularly considered synonyms, and “semiotics” is 
invariably used as an umbrella term to embrace the whole field (cited by 
Chandler, 2007, p.3-4), there are key differences it is important to note.  
For Saussure, there are two parts to a sign: the signifier (material form) and 
the signified (mental concept). Since the relationship that exists between 
these is arbitrary (based on convention or what Saussure terms the 
“unmotivated”) codes are developed to learn and understand such signs. The 
signifier and the signified are ‘intimately linked and each triggers the 
other’ (Saussure, 1983, p.66).  
In contrast with the dyadic Saussurian ontology of semiology, Peircean 
semiotics is based on  a trichotomy of icons, indices, and symbols that are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive. In iconic signs, the signifier represents the 
signified by holding a likeness to it; indexical signs feature an inherent, often 
culturally specific, relationship between the signified and signifier; symbolic 
signs in turn have a conventionalised but clearly arbitrary relation between 
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signifier and signified (Peirce, 1991). According to Peirce, thinking (now) only 
takes place in the form of signs, and, with roots in medieval philosophy (as 
opposed to Aristotle and neoplatonist knowledge for Saussure), the value of 
the sign is no longer constrained between signifier and signified. Whilst the 
representamen is similar in meaning to Saussure's signifier, and the 
interpretant can be aligned with the signified, Peirce's model of the sign 
includes an object or referent, which does not directly feature in Saussure's 
model. Linking the Peircean triadic model (1991) to the context of this study 
then provides a useful explanatory indicator: 
The Representamen: the form which the sign takes; for example the words 
Provisional Irish Republican Army or Ulster Defence Association in a media 
text. 
The Interpretant: the understanding or sense granted to the sign; for example 
“terrorists” or “freedom fighters”.  
The Object: to which the sign refers or stands for; for example “militant 
group/guerrilla fighters” or “legitimate organisation”. 
Television use all three forms: icon (sound and image), symbol (speech and 
text), and index (as the effect of what is filmed) and the film theorist Peter 
Wollen argues that:  
the great merit of Peirce's analysis of signs is that he did not see the different 
aspects as mutually exclusive. Unlike Saussure he did not show any particular 
prejudice in favour of one or the other. Indeed, he wanted a logic and a 
rhetoric which would be based on all three aspects (2013).  
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Whilst the two approaches therefore vary, the central concern of semiotics — 
the relationship between a sign and the meaning, and the way signs are 
combined into codes — can be elucidated from the above. Allied to this, the 
work of Roland Barthes offers another insightful account and builds on these 
foundations. It also, as Jonathan Bignell notes, ‘take us closer to the semiotic 
analysis of contemporary media’ (2002, p.16), and thus the nature of this 
research. Barthes applied ideas of semiotics, developing it from the linguistic 
roots of Saussure, to the visual, including advertising and photography. He 
termed the initial and immediate visual impact, of a sign consisting of a 
signifier and a signified, the denoted meaning (first order of signification) 
and the cultural meaning attached to this the connoted meaning (second 
order of signification).  
The analytic distinction that exists between the denotative signified and the 
connotative signified is the guiding idea of Barthes' semiotic theory, and 
connotation is the primary method for the mass media to communicate 
ideological meaning.  
Denotation is the strict definitional and literal meaning of a sign, for example 
a dove is a dove — a small wild bird related to the pigeon family. The 
denotation of a visual image, for Erwin Panofsky, is what the “reader”, 
regardless of culture and time, would recognise the image as depicting (cited 
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by Chandler, 2007, p.138).  In television and film, the denoted meaning is 23
conveyed through the digital or mechanical reproduction of twenty-four 
frames a second. 
Connotation in contrast is expressive and subjective, carrying what Rose 
would suggest are higher level meanings (2016). In this order, signs signify 
values, emotions and attitudes. In arguing this, it is insinuated 'the camera is 
never neutral; the representations it produces are highly coded’ (Tagg, 1988, 
p.63). John Tagg would then identify connotation as a reference to the socio-
cultural and personal associations (whether ideological or emotional) of the 
sign (ibid, p.4). Signs are “polysemic,” more open to interpretation in their 
connotations than their denotations; Wilden’s analogy is particularly 
insightful here as he proposes denotation be regarded as digital and 
connotation as analogue (1987, p.224). The dove is therefore a symbol of 
peace, a messenger, or, in Christian iconography, the Holy Spirit.  
In audiovisual media, this connotation is directed as a result of human 
intervention, for example technical aspects including camera angle, focus, 
colour, and depth-of-field. John Fiske succinctly summarises the two aspects: 
 Such a notion does of course raise questions regarding audience, and whether it is possible 23
to state all viewers would respond in such a manner. As Chandler notes, this likely excludes 
the very young and the insane, and trends instead to the ‘culturally well-adjusted’ (2007, p.
138). Here there is a movement towards Stuart Hall and his reception theory framework for 
the reading of a text (Hall et al., 1980). Based on the assumption that the latent meaning of 
the text is encoded in the dominant code, Hall suggested three hypothetical interpretative 
positions: the dominant (hegemonic) reading; the negotiated reading; and the oppositional 
(counter-hegemonic) reading; Chandler frequently argues these notions of a preferred 
reading can arguably be applied more easily to news and current affairs than to other mass 
media genres (2007).  
With semiotics essentially a subjective and interpretive method, this research, in seeking to 
unpack the complexity of the BBC news reporting as a textual structure, should be strictly 
read as advocating the preferred reading of one individual only. Areas of future research are, 
however, opened up by this approach. 
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‘denotation is what is photographed, connotation is how it is photographedʹ 
(1982, p.91). 
According to Barthes, signs in the second order of signification operate in two 
distinct ways: connotation and myth (termed the third order of signification 
by Fiske and Hartley (2004)). It is in the combining of signs with their 
connotation, in order to craft a particular message, that an ideology is 
espoused. This ideology is mythical, and these can essentially be seen as 
extended metaphors; as myths, signs seek to obfuscate ideology through 
making dominant cultural and historical values, attitudes and beliefs seem 
entirely natural and self-evident, promoting the ideological interests of ‘the 
bourgeoisie’ (Barthes, 1972). Myth takes hold of an existing sign, and makes 
it function as a signifier on another level. 
In the famous essay Myth Today (essentially a Marxist political tract), 
Barthes illustrated the concept of myth through analysis of the front cover of 
an issue of Paris Match, a French magazine depicting a ‘a young Negro in a 
French uniform [is] saluting, with his eyes uplifted, probably fixed on a fold 
of the tricolour’ (1972, p.125-126). Barthes read the signs contained within 
the image as showing a young boy giving a salute (denotation) yet it 
simultaneously also signifies ‘that France is a great Empire, that all her sons, 
without any colour discrimination, faithfully serve under her flag’ (ibid). 
Connecting mass media culture to French colonialism, Barthes here moves 
through the denotation of the first order signifier (the photo itself), the 
signified (the soldier), the sign (saluting), and towards the second order 
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signifier of French imperialism. He concludes with the connotation of the 
connoted sign itself: the French empire is positive and welcoming to all. 
Through a similar approach, the “second order” connotative structure of 
contemporary mythology can be revealed. 
The wider system of semiotics utilises signs in a number of ways and Rose 
highlights the variety; the mythology of Barthes (1972) is the referent systems 
of Williamson (1978) and the codes of Stuart Hall (1980). A code is a ways of 
making meaning that is specific to a medium, a process, a particular group of 
people. In the context of making television news programmes, for example, 
Stuart Hall comments on what he calls the “professional code” that is 
mobilised in the work of producers, editors, lighting and camera technicians, 
and newscasters. This guides such things as ‘the particular choice of 
presentational occasions and formats, the selection of personnel, the choice 
of images, the staging of debates’ (Hall, 1980, p.136). It has a ‘techno-
practical nature’ according to Hall because it operates with ‘such apparently 
neutral-technical questions as visual quality, news and presentational values, 
televisual quality, “professionalism” and so on’ (ibid). 
The concept of the code is therefore fundamental in semiotics and Daniel 
Chandler’s tripartite framework breaks down the range of code typologies 
across semiotics and media studies. Social codes, textual codes, and 
interpretive codes  
correspond broadly to three key kinds of knowledge required  
by interpreters of a text, namely knowledge of: the world  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(social knowledge); the medium and the genre (textual knowledge); the 
relationship between (1) and (2) (modality judgements) (2007, p.150).  
It is the mass media aspect of the second category (concerning textual or 
representational codes) that are primarily explored in this work and John 
Fiske and John Hartley exemplify these connotative mass media codes in 
their seminal text Reading Television (2004). They detail a news broadcast 
which reported on troop reinforcements in Northern Ireland, and showed 
British army soldiers patrolling Belfast, then ensconced in sandbagged 
positions, before culminated with shots of passing army helicopters and 
armoured troop carriers. Analysing each stage, across this series of images 
which the state show the ‘visual thesaurus of war’, they state this series of 
‘signs activate a myth chain’ (2004, p.27). In so doing, the British soldiers are 
presented as a coherent, well trained, technological advanced entity. 
Furthermore, in “shooting” footage from ‘over the soldiers’ shoulders, we 
share their position, and thus their role as one-of-us, defending us and ours, 
is immediately identified’ (ibid). The ultimate purpose of semiotic analysis is 
a search for understand through the meaning of an image; a similar process 
will  occur throughout this study.  
There are of course drawbacks to this form of analysis; it is laborious, 
technical, and as footnoted, there is a strong interpretive component at work. 
Furthermore, this is primarily concerned with the textual structure itself, and 
not the audience or categories of viewer. Nonetheless, as Allan reminds us 
‘critical researchers have borrowed a range of conceptual tools from various 
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approaches to textual analysis’ (1998, p.98); whilst there are dangers in 
drawing from diverse critical methods,  
real life — is multi-faceted, and its adequate study requires various theories 
and approaches applied together. No single approach is capable of providing 
more than the partial picture of social reality permitted by its own narrow 
perspectives and conceptual limitations. In this sense we should welcome 
eclecticism, not apologise for it (Halloran, 2010). 
Methodology: Semiotics  
Corner suggests that we must ‘develop closer and better micro-analysis, of 
the language and image of the media’ if we are to explore our relationship 
with a news text (1995, p.143). This semiotic analysis will then follow the 
theory of Kress and Van Leeuwen (1996), who advocate identifying the sign 
in line to three principle dimensions (representational, meta-functional and 
compositional) determining what these signify, and finally exploring the 
meanings of the signs in a cultural context (in this case, the context of the 
Troubles). Using semiotics to augment the content analysis qualitative data 
allows extra depth to be gained in this research; whilst a long shot can 
therefore show a location and people from a distance, on a semiotic level it 
can decrease their individuality (being unable to discern individual features) 
and transform them into types. Depicting people in groups can similarly 
decrease individuality, particularly if similarity is enforced and enhanced by 
the use of similar poses (particularly for Barthes), gestures, costume, or 
synchronised action. Therefore to again draw on the example provided by 
Fiske and Hartley, the myth of the army itself is propagated by the sign of 
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fatigue clad soldiers on the news ‘issuing from the heavy double gates of the 
fort into a suburban street. They move in a ritualistic, crouching glide, in a 
predetermined order to predetermined positions’ (2004, p.27) Such an image 
would become a familiar sight across BBC reportage of the Troubles; 
conversely, the IRA would seek to subvert the sign by creation of their own 
ritualistic, performative acts (i.e. staged funeral proceedings).  
Semiotics as a tool for analysis attempts to qualitatively place content in a 
larger cultural context of meaning. As Rose suggests, semiotics ‘confronts the 
question of how images make meanings head on. It is not simply 
descriptive..nor does it rely on quantitative estimations of significance’ (2016, 
p.106). Rose is here consciously echoing Corner’s desire for “closer and better 
micro-analysis” when she states semiotic analysis requires ‘taking an image 
apart and tracing how it works in relation to broader systems of 
meaning’ (ibid). Hall similarly argues that in so doing, we are looking for the 
patterns that point towards meaning (1975). It is through such a process 
(explicitly in an academic sense; implicitly in a passive viewer sense) that 
understanding is possible. It can also be stressed that this study focuses on 
existing materials and images; as Jensen argues, ‘the data are “found” rather 
than ‘made’ through the researcher’s intervention in the field’ (2002, p.243).  
With the content analysis coded date providing denotative details, it is then 
necessary to identify what signifiers have been created. The expansive corpus 
of footage will be examined for signs and themes within patterns of coverage. 
Amongst the subject matter clues sought were the presence (absence) of 
 123
religious and cultural symbols, Fiske and Hartley’s visual thesaurus of war, 
iconography of terrorism, images of warfare, violence, and the security 
apparatus of the state. Each was investigated within the overarching 
perspective of the news, a constructed entity, carefully composed of a number 
of items, all linked together in a coherent and recognisable manner to ensure 
the whole programme flows as a totality. These include, as detailed, the 
introductory sequence (central to myth forming), headlines, the actual news 
reports (themselves made up of a variety of items), summaries, sign-offs and 
credits. As Bignell notes 'the representation of reality offered by TV news is 
not reality itself, but reality mediated by the signs, codes, myths and 
ideologies of news’ (2002, p.112). Throughout the following chapters, the 








frighten ten thousand. 
Sun Tzu  






Today we were unlucky, but remember we only have to be lucky once            
(cited by Hoffman,  2004, p.254) 
On October 12th 1984, a bomb exploded at the Grand Hotel, Brighton, 
England, in an attempted assassination of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher 
and her cabinet. Provisional IRA member Patrick Magee — who served 
fourteen years in prison for planting the bomb — would however repudiate 
the nomenclature terrorist. For Magee, the term is a  
debased currency…more often applied tendentiously or pejoratively,  
not to explain or clarify but to obscure. “Terrorism” has become a  
non-explanation designed to perpetuate injustice, repression,  
and many gross asymmetries of power’ (English, 2009, p.1).  
The phenomenon of terrorism is ‘shrouded in terminological confusion’, one 
which surpasses mere semantic contestation; as Schlesinger et al. note, ‘real 
political outcomes are at stake’ (Schlesinger et al., 1983, p.1). As detailed in 
the introduction then, the very term terrorism is value laden and in constant 
modulation. Whilst Hoffman declares the design of terrorism is to ‘instil fear 
within’, the dividing line where fear slips into terror is particularly unclear 
(2013, p.40). Indeed it will never be clear since these subjects are intensely 
contested. Similarly, the manner in which the public relate to the term is 
shifting as the line fluctuates. Philosopher Michael Walzer suggested three-
forms of terrorism in 2002: national liberation/revolutionary movement (e.g. 
the IRA, PLO, Eta), state (e.g. the Argentine “disappearances”) and war (e.g. 
Hiroshima) (Walzer, 2004, pp.130-131). However grouping together 
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disparate organisations under such rubric, including the common 
“international terrorism”, effectively eliminates the ‘complexity and 
specificity of the circumstances which have produced these movements…they 
are detached from their particular history and redefined as part of a general 
phenomenon’ (Schlesinger et al., 1983, p.3). As Jason Burke points out, ‘there 
are multiple ways of defining terrorism, and all are subjective…none is 
satisfactory and grave problems with the use of term persist’ (2003, p.22).  
What can be recognised is the contemporary connection to media. Yet, even 
prior to the communications age, the relationship between terrorism and 
publicity was apparent. In its earliest manifestations, for example, zealots 
and assassins, attacking in the midst of crowded market places deliberately 
played to an audience far beyond their immediate victims (Chaliand and Blin, 
2007).  
Ireland 
The “Troubles” in Northern Ireland are 
generally understood to refer to a murderous dispute which for the past 
quarter century only, has come to involve the English and the Irish in 
sectarian quarrel in the north-eastern part of Ireland commonly, but 
erroneously referred to as “Ulster” (Coogan, 2002, p.1).  
Whilst such a euphemistic colloquialism is itself somewhat reductive, it is 
popularly accepted and will be used throughout this work to refer to the 
terrorism and violence of 1968 to 1998. 
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Any treatment must first address the origins of the ethno-political conflict, 
dating back to at least the twelfth century. Nationalists point to the Anglo-
Norman invasion of 1169 as the first instance of colonisation, ‘the starting 
point for eight hundred years of British oppression’ (ibid, p.2). The 
Plantation of Ulster in 1606 and 1609, the latter controlled by King James I of 
England (VI of Scotland), resulted in the forced confiscation of land and 
further displacement of the Irish population. The nationalist narrative is 
dominated by the Irish confederate wars (1641-1653), the Williamite war 
(1689-1691), the formal annexation of Ireland and incorporation into the 
United Kingdom with the Acts of Union 1800, and the Great Famine of the 
1840s.   24
Attempts to introduce Home Rule took place throughout the late 18th and 
early 19th centuries and three years after the 1916 Easter Rising, the first Dáil 
Éireann (Assembly of Ireland) parliament issued the Irish Declaration of 
Independence and the Irish War of Independence began. The following year, 
representatives of the British government and Irish Nationalists signed the 
Government of Ireland Act of 1920 (effectively the Fourth Home Rule Bill), 
which partitioned Ireland into two devolved administrations; the Six 
Counties in the northernmost part of the island became Northern Ireland. 
 Bardon (2009) provides a general introductory overview to Irish history. Specific accounts 24
of the Easter Rising include Coogan (2005) and Townshend (2011). Townshend (2014) 
details the immediate aftermath, Patterson (2007) explores the post World War Two period, 
whilst Ferriter (2005) delves deeply into the complete century. Taylor’s trilogy (1998, 2000, 
2002) are useful for an understanding of the central factions involved in the Troubles, 
including details on the origins. The political situation is detailed by Aughey and Morrow 
(1996) and Bew et al. (2002); Craig provides a particular focus on politics and diplomatic 
relations at the start of the Troubles. This historical overview is a synthesis of these texts. 
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The Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 then established the Irish Free State 
(comprising the twenty-six southern counties) as a dominion on 6th 
December 1922. Fifteen years later, the 1922 constitution was replaced by 
referendum, and the entirely sovereign state of the Republic of Ireland was 
formed. 
Northern Ireland was a unique construct; not coinciding with any traditional 
boundaries, it reinforced the power of Protestants holding the majority share 
of population (in the six counties, a minority community on the island). The 
architecture of the political structure replaced initial proportional 
representation with a first-past-the-post arrangement. Coupled with 
judicious electoral boundary changes, Unionists were able to guarantee 
around 40 of the available 52 seats in the Stormont parliament.  The use of 
such gerrymandering saw Nationalist controlled councils decrease from 
twenty-five in 1920 to just four in 1925.  
Systematic economic discrimination against Catholics occurred with Unionist 
politicians controlling all aspects of social and economic activity, including 
housing and industry. Areas of Catholic majority suffered high 
unemployment and rampant poverty. Prior to 1969, only those who owned 
houses and businesses could vote; those in the former received two votes, 
whilst the latter was calculated according to the number of staff. Due to 
restrictions on Catholic housing and employment they were therefore 
restricted in voting rights. The Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) police force 
and an armed reserve paramilitary force of the Ulster Special Constabulary, 
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(commonly called the “B Specials”) supported this Unionist control. Both 
were protestant dominated, with representation of Catholics in the RUC not 
exceeding 20%. Security forces could also utilise the provisions of the Special 
Powers Act 1922, which allowed wide-ranging powers of search and arrest 
and detention without trial.  
A Report of the Commission appointed by the Governor of Northern Ireland 
would detail the causes of disorder in 1969, detailing decades of systematic 
discrimination: 
(1) A rising sense of continuing injustice and grievance among large sections 
of the Catholic population in Northern Ireland in respect of (i) inadequacy of 
housing provision by certain local authorities (ii) unfair methods of allocation 
of houses built and let by such authorities, in particular; refusals and 
omissions to adopt a 'points' system in determining priorities and making 
allocations (iii) misuse in certain cases of discretionary powers of allocation 
of houses in order to perpetuate Unionist control of the local authority. 
(2) Complaints, now well documented in fact, of discrimination in the making 
of local government appointments, at all levels but especially in senior posts, 
to the prejudice of non-Unionists and especially Catholic members of the 
community, in some Unionist controlled authorities.  
(3) Complaints, again well documented, in some cases of deliberate 
manipulation of local government electoral boundaries and in others a 
refusal to apply for their necessary extension, in order to achieve and 
maintain Unionist control of local authorities and so to deny to Catholics 
influence in local government proportionate to their numbers  
(Lord Cameron, 1969).  
The IRA 
Claiming lineage to the Irish Volunteers (who staged the 1916 Easter Rising), 
the Irish Republican Army underwent a schism following the signing of the 
Anglo-Irish treaty. Opposed to the treaty, due to its failure to create a united 
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free Irish republic, the IRA fought free state forces during the Irish civil war. 
However they were not equipped nor trained to fight conventional warfare 
and quickly resorted to guerrilla tactics. The internal oppositions and 
fractured politics of the group however are highlighted by the fact IRA units 
within Northern Ireland largely supported the Free State forces. Indeed 
Peadar O'Donnell, a left wing IRA commander is recorded as saying ‘we don't 
have an IRA battalion in Belfast, we have a battalion of armed 
Catholics’ (Engeland and Rudolph, 2008, p.54). Outlawed by President 
Éamon de Valera in 1936, and suffering from reduced numbers, the 
remainder of the organisation attempted a bombing campaign in Great 
Britain, collaborated with the intelligence agency of Nazi Germany, and 
commenced a “Northern Campaign” across the border. This proved 
disastrous and concluded barely three months after it began. Internment 
effectively crippled the organisation and in 1950, the IRA renounced military 
attacks and ‘all types of aggression in the Twenty-Six county area’, focusing 
instead on a policy proclaimed the prior year: 
The aim of the army (IRA) is simply to drive the invader from the soil of 
Ireland and to restore the sovereign independent Republic proclaimed in 
1916. To that end, the policy is to prosecute a successful military campaign 
against the British forces of occupation in the Six Counties  
(Coogan, 2002, p.256). 
This military action began with a Border Campaign in 1956, a series of attacks 
that proved limited in their impact; again, internment (and military courts in 
the South) drastically affected operations, morale and funding. Tim Pat 
Coogan suggests that the campaign is more accurately referred to as 
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incidents, ‘because that is in fact what it was: a series of incidents along the 
border, impinging very little on Belfast, and annoying rather then terrifying 
the Northern administration’ (2002, p.303). David McKittrick (2005) 
suggests it ‘petered out ignominiously, apparently consigning the 
organisation to history’ and a formal declaration of campaign’s conclusion 
was announced in 1962:  
The leadership of the Resistance Movement has ordered the termination of 
the Campaign of Resistance to British occupation launched on 12 December 
1956…It calls on the Irish people for increased support and looks forward 
with confidence — in co-operation with the other branches of the Republican 
Movement - to a period of consolidation, expansion and preparation for the 
final and victorious phase of the struggle for the full freedom of Ireland 
(Jordan, 2002, p.28). 
For the remainder of the decade, the IRA was inactive; ’the green sea of 
support had largely dried up (Bowyer Bell, 1997, p.334)’. However with 
Loyalist anger at the reforms of Prime Minister Terence O’Neill resulting in 
increased attacks and unrest, the IRA — with a stated aim of defending the 
Catholic minority — quickly returned to violence. 
Civil Rights and Television Sights 
Throughout the world, the 1960s became a decade of radical change; in 
Africa, 32 countries gained independence from their European colonial rulers 
whilst in America, the peace movement and opposition to the Vietnam War 
gained popularity. Across countries, support for social protest groups — 
including civil rights, women’s rights, welfare, environmentalism, against 
racism and for gay liberation — rapidly increased. A student movement 
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resulted in numerous protests across West Germany whilst Martin Luther 
King, prominent leader of the African-American Civil Rights Movement was 
assassinated in 1968 and is positioned as a defining event in black politics 
and the (continued) quest for equality (Dyson, 2008). In France, the May 
1968 protest almost resulted in the collapse of President Charles de Gaulle's 
government.  
In 1958, the Nationalist party of Ireland, alongside the Northern Ireland 
Labour Party, introduced a resolution at Stormont, announcing Northern 
Ireland to be ‘the only part of these islands which denies universal adult 
suffrage in local government elections’ (Edwards & McGrattan, 2000, p.16). 
Several years later, the first generation of Catholics to grow up after the 
Second World War were benefiting from the 1949 Education Act, gaining a 
greater education and in turn demanding greater rights. In November 1966, 
in the War Memorial building in Belfast, members of various Wolfe Tone 
societies gathered to hold a public meeting on the issue of civil rights.  Two 25
main speakers spoke on the topics of ‘Civil Liberty — Ireland Today’ and 
‘Human Rights, An International Perspective’; overall support led to a second 
meeting in January 1967, attended by over one hundred people, including 
representatives from all Northern Ireland political parties. Three months 
later, the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association officially came into 
existence. NICRA would later write, ‘after 47 years…the question of civil 
 Theobald Wolfe Tone was one of the founders of the Society of United Irishmen and is 25
generally regarded as the father of Irish Republicanism; see Macdermot (1968). 
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rights was tackled seriously for the first time in 1967. It was…the beginning of 
a new era for Northern Ireland’ (1978). 
Television made all sides aware of the power of mass demonstration in 1968, 
including the March 17 anti-war demonstration in Grosvenor Square, 
London, May in Paris and August in Chicago at the Democratic National 
Convention. In Ireland, members of NICRA ‘deliberately sought to create the 
same kind of atmosphere in the North’ (Feeney, 2004, p.17). They would 
consciously model their tactics of direct action, non-violence and peaceful 
protest on the American Civil Rights movement, appropriating the anthem 
‘We Shall Overcome’ on their first civil rights march from Coalisland to 
Dungannon on Saturday August 24, 1968.  The significance of this 26
association, both tactical and aurally, cannot be understated: it was not an 
Irish Nationalist song selected. The Civil Rights campaign disoriented the 
majority population who were witnessing a clear victory in the propaganda 
battle.  
The original ‘rights’ claims were about issues of participation — how can we 
become accepted members of society? — and of distribution — how can we 
enjoy the full civil and social benefits entailed in being citizens. In short the 
campaign produced a revolution in rising expectations. When these could not 
be delivered speedily enough the criss became a ore fundamental one of 
identity and legitimacy (Arthur, 1996, p.16-17). 
Educated and articulate, the Civil Rights movement adopted a sophisticated 
model of rhetoric and representation, invoking the universal language of 
rights. Protestors had six particular demands: 
 The 2002 film Bloody Sunday also shows the song being sung prior to the events of 30th 26
January 1972 in the Bogside area of Derry. 
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An ending of the plural voting system in council elections,                          
simplified into a call for ‘one man, one vote’;                                                                                            
an end to discrimination and gerrymandering;                                           
machinery to deal with complaints against public authorities;                                 
the disbandment of the B-Specials;  
fair play in public housing allocations;  
and an end to the Special Powers Act (cited in Coogan, 2002, p.67). 
Despite some 4,000 attending this first march, it failed to gain significant 
attention. Instead the eyes of the world’s press were focused on the Russian 
invasion of Czechoslovakia three days prior. As such, without a crucial visual 
element — the arresting image of thousands marching in solidarity — there 
was no sustained media coverage across the BBC. Indeed the march was 
ignored; Pierre Bourdieu is again relevant: ‘Successful demonstrations are 
not those which mobilise the greatest number of people, but those which 
attract the greatest interest among journalists’ (cited by Hobsbawm, 1994, p.
320). Two months later represents the moment the world became aware of 
Northern Ireland, as the Troubles, the people and the country received a new 
context and setting: the television screen.  
The campaign proved impossible to repress or ignore…That pressure 
operated on the ground and also, via media coverage, through Westminster 
and Dublin. Perhaps the central success of the campaign was to attract 
outside attention and to bring outside pressure to bear on the Northern 
Ireland government (Ó Dochartaigh, 1997, p.19). 
October 5th 1968 
Home Secretary (and later Prime Minister) James Callaghan, in an interview 
broadcast by the BBC, believed 1968 to be ‘a remarkable year…a general air of 
disturbance existed throughout the world’ (archival footage, The Battle of the 
 138
Bogside 07/01/08). Following previous marches, NICRA were invited to 
march in Derry by the Derry Housing Action Committee (DHAC) and an 
ad-hoc committee set the march for Saturday 5th October. On October 1st, the 
Apprentice Boys of Derry declared they would also march along the same 
proposed route, on the same date, at the same time. William Craig, then 
Home Affairs Minister, banned both marches under the Public Order Act. 
Such a tactic was used several times, both before and after the Derry march, 
with possible conflict between the two providing the necessary justification 
for an overall ban. On Friday 4th, a NICRA delegation in consultation with 
local organisers, decided their march would go ahead. 
Accompanied by several Stormont ministers and members of the London 
Parliament, including Belfast MP and founder of the Social Democratic and 
Labour Party (SDLP) Gerry Fitt, the march proposed to walk from Duke 
Street to the centre of the city. Following violence at the August march, Gay 
O’Brien, a cameraman for RTE (Raidió Teilifís Éireann, state broadcaster for 
the Republic of Ireland) was also present. Around 400 people marched, with 
a further 200 observing from the street, however upon departure, they were 
stopped by a blockade of the RUC and there were brief clashes between the 
two groups. Simultaneously, RUC forces moved into position behind the 
marching column, preventing an exit back along Duke Street. Betty Sinclair, 
NICRA member and one of organising committee, addressed the crowd and 
advised dispersal. 
The RUC however attacked the crowd, baton charging marchers. According 
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to one historian, ‘There was a huge innocence about the day…no one had any 
sense that the police would attack’ (Keenan, 2008). Following the initial 
baton attack, water cannons drove demonstrators across Craigavon Bridge. 
Seventy-seven were injured, including several politicians. Shooting with an 
Auricon 16mm film camera, Gay O’Brien’s presence transformed a small-
localised campaign into a mass movement. He recorded twelve minutes of 
astonishing black and white footage, from the beginning of the attack, to the 
panicked confusion that followed. He also captured the aftermath of MP 
Gerry Fitt deliberately allowing blood from a baton wound on his head to 
pour down his ashen face. The propaganda campaign had begun: 
Gerry Fitt was interviewed by television reporters as he stood at the scene of 
the RUC's charge, his jacket, tie and shirt spotted with blood. This image of a 
member of the British Parliament, wounded during an unprovoked police 
charge as he attempted to march in support of one person/one vote, was 
flashed into millions of British homes and all around the world that October 
evening. English people, almost totally ignorant of the situation in the Six 
Counties, could hardly believe what they were seeing on their "tellys". This 
was part of the United Kingdom in the year 1968? Peaceful demonstrators 
were being beaten and arrested for demanding the passage of anti-
discrimination laws? What sort of place was Northern Ireland anyway?  
And why was it that the marchers' complaints had never once been fully 
discussed at Westminster? (Kelley,  1981, p.104) 
Having recently joined the newly established news-film pooling system, 
RTE’s footage was broadcast to the wider world by the BBC; according to 
historian Rex Cathcart, it ‘featured prominently on the BBC network news…
[and] proved sensational’ (1984, p.208). This footage then, as detailed, 
indicates the commencement of television coverage of Northern Ireland 
conflict and the propaganda war. With strong, on-the-scene, cinéma vérité 
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style documentary reportage, startlingly raw and unrestrained in a visual 
sense, it captured attention and set forth Sontag and Levi Strauss’s 
“evidence”.  
Two days of serious rioting followed in Derry, with the first petrol bombs 
thrown in anger. 20,000 people joined a reprisal march along the same route 
the following month. Broadcast by the BBC, it carried an enormous effect, 
with images of British forces attacking civilians flashing around the globe: 
The campaign proved impossible to repress or ignore. It exerted pressure on 
the Unionist government of Northern Ireland, not only as a huge media 
spectacle, but also through sheer force of numbers on the streets. That 
pressure operated on the ground and also, via media coverage, through 
Westminster and Dublin. Perhaps the central success of the campaign was to 
attract outside attention and to bring outside pressure to bear on the 
Northern Ireland government (Ó Dochartaigh, 1997, p.19). 
Simon Winchester, a reporter for The Guardian, was dispatched to the 
country in 1970. His description of BBC footage is masterful. To quote in full: 
There was terrible, terrible trouble. For the first time the men and women in 
England who watched the news that misty Saturday night with the day’s 
football over and the teapot or the tankard dry, saw something they could 
never forget. They saw grim-faced policemen battering student girls to the 
ground – the constables with long batons, the officers with gnarled, shiny 
sticks known as blackthorns. They saw water cannons trundling through the 
streets firing volley after volley of cold water to smash through a crowd not 
very different from the crowds who gathered almost every weekend in 
Trafalgar Square or at Hyde Park. They saw that the policemen carried guns…
few can have known that any British policemen were armed. They saw a 
Westminster MP — or a man who was identified as such — named Gerry Fitt, 
being led away with blood streaming from a cut in his head…they saw 
recognisable British MPs, who had gone across to Londonderry to observe a 
march whose origins they did not know and of whose repercussions they had 
no idea, seething with anger at the ‘brutality’ of the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary, as they police were named. And they saw notices with curiously 
African and Asian requests, like ‘One Man – One Vote’, a request they were 
sure had not been recently denied in the British Isles (1974, p.28-29).   
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At the end of November, with the footage resulting in increased public 
attention and awareness, the Stormont Government announced the 
appointment of a reform package, including the abolition of the Special 
Powers Act and the allocation of housing by local authorities based on need. 
In turn, NICRA would announce a ban on marches for one month. Terrence 
O’Neill appealed for calm in what would become known as the “crossroads 
speech”. He questioned 
What kind of Ulster do you want? A happy and respected province, in good 
standing with the rest of the UK, or a place continually torn apart by riots and 
demonstrations? (Bruce, 2007, p.96)  
Formed in the aftermath of October 5th, The People’s Democracy (PD) was a 
radical student led movement based at Queen’s University Belfast. Inspired 
by the actions of similar student movements, the PD planned a one-hundred-
and-twenty-kilometre long march from Belfast to Derry, modelled on the 
American civil rights march from Selma to Montgomery. Harassed along the 
way, as they provocatively marched through Loyalist districts, violence 
exploded at Burntollet Bridge, five miles from Derry. 200 Loyalists, including 
off-duty members of the 'B-Specials' ambushed marchers, attacking with 
clubs and stones. The RUC, who had accompanied the fifty or so marchers 
from Belfast, did not intervene in the attacks, standing by and observing. 
Indeed the nature of the police cordon, directed the marchers into a lane 
where attackers waited.  Again, members of the media were present, 27
recording footage that would lead to the formation of the Cameron 
 See eyewitness accounts in Egan and McCormack (1969).27
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Commission, an investigation into the causes of the disturbances. The 
Reverend Ian Paisley, founder of the staunchly Protestant Democratic 
Unionist Party (DUP), would call this ‘a betrayal of the Ulster people to the 
rebels’ and with O’Neill contemplating reform, Unionists believed Stormont 
was capitulating to the Catholic community (Bruce, 2007, p.96). Historian 
and Professor of Irish politics Paul Bew believes the ambush at Burntollet 
Bridge was ‘the spark that lit the prairie fire’, remarking  
It could be argued that the march marks the pivotal point at which the 
Troubles changed from being primarily about civil rights to being  
about the more traditional disputes concerning national and  
religious identities (Bew, 2007, p.493).  
According to Peter Taylor, in a BBC documentary, ‘the flames spread from 
Derry to Belfast…marching gave way to murder and a more sinister phase 
began’ (Timewatch, 27.01.93). Tim Pat Coogan suggests the violence came 
upon the two countries ‘both gradually and suddenly…bursting upon an 
unsuspecting population with appalling suddenness’ (Coogan, 2002, p.1). The 
BBC — indeed the world’s media in general — would similarly be caught 
unaware.  Coverage of NI prior to the cataclysmic events of 1968 was minimal 
and incidental. What broadcast journalism did not do was explain or 
investigate the connections between the various disquieting, but apparently 
discrete episodes occurring during the second half of the decade. What was 
missing, in other words, was real analysis of the background causes of the 
disturbance, a historical and religious framing.  
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Within days of Terence O’Neill’s departure in April 1969, the BBC directed 
that all reporting would now go via the controller of NI region, desiring that 
television coverage should not exacerbate the situation. The fear that 
television pictures might contribute to a breakdown of public order became 
the primary concern of management and senior broadcasters. Here there was 
already a tacit recognition, amongst politicians and broadcasters, that the 
visual representation of events would be crucial.  
In addition, because the BBC had a “no opting out” editorial policy, all 
network programs had to be presentable on BBC NI, effectively allowing 
circumstances in Belfast to define the frame of reference for national news. 
This was the tail waging the dog. Military intervention and media 
intransigence transported NI to the centre of British politics and primetime 
on the television screen.  
BBC 
Prior to the explosion of violence in 1968, Northern Ireland was, for 
mainstream British culture, ‘an obscure and unknown periphery, little 
acknowledged and rarely featured’ (McLoone, 1996, p.80). It was convention 
for BBC reporting to be separate: Ireland reported on Ireland whilst the 
mainland reported on mainland issues; the affairs of the province were never 
discussed in the House of Commons and were therefore not broadcast to the 
wider British public. When the first BBC radio station was formed in 1926, 
the Unionist hierarchy sought to establish a symbiotic relationship, initiating 
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this audio-visual partition; Gerald Beadle, former Director of BBC television:  
Mine was a task of consolidation, which meant building the  
BBC into the lives of the province and making it one of their public 
institutions… I was invited to become a member of the Ulster Club; the 
Governor, the Duke of Abercorn, was immensely helpful and friendly,  
and  Lord Craigavon, the Prime Minster, was a keen supporter of our  
work. In effect I was made a member of the Establishment…  
(Schlesinger, 1983, p.206). 
During the early years of radio broadcasting, for example, results of Gaelic 
football matches were not aired. This was combined with a general trend of 
avoiding news regarding provocative Unionist activities, such as the Orange 
Order July 12th demonstrations. Throughout World War Two, and in the 
immediate post-war period, it was BBC policy to not admit any attack on the 
constitutional position of Northern Ireland; when such programming arose 
(as in the case of an interview with an actress expressing sympathy for IRA 
internees) it was not broadcast in the North. BBC programming essentially 
drew direction from a 1930 document on the position of the BBC regional 
service, which ‘reflects the sentiments of the people who have always 
maintained unswerving loyalty to British ideals and British culture. Northern 
Ireland relies on broadcasting to strengthen its common loyalties within 
Britain’ (cited by Curtis, 1998, p.19). 
Following the broadcast of a Tonight current affairs episode in January 1959, 
the BBC received particularly strong criticism. Presented by Alan Whicker, 
the series consisted of eight ten-minute episodes, the first focusing on betting 
shops. However the opening sequence, amidst location setting shots of 
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Stormont and Belfast City Hall, featured graffiti — “No Pope Here” and “Vote 
Sinn Féin” — alongside a mention of armed policing and the absence of 
conscription. The following day, a bishop flew to London to complain, a BBC 
crew covering a football match were attacked, Stormont threatened to remove 
broadcasting rights from the BBC, and the controller issued an apology at the 
distress and indignation caused (Curtis, 1998, p.21). The remaining seven 
episodes were not shown; the BBC would not present another programme on 
the Six Counties for several years.  
The BBC then entered into a major news story, one demanding immediate 
and detailed media attention, quite unprepared for the complexities of 
coverage. They were effectively broadcasting to two distinct communities, 
two cultures within one province, where ‘due to the double-codedness of local 
political cultures, every utterance has a dual interpretation attached and, 
quite often, a dual intent’ (Butler, 1996, p.134). Every broadcast would, and 
continues to a lesser intent, to be underscored by these difficulties. Prior to 
1968, few programmes regarding with the region had been broadcast to a 
national audience. Those that did, proved problematic; Alan Parkinson points 
to the example of Richard Dimbleby’s interview with the premier of Northern 
Ireland Basil Brooke which saw the former ask the latter, ‘What exactly is this 
I-R-A?’ (cited in Parkinson, 1998, p.71). 
Initially, media organisations, particularly the BBC due to its place in the 
political domain and role as national broadcaster, were constrained into a 
patriotic stance of supporting the “national interest”. For example, violence of 
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the security forces would be situated in a legitimating framework, 
emphasising its necessity. Northern Ireland controller Richard Francis, in a 
1977 lecture pointed to the BBC’s name as inherently problematic since ‘the 
very title creates an expectation on the part of some people on the loyalist 
side that we should overtly support British institutions… on the other hand, 
the “British” in our title creates an air of suspicion among 
republicans’ (Francis, 1996, p.57). 
Until ITV (in the form of Ulster television) arrived in the North in 1959, the 
BBC monopolised broadcasting. Gaining a significant audience proportion, 
UTV forced the BBC into a measure of liberalisation during the 60s. 
However, Unionists continued to exert fierce pressure on programming, 
constraining reportage. Liz Curtis details a Tonight reporter who quit because 
‘he was not allowed to make a film about gerrymandering’ (Curtis, 1998, p.
22). She also suggests that members of the broadcaster feel the failing of the 
BBC to report on the earliest incidences of the civil rights movement 
‘contributed to the conflict by forcing nationalists to pursue their legitimate 
aims outside the democratic framework’ (ibid, p.23).  
It was only with the broadcast of footage of the October 5th March however, 
that matters changed; as the Irish Times declared, ‘Let’s make no mistake 
about it…the marches would not have mattered two pence if the TV cameras 
had not been there’ (Cathcart, 1984, p.209). Such a sentiment was to be 
echoed by the Prime Minster in the House of Commons; when the Grand 
Master of the Ulster Orange Order William Orr suggested the debate was 
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‘mischief making’, Harold Wilson responded (and perhaps revealed a little of 
his own sympathies): ‘Up till now we have perhaps had to rely on the 
statements of himself and others on these matters. Since then we have had 
British television’ (Coogan, 2002, p.73). This represents an implicit 
endorsement of the aforementioned Sontag (along with explicit endorsement 
of the framing of the BBC) and simultaneously stands in opposition to Davis 
and Walton: it was the representation of events, and not the associated 
framing, lacking in contextualisation and comprehension, that demanded 
attention. 
Lord Hill, the chairman of the BBC, would later write, ‘one of the hardest 
tests in the history of the BBC came in 1969, when we were broadcasting to 
the people of Northern Ireland at a time when argument had burst into the 
violence of stones, petrol bombs and firearms’ (cited by Cathcart, 1984, p.
214). 
To quote BBC reporter Keith Kyle in full: 
Nevertheless, to come to Northern Ireland at that particular time was to 
experience quite a shock. Having been a foreign correspondent in the United 
States during the civil rights’ movement, in Africa and in the Middle East, I 
was hardly a stranger to political breakdown and civil strife. Yet this had 
always been a matter of reporting from abroad, of seeking to convey to a 
British audience the elements of a situation that was exotic; now a 
comparable situation was occurring at home, but in a setting with which the 
vast bulk of the audience could not be expected to identify indistinctly as a 
domestic one. Some of the actions displayed and opinions expressed must, 
indeed, have appeared to people on the mainland as coming from the dark 
side of the moon. It was going to be no easy task to explain how a domestic 
political crisis in a part of the United Kingdom in the mid-twentieth century 
could involve the extensive use of violence, the burning of houses, the 
expression of political views in vehemently sectarian terms. On the one hand, 
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it was necessary to ensure that British people felt it was their crisis, not 
someone else’s that they were looking in at; if they were to take it seriously 
they must sample the depth and intensity of the passions involved. Yet at the 
same time we were going to have to bear in mind that what was transmitted 
nationally could be received locally, what we said and what we showed could 
directly affect the course of events (Kyle, 1996, pp.105-106).  
The inherent nature of the medium lends itself to visuals, and as such, it 
became difficult for television news to be both impartial and responsible. 
Indeed television is a crucial weapon for the non-violent campaigner; it is 
needed to provoke through the act of exposing “evidence”. Television is then 
a very visible presence on any scene, with symbolic gestures (often directly 
concerning other symbolic symbols) becoming a de facto visual language for 
all. In one early BBC broadcast covering the civil rights campaign, an Irish 
Republic flag was displayed in the nationalist Bogside area of Derry. The 
broadcast shows, a point reiterated by the reporter’s language, a well known 
IRA veteran removing the flag (17.10.68). Interestingly, without the rhetorical 
framing accompanying the broadcast, an entirely different situation, and 
symbolic image, would have been suggested.  
Such an act echoes the deliberate campaign song selection, a carefully crafted 
act of propaganda, aimed at both the immediate community and the wider 
television audience. Yet television broadcast news was profoundly 
unprepared for the violence that was to follow. Unsure of how to proceed 
visually, the BBC introduced a ‘temporary departure from normal journalistic 
considerations’ where events could only be explained and not shown (Kyle, 
1996, p.109). This then highlights multiple key issues: images were 
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recognised as a central component of broadcasting; the BBC were unsure how 
events should be represented visually; description should take precedence 
over analysis; (self) censorship was a means of response. The failure of BBC 
reporting in the early months was then a failure to initiate appropriate 
journalistic principles, a failure to grasp the underlying political reality, and a 
failure to frame these events appropriately.  
On July 14th Francis McCloskey, a 67-year-old Catholic civilian died after 
being attacked by the RUC in County Derry. His death, two days after the 
traditional July 12th Protestant celebrations of the Glorious Revolution of 
1688 and the victory of William of Orange at the 1690 Battle of the Boyne, 
would be the first of the conflict. Republicans in nearby Derry subsequently 
established the Derry Citizens’ Defence Association (DCDA) prior to the 
annual Apprentice Boys of Derry march on 12th August at the height of the 
“marching season”.  As Citizens Defence Associations gave way to 28
paramilitary organisations, the British public received little explanation on 
the underlying issues of sovereignty, territory and identity.  
The Battle of the Bogside 
Based in Derry, The Apprentice Boys is a Protestant fraternal society, formed 
to commemorate the 1689 siege of Derry by the Catholic James II. Whilst the 
 The DCDA (consisting of local residents, activists, members of the Republican Club and 28
several individuals associated with the IRA) stated their aim was to keep the peace, and 
defend the Bogside, a predominantly Catholic neighbourhood outside the city walls of Derry. 
The marching season is a period from June to September during which some 3,000 marches 
by the Orange Order occur. Many of these were marred by violence. (See McCann, 1993). 
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majority of political marches were declared illegal, exceptions were made for 
Orange Order marches deemed to be “traditional”. On 12th August 1969, the 
march passed close to the junction of Waterloo Place and William Street 
where trouble flared. Initial taunts gave way to the throwing of stones, 
continuing for two hours, before the RUC (and Loyalist marchers) charged 
Nationalists, pushing them into the Bogside itself. As the confrontation 
escalated, large crowds in the Bogside manned pre-prepared barricades, 
throwing petrol bombs and forcing the police forces and Loyalists out of the 
area. The RUC, with armoured cars and water cannons, again attempted to 
enter the Bogside using CS gas; some thousand canisters were released in the 
densely populated residential area (McLean, 1997). 
On the second day, activists in Derry and from NICRA appealed for 
demonstrations across Ireland, officially in support of Nationalists in Derry 
but ostensibly ‘to divert police resources away from the city’ (and in 
particular, the Bogside area); Bishop and Mallie note that this increased 
tension placed both communities  
in the grip of a mounting paranoia about the other's intentions. Catholics 
were convinced that they were about to become victims of a Protestant 
pogrom; Protestants that they were on the eve of an IRA insurrection  
(1987, p.77) 
Jack Lynch, Taoiseach of the Irish Republic , further exacerbated the 
situation, stating he ‘could not stand by and watch innocent people injured 
and perhaps worse’. He duly promised to send the Irish Army to the border to 
provide medial assistance (Jordan, 2002, p.88). Whilst nationalists believed 
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troops would support them, Unionists across Northern Ireland feared 
imminent invasion. Rioting spread across the Six Counties, stretching the 
abilities of the RUC; police stations were attacked in Belfast and Newry 
before rioting deteriorated into sectarian conflict.  Loyalists began burning 29
homes and businesses and mass Catholic evacuations occurred from central 
Belfast (particularly Bombay Street) to Andersonstown on the western 
periphery of the city. Believing they were under attack in Divis Street, the 
RUC opened fire on a high-rise tower block; thirteen flats were hit as 
Browning machine guns mounted on Shorland armoured personnel carriers 
fired high-velocity .30 caliber bullets. Tim Pat Coogan:  
The sound of these weapons, magnified in built-up areas, spread panic. The 
bullets tore through walls as if they were cardboard. A nine year old boy, 
Patrick Rooney, was killed as he lay asleep, leaving his distraught father to 
scrape his brains off the wall with a spoon and saucer (2002, p.92). 
The Nationalist opposition walked out of Stormont when the Deputy Home 
Affairs minister announced the mobilisation of 11,000 Protestant B-Specials. 
However before they could deploy in the Bogside area, the Prime Minster of 
NI, James Chichester-Clark requested Harold Wilson send troops to the city. 
At 4.45pm on the 14th of August 1969, a company of soldiers, under orders to 
not breach the barricades nor enter the Bogside, relived the RUC. The 
following day, British armed forces took up duties on the streets of West 
Belfast. Their arrival marked the first direct intervention of the London 
government since Ireland’s partition. Ten people would be killed, over one 
 In Derry, fighting was largely between the RUC and nationalists; in Belfast, it 29
predominantly occurred between the two religious groups.
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hundred and fifty treated for gunshot wounds and seven hundred others 
injured during the course of the rioting. In a subsequent inquiry, Mr. Justice 
Scarman found that 83% of premises damaged belonged to Catholics and of 
some 1800 families displaced, 1500 were Catholic (Feeney, 2014).  
The Battle of the Bogside was a pivotal event in the Troubles. “Peace-lines” 
began to proliferate, evolving from wood and barbed wire obstructions to ten-
meter high concrete barriers, as polarisation intensified across Belfast. RUC 
reorganisation occurred under a former Commissioner of the Metropolitan 
Police Direct and direct rule by proxy was in effect established with the 
arrival of two civil servants from London to direct Stormont affairs. British 
home secretary James Callaghan was, to all intents, governing Northern 
Ireland. The resurgence, split, and future violence of the IRA, can also be 
directly attributed to the events of August 1969;  
republican mural depicting a phoenix and the words "From the ashes of 
Bombay Street rose the Provisionals" appeared in the street. A mural on the 
site today declares: "Bombay Street - never again” (McKittrick, 2005). 
These events also represented a significant moment in the increasingly 
mediatised conflict. Following Burntollet Bridge in January, journalists had 
flooded into the province. In August, amongst the Protestant marchers 
descending on Derry, were ‘some two hundred journalists from around the 
world, including several specialists in civil disorders and guerrilla warfare’. 
As a Times photographer later told the Scarman Tribunal, ‘I was here because 
I knew there was a fair chance that a riot would erupt in the city on the 
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twelfth’ (Stetler, 1970). The expectation of violence created an expectation of 
visuals.  
Much of the footage captured and broadcast by the BBC during the “Battle” 
tended towards the spectacular but was in reality relatively meaningless. 
Images from the Bogside would become familiar signs — bonfires, burning 
vehicles, flames — and over time, these would become the dominant tropes of 
media coverage in Northern Ireland. During initial outbreaks of violence — 
the throwing of stones etc — the RUC did not seek to intervene, and in 
contrast to previous conduct at earlier confrontations, did not retaliate by 
replying in kind. Several have attributed this to the presence of television 
cameras; ‘there was greater candour in the lower ranks who simply admitted 
being conscious of the television cameras around them’ (ibid). Footage 
broadcast on the BBC reveals reporters inside the ranks of the security forces 
as stones and missiles are directed at them, smashing off the road and the 
shields of the RUC. This footage is however descriptive, absent from 
particulars, ‘“sanitised” to ensure all violent outbursts, inflammatory and 
violent accusations were not screened’ (Cathcart, 1984, p.211). Indeed, when 
startling black and white images of destroyed houses was shown on the BBC 
News (14.08.69) — footage of homes on fire, people salvaging objects, footage 
of refugees at a railway station, and concluding with the charred remnants of 
houses — ‘the reports gave no indication who these refugees were’. According 
to Martin Bell, BBC reporter, ‘we made a mistake…[we] just spoke of 
refugees. The public was not to know whether they were Catholic or 
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Protestant…who was attacking whom’ (ibid). This lack of context, of 
illustrative information would reoccur throughout the Troubles.  
Television quickly became the central medium of reportage for the conflict, 
with pictures ‘always a better medium for conveying violence and death than 
the written word’ (Winsby, 1970). Such images of violence proved attractive 
for the media, allowing (a version of) reality to be shown. However, there was 
again a failing, with the profound absence of context and clarity restricting 
the power of the corresponding visuals. Despite this, the Battle of the Bogside 
represented the first instance of a television conflict, where 
the people in whose name the war is being conducted are able to see in their 
own homes the incidents of battle night after night. There is a sharpness of 
impact that goes beyond the reporting of all previous…(The Times, 18.11.71) 
Such horrors would appear throughout the 70s as these initial sporadic acts 
of violence translated into “domestic terrorism”. Internal conflicts would 
arise within the BBC, particularly between staff on site in Ireland and their 
London based colleagues. The Observer details two-newspaper reporters, 
invited to give eyewitness accounts of the August riots, in fact turned away at 
the behest of the controller. The split in the IRA on 28th December 1969 — 
into the Provisional IRA (PIRA) and Official IRA (OIRA) factions — would 
bring daily terror to the streets of Northern Ireland. In attempting to report 
this escalation, the BBC would in turn face dispute with elements of the 
London and Stormont Governments, who both favoured a greater impetus 
towards censorship. Dramatic pictures dominated coverage with an emphasis 
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on the immediacy of the report rather than explanation of the underlying 
causes of the event, even on “open” modes of programming and the periphery 
of television news (late night magazine shows as opposed to the mass 
audience BBC One Evening News broadcasts). 
The framing and determination of an event, alongside the politics of image 
ambiguity, immediately created questions of neutrality, hierarchy, legitimacy 
and objectivity. Such questions would come to dominate coverage as Ireland 
faced a decade of death, destruction and despair. The words of Glasgow 
University academics Greg Philo and Mike Berry, writing regarding media 
coverage of Israel-Palestine in 2008, are both relevant and appropriate here, 
indicating the value of this study (and exemplifying the infamous “doomed to 
repeat history” aphorism of  George Santayana) 
The emphasis here is on “hot” live action and the immediacy of the report 
rather than any explanation of the underlying causes of the events.  
One BBC journalist who had reported on this conflict told us that his own 
editor had said to him that they did not want “explainers” — as he put it: “It’s 
all bang bang stuff.” The driving force behind such news is to hold the 
attention of as many viewers as possible, but in practice, as we will see, it 






Violence is news, whereas peace and harmony are not.  
The terrorists need the media, and the media find in  
terrorism all the ingredients of an exciting story. 
Walter Laqueur 





We use Facebook to schedule the protests and Twitter to coordinate, and 
YouTube to tell the world (Howard, 2011). 
The 2011 Arab Spring moved “social media” to the forefront of public 
consciousness. Facebook, twitter and live online blogs have been credited 
with facilitating a dialogue, ushering in a new age of revolutionary 
movements and citizen journalism. Whilst such a view has diminished 
somewhat — with the impact of television itself gaining greater prominence 
amongst academics — social networking tools transformed political discourse 
and the reporting of (24 hour rolling) news (see Alterman, 2011) through 
effectively validating these protests in their early stages, granting meaning 
and framing through the repetition of semiotically connotative imagery (see 
Werbner et al. 2014). Yet the instantaneous nature of this web 2.0 — 
elevating Paul Virilio’s global speed to an almost hyper-real nature — sets it 
in direct conflict with the mainstream news itself (Armitage, 2001). 
Traditional news values, including impartiality and fact (however tenuous 
these may actually be) are obliterated in the online environment where 
freedom reigns.  
On April 15th 2013, at 2.49pm EDT, two bombs exploded at the finish line of 
the Boston Marathon. As legacy media attempted to maintain relevance with 
new media, CNN and Fox News, citing unnamed law enforcement sources, 
erroneously reported an arrest had been made. Yet online, users at crowd-
sourced news site Reddit (along with the New York Post) wrongly named 
 161
several people as suspects, including theorising a missing Brown University 
student was one of the bombers. Twitter quickly followed this story, alive 
with misinformation and strident critiques of old media’s failings. A fog of 
news war was occurring;  
real life moves much slower than these technologies. There’s a gap between 
facts and comprehension, between finding some pictures online and making 
sense of how they fit into a story. What ends up filling that gap is 
speculation’ (Manjoo, 2013). 
President Barack Obama would pre-empt such sentiments, stating:  
In this age of instant reporting and tweets and blogs, there's a temptation 
to latch on to any bit of information, sometimes to jump to conclusions. 
 But when a tragedy like this happens, with public safety at risk and the 
stakes so high, it's important that we do this right.  That's why we have 
investigations.  That's why we relentlessly gather the facts (2013). 
Former director of BBC News, Richard Sambrook would similarly agree ‘in 
the digital age, social media will always win the race to be first (if not always 
the race to be right)’ (Sambrook and McGuire, 2014). Forty years ago, with 
daily acts of terror on the streets of Ireland, the BBC was required to be both. 
Words War 
Throughout August 1994, the BBC broadcast sixteen programmes exploring 
25 Bloody Years in Northern Ireland. The series sought to reframe events 
through a historical perspective with A Soldier’s Tale revealing “the Troubles 
[as] observed through the eyes of serving British soldiers”, and detailing the 
arrival, deployment, of troops on the streets of Belfast; initially the army had 
been welcomed by the Catholic community, with one paratrooper stating, 
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‘always tea and coffee from the Catholics…we felt like knights in shining 
armour, like Sir Galahad’ (cited by McCleery, 2012, p.412). Presenter Peter 
Taylor would however state “In July 1970, the honeymoon ended…this was 
the watershed”. (07.08.94) Accompanying this voiceover were the recurrent 
motifs established during the preceding two decades, including a camera 
panning across a burnt out house,  mythologising the symbolic “flames” of 
violence.  
For Simon Winchester, journalist for The Guardian newspaper, early ‘1970 
was a time of words, not war…For the reporters it was a time to try and 
absorb some of the atmosphere of this curious little corner of the world, to 
drink in its history and its mystery’ (Winchester, 1974, p.34). Per contra, 
there is a recognisance that July signified this watershed period:  
What happened on the afternoon on Friday, July 3, threw the last vestiges of 
hope for Northern Ireland out of the window. It was the start of a weekend 
now known as the ‘Falls Curfew’: it was one of the most clearly identifiable 
steps on the road that led, eventually and inexorably, to the downfall of the 
Stormont government nearly two years later (ibid, p.68). 
British policy towards Northern Ireland markedly changed emphasis 
following the election of a new Conservative government in June 1970. 
Historically supportive of the Unionist position, the government prioritised 
security by giving the British army a greater role. On Friday July 3rd, a 
fortnight after the election, such resources were put to use as British soldiers 
entered the terraced streets of the Catholic dominated Falls district, 
searching and seizing illegal weapons. This minor incident quickly escalated; 
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for Simon Winchester, ‘by 6.30pm it really had turned into war…the Lower 
Falls was going noisily and rapidly berserk’ (ibid, p.70).  
As rioters harassed the army detachment, Lt. Gen. Sir Ian Freeland, 
commander of British forces in Northern Ireland, ordered 3,000 troops — 
two-thirds of all those stationed in Belfast — backed by helicopters and 
armoured cars, to conduct house-to-house searches of the entire Catholic 
neighbourhood of the Lower Falls Road and declared a curfew of the area. It 
was the largest military engagement in Ireland since the Easter Rising of 
1916, a ‘continuous moving riot’ according to J. Bowyer Bell (1993, pp.
178-179). By Sunday, 5 July, four civilians were dead and over 60 wounded, 
including 15 soldiers. The army seized a number of weapons in addition to 
ammunition and explosives. After the curfew was lifted, the army escorted 
two ministers from the Unionist government in Stormont through the area to 
view ‘the pacified Falls,’ an act that further enraged the nationalists of the 
area (Williamson, 2010, p.201). The following months saw multiple 
explosions and numerous deaths; by the new year, daily rioting was occurring 
across Belfast. Media coverage increased, with images of violence on repeat. 
Many programmes were extended, particularly on BBC NI, with Scene 
Around Six regularly broadcasting for forty-five minutes. Yet there was 
almost a perverse interest in these broadcasts, with reports dominated by 
visceral images of the dark night skies illuminated by burning buildings and 
intense and attractive flames. Repeated throughout the troubles, and in 
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London during the 2011 riots (see the conclusion), such sights would reach 
their apex in August 1971 following the introduction of internment. 
Internment 
In 1971, the conflict descended into chaos. ‘Friction became even more 
embittered. Curfew, house searches and the introduction of internment 
precipitated endless violence’ (Cathcart, 1984, p.222). One evening BBC news 
report detailed an incident in West Belfast, with a report made from the scene 
(23.10.71). Local people disputed the army account and journalist Keith 
Graves interviewed two witnesses onscreen, a resident and the driver of a 
vehicle involved. They offered an alternative perspective (one of the last that 
would be offered in a bulletin prior to reform by Waldo Maguire), but in the 
structure and framing ‘and editing of the piece…the last word [went] to the 
officer in charge of the troops’ (ibid, 1984, p.223). The sight of a military 
officer, in uniform and granted this important position in a report, 
automatically connotes truth and denotes authority, particularly for an 
audience favourably disposed to the military. In recognising precisely how 
such an image was conveyed and precisely how it would be interpreted, the 
BBC can be identified as pointing towards the ban on IRA members/
representatives appearing onscreen — and therefore made real to an audience 
— later in the decade.  
Significant uproar, across Conservative and Unionist ministers, followed the 
bulletin, and the incident and its reportage were raised in the House of 
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Commons. Even with the framing structure of the interview and news report 
implicitly granting credence and credibility to the official security services 
version of events, complaints were made. Lord Hill, chairman of the board of 
Governors of the BBC, in response stated ‘we see it as out overriding 
responsibility to report the scene as it is in all its tragedy to all the people of 
the United Kingdom (ibid, p.224). 
Such tragedy would be made visible in BBC reporting of the violence 
surrounding the launch of internment. Simon Winchester again offers an 
astonishingly candid account of the visuals witnessed:  
Tuesday saw some of the most tragic burnings in Belfast, when over two 
hundred houses — mostly Protestant homes that sat beside Catholic terraces 
from which, it was claimed, gunfire was raging continually — were destroyed 
by fire. There was a terrible fascination for some of the reporters who went up 
to Farringdon gardens that night: row upon row of houses were blazing, 
totally out of control. Smoke was blowing down the streets. Gunmen scuttled 
for cover from lamp post to lamp post. Soldiers, crouching flat on the glass-
strewn pavements, fire sporadically into the darkness. Figures moved in and 
out of the blazing houses, snatching what they could from the wreckage. 
Lorries, piled high with belongings, lurched away from the area to the safety 
of friends. Cameras clicked away. Men and women dashed to and fro, there 
were screams, buildings collapsed in showers of spark and tongues of fire. 
The noise was continual, deafening-banging, screaming, shooting, 
explosions, shouts, cries, orders, radio messages, crashes and all the time the 
fierce crackling, sizzling sound of the flames. It was a dreadful, satanic night 
— and a time when many of us thought that the very fabric of civilised life was 
coming away at the edges, and some sort of Armageddon was upon us all 
(Winchester, 1974, p.167-168).  
The footage broadcast by the BBC is again astonishing in its visceral cinéma 
vérité style. The early years of the Troubles are dominated by such reporting. 
With no prior incidences of framing to consider and utilise, no existing 
visuals to contrast against (particularly in regard to a conflict on British soil), 
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there is an incredible human and “real” atmosphere communicated. Here in 
particular, television highlighted its benefits against print and radio 
broadcasting where a lack of visuals, for such a graphic event, affected the 
impact.  
The BBC reports, particularly on the Monday and Tuesday evening news 
bulletins, rely entirely on the visuals to tell the story (09.08.71 and 10.08.71). 
Footage often began with an establishing shot, a cinematic term in cinema, 
described by Bordwell and Thompson as one which ‘shows the spatial 
relations among the important figures, objects and setting in a scene’, to 
frame the narrative and set our scene (Bordwell and Thomson, 2008, p.504). 
This functioned in a narrative role, but with little context provided, largely 
meant little.  
In addition, a rhetorical aspect of reportage regarding the Operation must be 
noted. The first female victim of the conflict was killed on the 10th, shot, 
according to police, by a “terrorist sniper”. Such a linguistic phrase could only 
be applied to a terrorist; as has been noted, the term sniper could not be 
utilised to refer to the security services due to its suggestive connotations 
(Cathcart, p.221).  
The political atmosphere of the Troubles had now altered, with an associated 
alteration of the media context. Wider interest grew, particularly with the 
dramatic visuals of the Falls Road and Internment engaging attention. The 
Westminster Government directed greater attention to media coverage and 
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its means and methods of representation. Whilst BBC reporters were initially 
conscious of the various perspectives available, and frequently attempted to 
offer two accounts, ‘viewing audiences in Britain, like Loyalist audiences in 
Ireland were prone to believe the army case and dismiss all counter 
claims’ (Curtis, 1998, p.65). Criticism of the BBC increased, and Controller of 
BBC NI Waldo Maguire implemented a technical revision imposed on all 
news and current affairs reportage. Maguire, evidently placing a degree of 
faith in the media-as-incendiary argument, dictated that every report should 
be self-balanced, that is representing a weighted balance within the division 
of opinion. Such a ruling elevated reported speech above filmed interviews 
(later to impact a filmed report during Operation Motorman), and required 
journalistic copy to be filed direct to camera shot in medium close up. In 
removing the background from the shot, there was a concerted attempt to 
reduce visual output, whilst simultaneously recognising its importance.  
The aim was to restrict all possible signification other than the reporters 
summary description of what had actually happened (or in Barthes’ words to 
contest the terror of the uncertain signified). As the records shows, the result 
was…a lopsided view of events (Butler, 1995, p.63). 
Here again is Philip Elliot’s idea of the official ideological perspective 
presented as framing structure by the media. Yet, there is also tacit 
endorsement it is the visual component of representation that dominates. 
This represents what Curtis (1998), Butler (1995), and Miller (1994) declare 
to be the British way of censorship, operating indirectly, and carefully 
limiting the way in which a news story could be presented on television.  
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The escalation of restrictions would eventually force reporters into a form of 
self-censorship. Politicians were however concerned with television (above 
print and radio) due to the size of the available audience and particularly 
because of the visual impact of footage. In addition, the BBC held notions of 
impartiality and respectability across the world (continued to this day); 
Curtis quotes a Times survey of ‘a representative sample of people listed in 
Who’s Who found that a majority thought that the BBC was more influential 
than Parliament, the press, trade unions, the civil service, the monarchy and 
the church’ (Curtis, 1998, p.8). 
Self-censorship, identified as a tool early in proceedings, would prove 
effective, being subtle and concealed from general public (and other media) 
attention.  
As the Secretary of the Federation of Broadcasting Unions, Tom Rhys put it 
in a letter of protest to Lord Hill in 1972, the “checks and balances” 
introduced by the BBC were “becoming as effective as censorship, probably 
more effective, because they were not known outside the circles immediately 
involved, were superficially merely an intensification of normal safeguards, 
and were too vague and distant a target for public criticism. Frustrated staff 
were beginning to “avoid items on which they ought to work”,                               
or avoid Irish subjects altogether. (Curtis, 1984, p.13, emphasis my own). 
Violence then dominated the first four years of BBC coverage of Northern 
Ireland. A Philip Elliot survey found that most stories were about acts of 
violence or the enforcement of the law and that only a third of stories dealt 
with politics and other subjects. It is important to stress here his findings 
regarding Irish media: not only did they carry five times more stories on the 
North than British media, they were more concerned with serving an 
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analytical function and exploring the political dimension (1976, pp.398-401). 
The British media conversely, concentrated on violence, with a visual 
shorthand used as a substitute for context or explanation. As specific case 
studies will suggest, and echoing the findings of Jay G. Blumler, comment 
was rigorously excluded from news broadcasts, with strategic assessments 
avoided (1971). Whilst the media would then provide factual information, 
masquerading throughout as objective framing, it revealed nothing little 
about the root cause.  
Liz Curtis argues that the amount of attention paid to acts of violence 
depended on the circumstance, however this can be clarified further. The 
amount of attention paid to acts of violence depended instead on the related 
visuals/images available. BBC war correspondent Martin Bell succinctly 
details why this fascination exists with the visual: ‘The devil has all the best 
fireworks’ (p.231). Attacks taking place in Britain, the murder of particular 
people (for example Lord Mountbatten) and bombs that resulted in “civilian” 
deaths received greatest coverage. However again, each of these can be 
qualified: attacks taking place in Britain inevitably garnered greater coverage 
due to greater visuals (geography and accessibility); attacks on prominent 
individuals could utilise library images to humanise and concretise the 
person whilst colleagues provided elegiac eulogies; bombings invariably 
allowed strong visuals. These reflect considered judgments against news 
values, particularly the “elite” principles of Galtung and Ruge, that over time 
create precedent for future events.  
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Domhnach na Fola 
The media invariably reported violent incidents in “human interest” terms, 
concentrating on the experience of individuals rather then groups. There was 
also an overall tendency to dramatise a single event, treating it as an isolated 
occurrence, as opposed to exploring the background and situating it within a 
context. However the media (and it is notable precisely how this differs 
amongst media outlets, particularly the printed press) are particularly 
selective about those they take an interest in.  Reportage of violence in 30
Northern Ireland, presents “our” lives as more valuable and important. This 
notion of two distinct categories would return in the post 9/11 World, where 
radical Islam is posited as the “other”. British/Loyalist violence usually 
featured victims as a cipher, with little details provided, often including an 
absence of even a name. Victims of Republican violence however were 
regularly detailed, fleshed out, humanised and given a concrete identity and 
personality. The commentary on a BBC Tonight sequence neatly illustrates 
this contrasting treatment. Amidst footage of Bloody Sunday, a voiceover 
reveals:  
In January 1972, British paratroopers shot dead 13 unarmed civilians during 
a civil rights march in Londonderry. In retaliation, the Official IRA bombed 
the paras’ Aldershot headquarters. The explosion killed five woman canteen 
workers, a Gardner and a Catholic padre. (15.02.77) 
 Furthermore, animals (such as Sefton the horse and Rats the war dog mascot) can be 30
placed above (certain) humans in the hierarchy of death.
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Fewer people were killed at Aldershot then on Bloody Sunday, yet as 
presented here, one group of deaths held greater prominence. Whilst three 
pieces of information are revealed about the Bloody Sunday victims — they 
were unarmed, they were civilian, they were taking part in a civil rights 
march — they are presented as an amorphous lot, a singular grouping in a 
singular incident. 
Bloody Sunday occurred on the 30th January 1972, during a march against 
internment in the Creggan and the Bogside areas of Derry. The march 
included many families and children, with the IRA promising they would stay 
away from the march. It was intended as a civil rights march, evoking the 
intent and spirit of 1969. The army had however sealed off entrances to the 
city centre area, re-directing marchers, and there were subsequent 
confrontations with soldiers in the William Street district.  
Culturally existing as one of the most famous events in the Troubles, Bloody 
Sunday featured particularly graphic coverage that exists as the last instance 
of what can be identified as the initial, unclear and undirected visual 
representation. A deliberate movement away from this form of iconography 
occurred in the aftermath. To again deploy the reportage of Simon 
Winchester as illustrating events: 
four or five armoured cars appeared in William Street and raced into the 
Rossville Street square, and several thousand people began to run away…
Paratroopers piled out of their vehicles, many ran forward to make arrests, 
but others rushed to the street corners. It was these men, perhaps 20 in all, 
who opened fire with their rifles. I saw three men fall to the group. One was 
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still obviously alive, with blood pumping from his leg. The others, both 
apparently in their teens, seemed dead (cited by Curtis, 1998, p.40). 
The first news bulletin in the aftermath of the incident featured minimal 
visuals, using an on-screen map to illustrate the area involved, and a short 
description of events (30.01.72). Following this, an unidentified man 
provides an account of events, explicitly from an official perspective:  
Young hooligans started a heavy barrage of missiles against barrier 14, 
reached unacceptable levels and at that time the brigade commander decided 
to launch his arrest force with the purpose of grabbing as many as possible of 
these hooligans. They dispersed to Rossville flats area where they were 
leading us on to an ambush. 
It is only with a second report, later the same day that visuals are shown, 
effectively undercutting this account (30.02.72). The graphic footage, even 
today, is startling; steady, careful and edited to reveal a presentation of 
events that can be considered full. Diegetic audio is played throughout and 
there is no reporter voiceover. Instead, the report plays in its entirety before 
progression to eye-witness interviews.  
Beginning with footage of the crowd marching, shouts and chanting can be 
heard, along with a number of children’s voice, including laughter. People 
holding hands are visible before an edit to a second camera position, behind 
the ranks of British Soldiers, occurs. The march is preceding parallel along 
the street ahead. Marshals are attempting to direct them down the street and 
avoid direct confrontation with soldiers. The shot changes again as we return 
to the crowds and marchers with renewed chanting. Two camera crews were 
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evidently in attendance and the footage has been edited together carefully to 
create a semblance of cohesion and a narrative framing.  
It changes again to the perspective of the soldiers where noise levels have 
increased considerably. People are addressing the soldiers, gesticulating and 
waving at them. The soldiers have vehicles next to them. An edit occurs, to 
the same camera, now positioned behind soldiers next to an armoured 
personnel carrier. Bottles are being thrown, and a soldiers can be seen 
dodging some that smash audibly in the centre of the frame. More missiles 
are thrown with the sound of impact on the metal hull of the APC. Back to 
marchers at barricade, where they are attempting to engage (orally) with 
soldiers. A sharp cut shows the same moment from the soldiers perspective 
and they walk away from the protestors before using a loudspeaker to give 
directions. Two soldiers are visible to the left of the frame, using a vehicle as 
cover. Ahead and dominating, almost overwhelming the frame are people 
throwing rocks and bottles. A cameraman is visible surrounded by marchers, 
with the camera moving around wildly. Shouts and swears can be heard. 
Then two people, a woman and a man can be seen, the man lying on the 
ground and the woman attempting to lift him up. She is shouting for help.  
More footage from the previous position with the APC and a volley of missiles 
being thrown. A zoomed in shot shows a number of individuals involved with 
one man holding a very long stick which he throws. Back to the perspective of 
the marchers, centre of frame and flanked by two vehicles. A soldier can be 
seen moving from the right and there is an audible crack of a gunshot. Several 
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more shots occur and the marchers scatter in chaos. The camera remains 
steady and focused. Cut to the military perspective, with soldiers hiding 
behind vehicles. Multiple shots are fired and there is a brief sight of soldiers 
gathered in riot gear. Close up image of soldiers, with riot guns clearly visible. 
Audible dialogue: “how many? 3?” 
More soldiers can be seen advancing to street corners. Some are standing, 
taking aim and gunfire can be heard. Soldiers running. Cut to what became 
the iconic shot of the day, repeated across the world in newspapers, and a 
visual shorthand, to this day, of Bloody Sunday. It continues to be used in 
retrospective, historical pieces as a central motif for human interest, death 
and The Troubles itself. A priest can seen advancing down the street. He is 
leading four people who are carrying someone. Blood is visible on their 
clothes, with one top stained red. He is waving a handkerchief and ducks 
whenever there is the sound of gunfire.  
Cut to soldiers running with more gunfire heard. A burnt out van can now be 
seen, however, there is little context available or provided. No flames are (or 
have been) visible. To the rear is an army vehicle with a soldier using it as 
cover and situated in an offensive firing position. The camera zooms in and 
he can be clearly seen with his gun raised and his finger on the trigger. More 
soldiers enter from right of frame and a female voice can be heard, however it 
is unclear what she is saying. Fragments can be captured: “What the hell are 
you....?’ Fuck off...What do you want me to do now”.  
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Edited to compress the narrative of time, the next sequence shows soldiers 
searching a number of people positioned against a wall, and there is a hard 
cut to ambulances which have arrived. Crowds of people surround one, and 
there is a body being put in the back. A close up shot focuses on a bloody rag 
laying in the middle of the road. The camera gradually pans to show rocks, 
rubble and debris across the entire street. It pans back around, revealing the 
same ambulance and a body can be seen on the adjacent ground, covered by a 
blanket. A cut reveals a second body however it is unclear if this is the same 
from a different angle. Arms and legs can be seen outside the blanket and 
there is a pool of blood near the right arm.  
Gunfire is heard and the crowd scatter however the camera stays focused on 
the body as people hide behind the front of ambulance. In the foreground of 
the frame a group are lifting another body slowly toward the ambulance. One 
man has his arms raised aloft in surrender while another is waving a white 
handkerchief. The footage ends on this white handkerchief, a medium close 
up, showing it in the centre of the frame. On a semiotic level, it is a symbolic 
image, mythologising the deaths through a connotative allusion to peace, 
loss, and grief.  
Following this section, two interviews are played. One with the Priest 
previously visible, and the second with an elderly senior soldier. Each 
provides their account of events, however the army officer reveals he was not 
present: “My information at the moment, and it is very immediately after the 
incident, is that the paratroop battalion fired 3 rounds”. Concluding the 
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report with this interview, as a dramatic reveal and tacit endorsement of 
official ideology, carefully juxtaposes it against the visuals and the language 
of Father Daly moments before: “I can speak of this without any difficulty 
whatsoever, because I was there”.  
During the footage a number of shots were audible, with the camera in, and 
amongst, the soldiers at various points. Without deliberately asking, there is a 
suggestion, through the manner of the reports structural framing and the 
contrast of words and pictures, that one particular account is false. The 
camera is the witness; Sontag’s evidence abounds. The authoritative images 
provided undercut the account of one man (speaking as a figure of the 
military, the Government, and the State); this further initiated a movement 
from graphic imagery of violence.  
As such, images would, for the foreseeable future, alter to a focus on the 
motifs and verbal cues established during the subsequent Operation 
Motorman, with a military perspective and visuals thesaurus existing as the 
sole avenue of representation. Aftermath footage, emphasising the impact of 
bombs, and a human interest angle, similarly began its trend towards facile 
tropes and symbolic instances of terror related visual shorthand. 
Furthermore, frequent repetition and re-framing of key television images and 
discourses, like the sequence involving Father Daly, extends the past into the 
present in new ways, though the creation of ‘media templates’ (Kitzinger, 
2000) with which to measure, interpret and reinterpret the present. Such 
templates are, as Hoskins and O’Loughlin note, television’s ‘principal 
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mechanism of instant comparison and contrast’ (2013, p. 91), reintroduced at 
particular moments in order to ‘shape the way we make sense of the 
world’ (Kitzinger, 2000, p. 81). In the digital age these (are forced to) change 
through digital remediation, editing and remixing, but for the BBC and the 
Troubles, media templates were used as a closed (rarely disputed but 
problematised through lack of impetus) visual shorthand to direct the news 
narrative through the past, present, and future.  
Motorman 
In the immediate aftermath of “Bloody Friday”, a series of IRA bombings 
across Belfast, the British Army would launch Operation Motorman on July 
31st. Almost 30,000 troops, in the biggest British military operation since the 
Suez crisis in 1956, would seek to dismantle barricades and retake ‘no-go’ 
areas controlled by IRA factions in Belfast and Derry. The operation, due to 
its intense scope, would receive significant media coverage with one central 
aspect particularly important: the accompanying visuals broadcast.  
Some 300 vehicles were involved, including Centurion tanks to clear the 
barricades; these represent the only heavy armoured vehicles to be deployed 
operationally by the British Army in Northern Ireland during the Troubles. 
With the turrets traversed to the rear and main weaponry covered by 
tarpaulins there was an overt attempt to emphasise the vehicles were being 
utilised in a non-lethal sense.  However it is noticeable that on no occasion 31
 Indeed some cannons were removed completely. (See Dustan, 2003, p.47)31
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were the modified tanks visible in news coverage. Due to the scale of the 
operation, and the daily build up of troops and resources, it would appear 
that a conscious policy decision was taken to avoid the visual analogy of tanks 
in city streets — akin to events in Hungary or Czechoslovakia; ‘Not since 
Russian troops entered Budapest and Prague in the 1950s and 1960s to 
suppress risings of the Czechoslovakian and Hungarian people, have [such] 
sights been seen’ (McCafferty, 1989, p.26). Of further interest here is the fact 
that evening newspapers carried pictures of the tanks; the immediate 
conclusion here is that still images have less impact then moving footage.   
A Panorama news crew filmed during the operation and the dismantling of 
barricades. The on the scene footage — in accompanying Coldstream Guard 
soldiers and therefore framed from an official perspective (akin to the 
embedded reporting of the Iraq War in 2003) — was contrasted with 
interviews filmed later that day with local residents reacting to the prior 
events. The Panorama film, precisely the relatively open programme 
identified by Schlesinger et al. as an arena for contrasting viewpoints, was 
suppressed on the orders of a senior BBC executive (Curtis, 1998, p.280). 
In addition, there evolved a fierce official and governmental resistance to 
interviewing members of the IRA in the media; this quickly become a form of 
self-censorship. Peregrine Worsthorne, Associate Editor of the Daily 
Telegraph believed the media  
have a very important job in assisting the army to beat the IRA and                    
that means resisting IRA propaganda, and I would like to see                  
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[journalists] who work in Northern Ireland quite clear in their own mind     
that they are not there as neutral observers…[they] should make               
absolutely sure their heart is in the right place (The Editors, 28.06.81).  
This argument seeks to delineate sides and asks the media to set forth a 
particular stance, promoting (and not reporting) the news in a specific 
manner. Worsthorne would state that the idea 
you actually need to go and give them an opportunity to put their propaganda 
across to millions on the British television, or the British radio, or the British 
newspapers, is just a load of old rubbish…any kind of high minded 
justification for this thing seems to me completely unacceptable (ibid). 
UWC 
Despite the coverage afforded to Bloody Sunday, ennui can be identified as 
settling in, with the Troubles gradually becoming less prominent as a news 
story. Setting 1975 as a significant marker, Schlesinger et al., suggest two 
entwined primary reasons focusing on news judgement (and a third of 
financial consideration): general public boredom/dissatisfaction and a 
decline in genuine narratives (1983). With violence, death and destruction 
becoming a regular occurrence — no longer a phenomenon — the resultant 
images, in moving away from the graphic representation, were reduced to 
facile sequences, motifs and an accompanying literal reporting: the who, 
what, where and when. As one editor states, ‘the main heat was now out of 
the story’ (Clark, 1977, p.10). Consequently, there was therefore a distinct 
absence of the spectacular necessary to sustain the visual nature of television 
news. Parkinson agrees, explaining ‘media treatment of the conflict…declined 
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somewhat from the mid 1970s. This was due to the monotonous nature of 
Ulster news stories and the lack of progress in both political and security 
fields’ (1998, p.71).  
He echoes the remarks of Home Secretary Reginald Maudling, suggesting:  
there was a growing recognition by the media of the unofficial political line of 
an “acceptable level of violence”. Consequently the media duly reported 
incidents involving serious injury or loss of life (although the degree of space 
allotted to the killings of soldiers inevitably declined to a brief mention on a 
news bulletin or a short paragraph in a national paper), only concentrating in 
greater detail on large-scale security incidents or on signs of political 
development (1998, p.72).  
It is necessary here then to highlight coverage of the 1974 Ulster Workers' 
Council (UWC) strike. Whilst not an act of terror, is was framed within the 
overall context of the Troubles and is unquestionably an important event; 
Parkinson’s “sign of political development”. The strike was called by Loyalists 
and Unionists opposed to the December 1973 Sunningdale Agreement 
seeking to establish a power-sharing Northern Ireland Executive and initiate 
a cross-border governance Council of Ireland;  
the modern rebellion of 1974 is one of the most significant — and intriguing 
— events of the last 25 years of conflict…It was an episode of complex 
political, social and military events (Anderson, 1994, p.ix). 
As Robert Fisk explained, 
a section of the realm became totally ungovernable. A self-elected  
provisional government of Protestant power workers, well-armed  
private armies and extreme politicians organised a strike which almost  
broke up the fabric of civilised life in Ulster. They deprived most of the 
population for much of the time of food, water, electricity, gas, transport, 
money and any form of livelihood (1975, p.13). 
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On day eleven of the strike, Prime Minister Harold Wilson made an 
astonishing speech on the BBC news at 10.15pm. It would be, for Peter 
Taylor, ‘the most scathing attack on the majority community ever made by a 
British Prime Minister’ (1999, p.194). Wilson accused the UWC of seeking ‘to 
set up there a sectarian and undemocratic state’. In effect,  
those who are now challenging constitutional authority are denying the 
fundamental right of every man and woman the right to work. They  
have decided, without having been elected by a single vote, who shall work  
in Northern Ireland and who shall not. They seek to allocate food, to decide 
who shall eat and who shall not…By their use of force and intimidation they 
have condemned hundreds of thousands of workers to  
involuntary unemployment…[the strikers] now viciously defy  
Westminster, purporting to act as though they were an elected government; 
people who spend their lives sponging on Westminster  
and British democracy and then systematically assault democratic methods. 
Who do these people think they are? (ibid, p.253). 
Richard Francis, BBC Controller, agreed the events were ‘unprecedented and 
unexpected. Coverage of the strike made for exceptional difficulties’ (Francis, 
1996, p.61). These difficulties were compounded by the reluctance of the 
Northern Ireland Office and Executive to publicly communicate, appearing 
increasingly irrelevant. Broadcasting played a crucial role in the crisis; just as 
the civil rights depended on “British” broadcasting as witness, and the IRA 
recognised the intrinsic power of the media, the UWC knew it would be 
similarly vital during the strike. Indeed during planning, they had made 
arrangements to launch a radio station to promote their daily messages. 
Shipyard union leader Harry Murray would later highlight such awareness, 
declaring success hinged upon the media and  
 182
the BBC were marvellous — they were prepared to be fed any information. 
They fell into their own trap that “the public must get the news”. Sometimes 
they were just a news service for us; we found that if the media was on our 
side we didn’t need a gun (Fisk, 1975, p.127). 
Francis would repeatedly ask ministers to respond to the UWC and provide 
an alternate viewpoint but to little avail. In ceding the narrative, they ‘in 
effect forfeited their functions’, allowing the UWC unfettered access to every 
moment of BBC airtime Cathcart (1984, p.231-232). Robert Fisk has explored 
the BBC’s role in depth, detailing a number of broadcasts and highlighting 
the BBC’s treatment of the strike as a straight news story. To quote in depth:  
the early Northern Ireland news bulletin had carried a report which cast 
more than a little doubt on the ability of the authorities to maintain any kind 
of order in the streets of Belfast. Only seconds after the news reader had 
repeated Stormont’s promise to keep the roads open, Brian Walker, one of 
the BBC’s most able reporters in the city, was stating, “We’ve just heard that 
new road-blocks are going up in Belfast.” He named the locations of eight 
new highjacking incidents, referred to “gangs of men roaming around the 
Greenisland estate highjacking vehicles” and to barricades in Carrickfergus, 
Newtonards, Bangor and South Belfast. It was a style of reporting  — fast, 
dramatic and in Walker’s case completely accurate — that made Rees, 
Faulkner and their respective ministers look fools. how could people be 
expected to believe Stormont’s earnest promise to maintain order if                  
the BBC was saying that the facts did not accord with                                            
what the Government was promising? (Fisk, 1975, p.127) 
Yet in this daily race to provide the latest updates and the newest 
developments — foreshadowing the nature of 24 hour rolling coverage — the 
BBC failed to challenge and question the UWC. There was repetition without 
analysis, reporting with criticism. As Rex Cathcart notes, ‘the news machine 
ran away with itself and all the participant reporters were intoxicated by the 
process’ (Cathcart, 1984, p.232). UWC assertions, intimidation was absent, 
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leaders were elected democratically and the UDA were uninvolved, went 
unchallenged. To again quote Fisk 
staff were forced by circumstances — principally the sheer amount of time 
devoted to live broadcasting — to abandon any attempt at examine the 
political and constitutional implications of the strike. They used up their 
talents in composing the unending stream of special news bulletins which 
detailed the location of road blocks, the political statements, the problems of 
the social services, the availability of bread and transport; constantly trying to 
keep this information up to date and searching for a new angle to make their 
summaries more informative, they could do no more than scratch the surface 
(1975, p.137). 
RTÉ, whilst acknowledging the prevalence of violence in the overall 
representation, would later echo the BBC’s justification for the overall nature 
of coverage:  
This means presenting violence, sometimes of the most horrific kind…it also 
means that we present political gimmicks and men on mountaintops 
threatening the world with bits of paper in the dead of night. We present 
political bickering and statement and stalemate and argument…  
Ireland’s problems won’t go away if they’re ignored —  
indeed they would increase and intensify (Clark, 1977).  
Therefore whilst acknowledging the unbalanced nature of coverage, Richard 
Francis would seek to highlight the Governmental role in fostering such a 
situation:  
To have refused to carry UWC statements unless or until government retorts 
were forthcoming would have implied a power of veto. The UWC initiatives 
affected the daily lives of everyone in the province and the public had a right 
to know what was happening. In the face of Government inactivity and 
official silence, our coverage was inevitably somewhat unbalanced  
(Francis, 1996).  
The BBC therefore implied strike leaders held momentum, initiative and 
consequently authority.  
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However it is important to note here, such coverage, when repeated three 
years later, would play a vital role in limiting the impact of a second Loyalist 
strike. Protesting against Direct rule, and keen for the imposition of greater 
security measures, the 1977 strike was organised by The United Unionist 
Action Council (UUAC) and led by Ian Paisley, then leader of the Democratic 
Unionist Party. It aimed, amongst other measures, to close newspapers and 
restrict media reportage.  As the press did not comply, choosing instead to 32
report on the large turn-out of workers to factories and offices across the 
region, numbers increased on subsequent days.  
If that fact had not been reported, I believe that the fear and suspicions which 
the calling of the strike aroused, particularly the expected intimidation and 
violence, would have scared people into staying at home (Clark, 1977).   
In broadcasting informational news, dealing solely with public statements, 
the BBC were unable (and unwilling) to analyse the root causes and the 
ultimate intentions of those dictating events. What was a political — 
insurrectionary, indeed (counter)revolutionary — strike was instead treated 
as little more than an industrial dispute. Yet this was primarily encountered 
within the Six Counties; Fisk details coverage within the province in May 
1974: ‘a minimum of six local news broadcasts each day…during the course of 
the stoppage these were extended and multiplied as the political situation 
grew more serious’ (1975, p.130). On the mainland however, beyond the 
importance granted to Wilson’s speech, coverage was minimal. The strike 
 A curious tactic, given the role of the media in the UWC strike. It can be read as indicative 32
of Paisley/Loyalist attitudes to the BBC at this point. 
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presented an opportunity for the background to be explored and greater 
context provided but in the absence of arresting visuals, it was inherently 
lacking the vital ingredients necessary. As Trevor MacDonald stated, ‘Last 
week was a good example of the pressures where one can’t work…one 
problem is representing that in a cinematic sense — so much of the 
information is not terribly filmable’ (cited by Clark, 1977). The predominantly 
reactive nature of news reportage — a difficulty compounded upon 
broadcasting but trending towards zero in the age of true “liveness” — 
illuminates precisely why the BBC so freely utilised the daily statements of 
the UWC. Indeed there was a general failing to comprehend the amorphous 
and continually changing landscape, particularly the increasing importance 
of the strike as it progressed; in the minutes of a BBC NI Advisory Council 
meeting, the Controller specifically noted: ‘on Day One we were dealing with 
an industrial stoppage, by Day Fifteen it had brought down a government and 
shaken the very fabric of the State’ (BBC Controller’s Report, 1974). 
As Francis noted,  
One thing everyone in Northern Ireland still wants is news of the situation. 
Whenever there is trouble in the streets or the sound of an explosion rocks 
the town, people turn to the BBC to find out what is happening. Our task 
must be to limit that concern as quickly and precisely as possible. During the 
UWC strike in 1974, half the telephone calls received by the BBC were either 
offering or requesting further information about the situation. If we fail to 
report incidents of violence invariably we will attract criticism from people in 
the vicinity (1996, p.57). 
Indeed the UWC Strike was, as described by David Butler, ‘as oppositional in 
their [Loyalist] orientation as the ballot box and armalite strategy pursued by 
 186
the republican movement’ (1995, p.10). It was an act conducted, just as the 
Civil Rights Marches were in 1969, for both the immediate community and 
the wider televisual audience. Reporting was descriptive, with journalists 
from across the broadcast media, presenting a literal reading of events. As 
Butler notes, in a period of just over five years, the function and role of 
television journalism had been eroded and undermined to such a significant 
attempt that there was no analysis possible, no consideration of “why”, and in 
essence, no alternative means of representation. 
Yet BBC inaction — and it is the BBC that received criticism regarding this — 
can be interpreted and accepted for geographic reasons. Whilst the 
corporation failed to oppose the anti-constitutional stance of the strike, it was 
able to do so because the integrity of the British State, beyond the Irish Sea, 
was not threatened (Butler, 1995). The very nature of the strike, contained 
within Northern Ireland, ensured the BBC’s stance was tenable to the ruling 
(London) government. Daily news broadcasts featured weak images, 
dominated by passivity and inaction and an absence of connotation; 
information was purely factual and denotative. Such footage lacked impact 
for an audience beyond those affected and interested as a purely information 
based economy. 
The Ulster Workers Council strike then, can be taken as a reference point for 
the second phase of media coverage of Northern Ireland. With the “war” 
active for some six years — longer at this stage then World War Two — the 
monotonous nature of coverage was becoming ingrained in both broadcasters 
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and the audience. The second phase, active until around 1981 and the Hunger 
Strikes, saw a decrease in the conflict’s intensity resulting in a related marked 
reduction in media interest, particularly amongst mainland media coverage. 
Jim Dougal, RTE Northern Correspondent:  
The Northern Ireland problem was reported throughout the world…until the 
fall of the power-sharing Executive in 1974. Internment, Bloody Sunday, the 
Shankill Butcher killings, Sunningdale, were all major stories. When the 
Executive fell however, the story declined in importance  
(Irish Broadcasting Review, 1983). 
In Britain, over subsequent years, the story would seldom again reach beyond 
the spectacular.  
Question of Ulster 
The aftermath of Question of Ulster, a three hour television special, would see 
decision making powers regarding BBC broadcasting officially moved from 
Belfast to London. The programme, mimicking Senate hearings in the United 
States, was an inquiry based ceremonial (even contested) event, with a 
variety of individuals from across the political and religious spectrum being 
questioned, offering solutions, calling witnesses and generally ‘review[ing] 
the range of proffered options’ (Cathcart,  1984, p.226). Immediately Home 
Secretary Reginald Maudling, and the Stormont Government, attempted to 
block proceedings and the BBC quickly conceded to restructure the 
programme and grant greater emphasis to the ruling party’s stance (the IRA 
were not asked to participate). According to The TV Mail,  
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what they were afraid of is “that any point of view other than their  
own will be expressed, and that the viewing public might realise  
that there is another point of view at all”.  
Maudling publicly rebuked the BBC and Lord Hill, however this in fact 
effectively forced continuation: ‘The BBC had little option but to go ahead 
with the programme since as an independent corporation it could not be seen 
to give in to political pressures’ (Curtis, 1998, p.17). Seven and a half million 
viewers watched live on BBC One, including two-thirds of the population of 
Northern Ireland, whilst RTE broadcast the programme throughout The 
Republic of Ireland. The Financial Times later declared the programme 
‘typical of the BBC at its most sober’ and British viewers found the 
programme so boring that half of them switched over to a football match on 
ITV’ (ibid).  
“What they saw,” Francis (Richard Francis was BBCNI Controller)  
reported, “was a cool, at times laborious, examination of eight  
different solutions to the problems of Ulster. Inevitably it was an  
anti-climax but more than half the viewers who started stayed through to the 
summing up at a quarter past midnight” (BBC, 1979).  
Whilst Curtis mocks the decline in audience, Francis seeks to emphasise 
those who remained. Yet neither acknowledges the limitations of the format; 
as a studio based, quasi-judicial hearing, (with limitations on the agenda — 
Lord Devlin, chair of the panel, only appeared on condition internment was 
not discussed), there was a distinct lack of visuals. The central aspect was 
rhetoric, but without a strong related image, it was inevitable for the audience 
to decline. However as Cathcart notes, ‘it is rightly regarded as a significant 
occasion when the BBC asserted its independence’ and sought to conduct an 
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examination — however stilted and limited it was —  on the “why” aspect of 
the conflict (Cathcart, 1984, p.227). 
Impartiality 
For Schlesinger, ‘it is especially worth considering what happened in 1971 and 
1972 because those were crucial years which have had an enduring impact on 
the BBC’s approach’ (Schlesinger, 1979, p.10). Since inception, and until the 
1950s, the BBC within Northern Ireland ‘sought to portray a society without 
division: the very mention of “partition” was precluded’ (cited by Miller, 
1990, 37). As Miller notes, this parallels coverage of conflicts elsewhere, 
including Oman (ibid).  Indeed the BBC regional news service established 33
following World War One would ‘reflect the sentiments of the people, who 
have always maintained unswerving loyalty to British ideals and British 
culture’ (cited by Curtis, 1998, p.19). 
During the initial years of BBC broadcasting, Home Secretary Reginald 
Maudling would object on several occasions to the nature of coverage, 
particularly how events were represented (including the previously detailed 
Question of Ulster). At this point then, the conflict (insofar as it can 
justifiably be termed a conflict) was transitioning from a civil right and 
discrimination focus, to terrorism as the central concern. Here then,  
 Between the conclusion of World War 2 and August 1969 (circa the outbreak of the Civil 33
Rights Movement in Ireland), the army were involved (‘had experience’) in 53 counter 
revolutionary operations. (See Miller, 1990, p.43n3).
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To all intents and purposes, analysis of the deeper causes of the violence was 
barred. In journalistic terminology, the “who, what, where and when” could 
still be reported, but the context, the “why”, could not’ (Butler, 1995, p.63).  
The nature of coverage was reduced to what was ultimately a descriptive 
function, a fact particularly overt during the UWC Strike in 1974. Therefore 
whilst viewers received vital information — a factual gathering of the events 
of the day — it was devoid of any political discussion regarding the wider 
context and issue. Using the phrase the aperture of consensus to describe the 
permitted valve for discussion, widening and narrowing depending on the 
government's wishes, Butler believes the media (BBC) model of broadcasting 
was implicit in a failure to present adequate expression (ibid).  
Such a notion can be traced throughout BBC broadcasting of events within 
Northern Ireland, beginning in 1971 with the words of Christopher Chataway, 
Minister for Posts and Telecommunications and accountable to Parliament. 
Chataway effectively sought to set forth a prescription that broadcasters were 
not required to strike an even balance between the IRA and the Stormont 
government, or between the army and the “terrorists”; they instead stood 
within the consensus ‘of the values and the objectives of the society they are 
there to serve’ (cited by Schlesinger, 1992, p.211).  The speech echoed an 34
earlier demand made by the Defence Secretary Lord Carrington for the BBC 
to prevent the repetition of reports which are ‘unfairly loaded to suggest 
 The speech echoed an earlier demand made by Defence Secretary Lord Carrington for the 34
BBC to prevent reportage unfairly loaded to suggest improper behaviour by troops.
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improper behaviour by British troops’ (cited by Coogan, 2002, p.353). In the 
mythological construction of the British soldier, visual motifs were vital.  
Lord Hill, Chairman of the BBC responded to the charges by writing to 
Maudling: ‘between the British Army and the gunmen, the BBC is not and 
cannot be impartial’ (cited by Braun, 2014, p.173). Whilst his letter included a 
defence of the BBC and a particularly strong indictment against censorship, 
the impartiality remark requires attention. In effect setting the British Army 
and the gunmen as good versus bad/black versus white (setting aside the 
immediate difficulties the term “gunmen” raises), the issue was profoundly 
more complex, particularly for journalists on the ground. The second clause 
of the National Union of Journalists Code of Conduct states:  
A journalist shall at all times defend the principle of the freedom of the press 
and other media in relation to the collection of information and the 
expression of comment and criticism (Alia, 2004, p.191). 
There is then a duty to explain the motivations of the gunmen, the context 
from where they came and the result of their actions. Within Northern 
Ireland, this posed significant complexities in the framing of an event; how 
could the BBC deal with politicians and the public who supported violent 
means? What if the terrorist transitioned to the ballot box for validation and 
election? Representation was then directly related to journalistic freedom 
and media independence. The notion of impartiality arose again following the 
UWC strike, with the minutes of a BBC NI Advisory Council meeting 
recording the Controller remarking ‘I suggest to you that we are not impartial 
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actually, we are not impartial towards undemocratic means, we are not 
impartial towards violence, nor incitement to violence’ (BBC Controller’s 
Report, 1974). Francis stated he understood emotional calls for the BBC to 
‘treat paramilitaries for what they are — thugs, murderers and bombers by 
any other name’ (1996, p.63). Yet as noted, if the government allowed 
organisations like Provisional Sinn Féin to remain legal, then the BBC had a 
clear duty to cover their activities. This period also encompassed the UDA as 
a legal organisation; the indirect argument then becomes if the government 
would not ban such organisations, how could the BBC not report their 
actions? 
One episode of Panorama, in July 1970, did contain a number of interviews 
with relatives of six people killed in Belfast, including a ‘widow crying out for 
vengeance for her dead husband, shot by terrorists’. Deemed inflammatory 
by the BBC NI region (Madden, 1979, p.10) it was therefore transmitted to 
the mainland UK, on the primary BBC network, but BBC NI opted out, 
believing its broadcast could lead to further violence. This, the first instance 
of “opting-out” was recognised as deeply problematic, further setting apart 
communities and adding to the creation of two distinct communities (in this 
case, mainland and island audiences). In this period, with Hugh Carlton 
Greene as Director-General, it was decreed that content of BBC’s 
programmes should be identical in Britain and Northern Ireland. As detailed, 
the effect of this policy — to make BBC networked programmes on the 
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‘Troubles’ acceptable in Northern Ireland — was detrimental and inhibitive to 
coverage. 
For Richard Francis, speaking in 1977, after continued and protracted clashes 
between the BBC and the Government,  
The experience in Northern Ireland, where communities and 
governments are in conflict but not in a state of emergency or a state of 
war, suggests a greater need than ever for the media to function as the 
“fourth estate,” distinct from the executive, the legislature and the 
judiciary. But if the functions are to remain separate, it must be left to the 
media themselves to take the decisions (within the limits of responsibility) 
as to what to publish, as to when, and as to how (1996, p.58). 
During BBC reporting — both radio and televisual — an overall trend can be 
recognised: the governmental/military position dominates. Invariably 
granted precedence by journalists, these sources also regularly benefited 
from a greater time allocation. The official account is therefore granted undue 
weight and an implicit credibility gap is created.  
During October 1971, two sisters were shot dead in the Lower Falls area of 
Belfast. The evening BBC radio bulletin granted precedence to an army 
spokesman, allocated some seventy-seconds of airtime; the opposing 
account, provided by the driver of the vehicle involved received less then 
forty-seconds (23.10.71). It is interesting to compare this to the morning 
bulletin, broadcast at 7am and shortly after the incident occurred. During this 
coverage — before official and eyewitness testimony were gathered for 
inclusion — the reportage tended towards the factual. However this 
information was received by a telephone call to Colonel Maurice Tugwell, 
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general staff officer in charge of the army’s “informational policy”. Therefore 
the immediate BBC account, based on information provided by the military, 
announced ‘two woman — dressed as men — had been shot and killed by the 
army after they, or someone else in the car in which they were passengers had 
fired two shots at the troops’ (Winchester, 1971) Such connotations were 
similarly apparent in the print coverage by the Sunday News — Unionist and 
Loyalist in editorial tone — who sought to emphasise the masculine nature of 
dress. Whilst the immediacy of television and radio reporting may contribute 
to the problems of establishing events as quickly as possible, notions of 
impartiality become highly suspect when scrutinised in this manner.  Indeed 35
Schlesinger quotes a BBC television news sub-editor — ‘the official line is we 
put the army’s version first and then the other’ — and a BBC radio news 
organiser — ‘You don’t always have time to check out the army’s account…
after all, it is the British army, and we are on their side’ (1992, p.225). This 
echoes the earlier interview structure detailed, when instead of putting the 
army’s view first, it was allowed to be presented last, effectively responding to 
the previous two charges.  
This policy was recognised as problematic by a number of journalists who 
would tacitly begin using attributions. These in turn established a precedent 
acknowledged by Richard Francis in 1977: ‘Generally, therefore, we will 
report that “the Army say”, whereas the paramilitaries “claim” or “allege”. 
Wording is crucial’ (1996, p.62). This can be explored in an analysis of the 
 Such an issue will be compounded in the digital age.35
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rhetoric, which supports a view the military were recognised as the “correct 
side”. In one instance, a reporter used the descriptive term ‘army sniper’; this 
was flagged as incorrect, with ‘army marksman’ deemed the correct 
terminology. Members of the British army could not be referred to as snipers 
by the BBC (Cathcart, 1984, p.220).  
This reliance on official accounts — often reporting/repeating unquestioned 
— would continue throughout future years. A bomb in the Falls Road in 1976 
for example, would initially be assumed as a Loyalist reprisal attack. The 
army press desk at military headquarters in Lisburn would however declare 
the bomb a Provisional IRA construction that had detonated early, a “fumble 
finger”. This was duly repeated on the BBC Nine O’Clock news. When the 
PIRA identified the car as one stolen from a Protestant area, a fact confirmed 
by the RUC, the original suggestion had already reached mainstream 
acceptance and the army achieved a public relations success (Stephen, 1976). 
The media, courted by all, were increasingly susceptible to being used as a 
propaganda tool; indeed on many occasions they directly allowed such an 
occurrence. On the problem of broadcasting where particular individual 
accounts are inevitable, the complexity of Ulster issues and the high 
sensitivity of both politicians and public, meant a deliberate awareness to 
avoid gross over-simplification. Due to the superficiality of television news 
coverage, particular difficulties arose.  
The BBC also displayed an overt tendency to broadcast images which, due to 
the eye of the reporter (subconsciously) reflecting the attitudes and 
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prejudices of the intended audience, can be interpreted as allied to the official 
narrative and supportive of the official position. Burning buildings (initially), 
people abandoning their homes, and, following deployment, daily footage of 
troops patrolling (invariably deserted) streets. Within Britain, such images 
would be presented as brave restrained soldiers, with evil overtones of abuse 
by civilians and violence from gunmen; what BBC director Colin Thomas 
would later describe as ‘an army calm, patient and natural’ (Thomas, 1979, p.
11).  Similar footage broadcast to Ireland, particularly on the RTE network, 36
would instead trend towards a presentation of the army as suspicious and 
sinister; burly troops searching children, armoured vehicles speeding roaring 
through lower class neighbourhoods and smashing amateur barricades - ‘the 
impression here was of a terrified community cowering behind closed 
doors’ (Holland, 1971). At this point in media coverage then, the BBC can be 
seen as stepping away from the earlier visceral-vérité style, effectively moving 
towards a more united, tacit support of the dominant discourse through 
coded images supportive of the security services. Troops would often be seen 
patrolling on foot (and not in vehicles), with weaponry pointed towards the 
ground and cradled across folded arms. The non-threatening visuals, passive 
in execution and intent, are in marked contrast to the images dominating the 
initial years of coverage. They would become a shorthand for terrorism 
representation for the signifiant future.  
 Thomas, a BBC film director, would resign in 1978 in protest at the censorship of two 36
documentaries. 
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The Fourth Estate 
What can then be termed this Golden Age of Northern Ireland reportage, 
spanned from 1968-1973. During this period, it dominated coverage across 
the United Kingdom, consistently leading BBC broadcasting news bulletins 
with arresting visuals of genuine peril and distress.  
What started as a localised protest over social and political discrimination 
quickly developed into a violent inter-communal conflict which at times 
verged on open civil war. Almost as quickly, it was transformed into an open 
military conflict between sections of the nationalist                                  
community and the British Army (Hamilton-Tweedale, 1987, p.412). 
By the mid-70s, political violence had however gained such significant levels 
of coverage that it struggled to capture the public consciousness, and was 
moving beyond an ability to shock. In essence, the conflict was over-reported 
but under-contextualised; bombs and murders had, with almost constant 
repetition, become predictable and mundane for the audience. The BBC in 
moving away from such footage, trended towards more neutral, supportive, 
daily life imagery.  
In a BBC lunch-time lecture, Desmond Taylor, editor of News and Current 
Affairs, would seek to emphasise the precise role of a BBC journalist: 
He must not try to change people's minds, or confirm their beliefs; he must 
give them the untainted information they need to make up their own minds. 
He cannot aim to move events, from however worthy a motive and for 
however worthy an end. He can report possible abuse, not campaign for its 
abolition; call attention to what seems like law breaking, not advocate 
prosecution; give an account of a demonstration without making a judgement 
as to whether its aims of conduct are right or wrong; say there was a strike 
and what it was about, without taking sides between employers and 
employed. In other words, he reports and in doing so he implies neither 
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approval nor disapproval. He is merely saying to the public: “This has 
happened, and we feel you might be interested in it — or alternatively, that 
you ought to know about it and the arguments it has aroused.                                   
What you do with the information is up to you and your judgement                      
as to how you should act as a citizen” (Taylor, 1975, p.3) 
Yet by 1977, despite this movement of the visual landscape, Airey Neave, Tory 
front bench spokesperson on Northern Ireland believed the Government to 
be losing the propaganda war:  
a review of present attitudes to media freedom is needed therefore to take 
account of a desperate emergency. Some of the media deny that we are really 
at war with terrorism. Some of their actions actually stimulate the hardcore 
terrorist mentality. The BBC in particular pronounce on the security situation 
in Northern Ireland with studied grandiloquence and ignore the true dangers 
(Curtis, 1998, p.55). 
Within this propaganda war, broadcast news is inherently reactive. The BBC 
news schema is constructed as central to the television schedule and event 
based, following a specific agenda, with a hierarchy of stories.  Within this 37
then, instead of searching, investigating, analysing and reporting, there is a 
tendency to report that which is offered directly, i.e., the daily press releases 
of the propaganda offices. Despite the statement of one BBC Director 
General: ‘I believe we have the duty to solicit, to go out and find those stories 
that will throw a perspective on the whole situation’, the perspective 
invariably offered was limited (Trethowan, 1981). The visual representation, 
in the late 70s, was lacking. 
Philip Elliot, working from the Mass Communication Research Centre at 
Leicester University would critically examine reportage from the region in 
 Agenda is not used here in a pejorative sense. 37
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(the tellingly entitled) Misreporting Ulster: News as Field Dressing. Elliot 
suggested that reporting acts of violence has a function of social 
cauterisation, where the  
emphasis of current affairs output has shifted almost exclusively to 
“objective” factual news reporting…This provides information which is 
casually unrelated to the incidence of violence. It is descriptive not 
explanatory…Posing as value-free it is heavily value-laden. It emphasises 
those facts which make the violence less rather than more explicable  
(Elliot, 1976, p.400). 
One possible method of explanation would remain absent. The IRA were 
unseen and unheard for almost the entire decade. Representatives of the 
organisation, along with the INLA, were virtually excluded from the 
television screen. The British consensus view, again to repeat the supposition 
of Schlesinger et al., of a terrorist rationale (or lack thereof), went 
unchallenged. Terrorism as criminal was the dominant framing device. This 
is due to an absence of the representation of the IRA, beyond superficial 
connotations raised by combat fatigues, volleys of gunfire and masked men of 
violence. The BBC (alongside other media organisations) ensured that could 
be no possible humanisation of the organisation. The image of an IRA 
member, attempting to justify their acts, would have been a powerful visual, 
engaging on a number of levels, in both the violence implied and absent.  
Two interviews with members of the IRA were however screened by the BBC, 
both on 24 Hours, and both in early 1971. They would only appear once more 
(a press conference by Joe Cahill) following implementation of an internal 
rule that such interviews were to be referred upwards to the Director General. 
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In his 1977 lecture Broadcasting to a Community in Conflict, Richard Francis 
would detail the interviews with Sin Féin and Loyalist Paramilitaries however 
he would focus his attention on the BBC NI channel (1996). What was a very 
rare visual on Northern Ireland television was extinct on the mainland.  
According to Brian Jenkins’ metaphor, terrorism is theatre, with the intended 
audience being those watching on television (1975, p.15). His language is 
echoed by Walter Laquer who notes:  
Terrorists have learned that the media are of paramount importance in their 
campaigns, that the terrorist act itself is next to nothing, whereas publicity is 
all…Terrorists will always have to be innovative. They are in some respects, 
the super entertainers of our time (1977, p.144). 
Terrorists are here portrayed as the cause, organisers of spectacular events to 
engage with a wider, distant audience. Selected journalists sought to oppose 
this governmental and broadcasting authority stance, believing there was a 
public right to know and a journalistic duty to report. 
BBC reporter Bernard Falk argued it was in the publics interest both for the 
security forces to pursue the IRA and for journalists to accordingly report on 
IRA activity: “if one assumes that this organisation is an enemy of Britain 
then the public must have a right to know why it is waging war against                                        
Britain and what methods it is using” (cited by Curtis, 1998, p.149).  
Yet in removing the person of the enemy, the ability to gain an understanding 
on the desires of others, was removed. As Hawthorne states, 
it would be naive in Northern Ireland to assume that people are always trying 
to be truthful, and we have to balance one set of lies against the other’, 
removing a set of voices from the discourse and a physical personality from 
the representation entirely limited a notion of balance (1981, p.13).  
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Death on the Rock, a This Week documentary, aired on ITV/UTV in April 
1988. Edited by Roger Bolton (a previous BBC editor on both Panorama and 
Nationwide), the programme examined the deaths of three PIRA members in 
Gibraltar, killed by members of the British Special Air Service. Existing as 
one of a few analytic programmes created and broadcast in the immediate 
aftermath of an incident, Death on the Rock presented evidence that the 
three were shot without warning and/or whilst attempting to surrender. Prior 
to broadcast, the programme received significant attention (particularly from 
tabloid newspapers) for questioning the official Government and security 
services narrative. It subsequently became the first documentary to be the 
subject of an independent inquiry (in which it was largely vindicated) and 
would later win a BAFTA Award for Best Documentary.   38
Edited to refocus on Mairead Farrell, the programme was broadcast in the 
United States with the title Death of a Terrorist, where the understated 
observation is ‘there was a strong air of Government cover-up and 
disinformation’ (O’Conner, 1989). What is important to note about this 
programme, was the visual representation of Farrell, one of the three IRA 
members killed. Footage of Farrell, shot for a previous (and unaired) Channel 
4 documentary, effectively undermined the ideological governmental frame 
of terrorists as irrational. Indeed it is a humanising portrayal, encapsulating 
the demands of Bernard Falk above. As such, it could not be included and 
shown on British television, existing as outside the dominant hegemonic 
 David Miller’s Truth on the Rock (1988) and The Damage Was Done (1989) provide an 38
analysis of general media coverage of the incident.  
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frame. Whilst Death on the Rock could ultimately be broadcast, it’s focus was 
rather on Governmental/security acts, particularly the shoot-to-kill policy, 
and not an exploration of IRA methods or justifications. American audiences 
were therefore shown a representation of an individual who  
wouldn't have fitted into the stereotype of the terrorist she was portrayed as 
in the British media. I think people would have seen an intelligent, articulate, 
attractive woman on their screen. It might have raised questions about their 
notions of what is a terrorist. It might have raised questions about the 
manner in which she was killed. And it also probably would have made 
people think, “What makes someone who looks like the girl next door take up 
arms? She looks intelligent. She must have some rational reason for 
that?” (Miller, 1994b, p.85).  
Indeed audiences on mainland Britain were poorly served by BBC coverage of 
the incident. BBC NI produced an episode of weekly current affairs show 
Spotlight which echoed the findings of This Week. Garnering similar 
criticism, the BBC restricted transmission to Northern Ireland, despite a clear 
national (and international) interest. ‘The preservation of the Institution 
came before its journalistic duty’ (Bolton, 1990, p.246). A later Panorama 
programme, coinciding with the conclusion of the inquest into Death on the 
Rock was postponed by BBC Director General Michael Checkland and his 
deputy, John Birt, yet Roger Bolton quotes Daily Telegraph coverage of 
internal BBC staff reaction: ‘Everything had been referred along the line. It 
was probably the most careful programme ever made’ (ibid). Two moments 
in BBC coverage can be identified as root causes of this need for “care”.  
INLA 
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The media, particularly reporters operating in Ireland at the height of the 
conflict, struggled with both objectivity and truth. In essence, archival 
research of BBC output suggests, that in the ‘practice of journalism, it is more 
a matter of striving to get things right by reliance on sources that can be cited 
and evidence that can be confirmed by an accredited authority’ (Tumber and 
Webster, 2007, p.68). This is particularly crucial for the BBC, with the 
connotations its reportage carries (on a global level).  39
It is evident there was an unwillingness amongst the media, for the initial 
decade of the crisis, to admit that beneath the civil rights troubles lay a more 
profound dispute: the very nature of Northern Ireland sovereignty. There was 
no desire to explore such underlying issues, however it is also clear that for 
initial years, the nature of violence — framed in a civil/human rights 
perspective — was unexpected. Caught off guard, with no comparable events, 
the BBC were unsure how to report events. Reportage began in one direction, 
before gradually moving away from the visuals shown and towards a generic 
code representative of “terrorism”.  
Television coverage was therefore only interested in Ulster when conflicts 
and personality provided strong words and stronger pictures. Whilst this 
invariably lends itself to reportage of violence, where related visuals are 
strong yet simple, events featuring similarly strong footage can gain 
prominence: witness the Enniskillen bombing in chapter five. However, it 
was the images of death and destruction that framed coverage for initial years 
 Of course what is “right” raises a multiplicity of further questions. 39
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— amidst successive political failures and initiatives — that led the British 
media, establishment and population to become wary. Further, whilst Peter 
Taylor does not invoke compassion fatigue, he rather feels a weariness was 
prevalent, with a lack of context, understanding, and resolution, affecting 
attitudes (23.01.03). 
BBC reporters then, were challenged with covering a complex and multi-
faceted event in a short three minute piece on the nightly bulletins. Philip 
Schlesinger details BBC production, organised to serve the two channels with 
three bulletins on BBC One, 1.45pm (15 mins), 5.45pm (15 mins) and 9.00pm 
(25 mins), and two on BBC Two, 7.30pm (10 mins) and 11.00pm (15 mins) 
(1987, p.48). By their very nature, such broadcasts offer little room for 
analysis and scant space for subtlety. In turn, viewer knowledge of the 
situation, and concern for the future, is prohibited and limited.  
Indeed, in a conflict recognised for these strong pictures and strong words, 
the figure of Ian Paisley has been argued as “created, and reflected by, the 
media itself (cited by Taylor, 1977). However if the media had ignored Paisley 
— a stunning orator with ‘a searing, acerbic approach to religion’ who 
guaranteed intense and provocative language (Dillon, 1998, p.183) — he 
would not have been diminished nor granted less influence. Instead it would 
have further ill served the enlightenment of the public, and so the journalistic 
point of departure was re-situated as ‘Paisley exists because Ulster 
exists’ (Taylor, 1977). To understand the nature of the Loyalist strike, and 
Paisley’s subsequent success at the polls, context and perspective were 
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required for the viewer. Where a bold approach was needed, with provocative 
questioning, a search for knowledge, and a desire to further understanding, 
the media failed, promoting arresting visuals.  
There can be silence on the screen: no words, no music, no sound effects: but 
there must be pictures (Schlesinger, 1992, p.128). 
To fully understand the environment the BBC was operating within, it is 
important to consider the broadcast of two episodes of the Tonight 
programme, broadcast in 1977 and 1979. The first, broadcast on Thursday 
15th December 1977, featured the inclusion of interviews with members of 
Provisional Sinn Féin and the Provisional IRA and was termed an 
explanatory piece by producer Sean Hardie. For Airey Neave, Conservative 
MP, Shadow Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and vociferous critic of 
the BBC, the programme was a Party Political Broadcast for the IRA, ‘the 
most dangerous programme shown for many years…which will inevitably 
give new encouragement to terrorism’. He asked BBC’s Director General, Ian 
Trethowan  
do the BBC want to prolong the “armed struggle" in Northern Ireland…by 
glorifying violence and fostering a new generation of killers. The terrorists are 
using your Corporation for their own propaganda’ (BBC NI Chronicle, p.30).  
The programme however sought to attempt to place a form of visual 
recognisance on the deaths that had occurred, and it is difficult to reconcile 
the footage with Neave’s proclamation it glorified violence. A list of the dead 
in the printed press is profoundly lacking an associated visual, some “thing” 
simultaneously making real Barthes pseudo-presence and token of absence of 
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the dead. Beginning with a slow montage of shots, panning across hundreds 
of small white crosses — with the associated peaceful connotations — 
commemorating those killed, the film sought to detail IRA violence 
frequently, particularly in the reporter’s questioning of the interview subjects. 
The programme concluded with a second visual motif again symbolising 
violence through footage of various memorials across three groups: the IRA 
itself, British military personnel, and civilian victims. Such footage was rich 
in connotations, seeking to evoke considerable sympathy in the audience.  
Whilst the speakers sought to justify their actions, and promote the actions of 
the IRA, they were balanced, or more accurately, undercut, by an emphasis 
that the Republican movement was fractured, limited in numbers and 
financially suffering. It is worthwhile then detailing the response of Ian 
Trethowan, Director General of the BBC, who highlights the precise issue the 
broadcast was problematic:   
what is really at issue is what the public can be trusted to be shown. You seem 
to take the view that the public should not be shown, in any serious form, 
what is happening among the Republican groups, even at a moment of 
change. We disagree. We believe that the public can be trusted to make its 
own judgement, even in Northern Ireland. It is sending 14,000 of its sons to 
risk disablement, even death, on the streets of Belfast and in the hedgerows 
of South Armagh…The public is entitled to expect that we recognised that 
reporting in Northern Ireland is very different from reporting in Norfolk 
(written reply to Neave, 20.12.77). 
The second programme, aired on July 5th 1979, featured an interview with a 
member of the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) who claimed the 
organisation was responsible for the death of Airey Neave, assassinated in 
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March 1979 in a car-bomb attack at the House of Commons.  Whilst several 40
newspapers had previously interviewed members of the INLA (at the time it 
was not a proscribed terrorist organisation) it was only when the BBC 
featured the spokesperson on television that issues arose, highlighting 
Margaret Thatcher’s awareness that television was a more powerful medium 
then the printed word (or radio), transmitting but not interfering with the 
visuals, the experience.  
Following an introduction, including an explanation of the circumstances in 
which it was shot and the history of the INLA, David Lomax presented his 
twelve and a half minute interview with the disguised INLA member. With a 
disagreement on terminology, the INLA member denying Neave had been 
assassinated/executed and not murdered, the tone is markedly hostile. The 
interview was followed by a studio discussion, featuring both Protestant and 
Catholic guests, and both disagreed on future policy regarding terrorism in 
Ireland. There was a clear lack of engagement with the political content of the 
interview, indeed an overt rejection of all proposed. Two oppositional 
perspectives were instead submitted: the criminality of the act (Robin Day) 
against the sub-humanising reactionary populism of Robert Bradford MP — 
‘this creature will be pursued by us’, referring first to Loyalists, and then the 
security forces (Schlesinger et al., 1983, p.52).  
 The would be the last episode of Spotlight however it was not as a result of the content of 40
the episode. 
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It is however also important to note that Gerry Fitt MP, present on the panel, 
introduced a third reading of the interview: it was irresponsible. This, the 
standard official argument, is that which would garner attention on an official 
level. A BBC audience investigation by the broadcasting research department 
found four-fifths of respondents believed it was right to broadcast the item, 
with most claiming to be more hostile to the INLA and IRA as a consequence. 
Indeed,  
Those who favoured our decision to broadcast the programme said that 
people needed to be informed about the situation in Northern Ireland…and 
that viewers were capable of making up their own minds (Bolton, 1990, p.47)  
As Tim Pat Coogan highlights, there ‘was no particular outcry until Airey 
Neave’s widow wrote to the Daily Telegraph complaining that the “terrorist 
had been given ample scope to besmirch the memory of my husband”’ (2002, 
p.367). Margaret Thatcher herself spoke in Parliament, stating ‘I am appalled 
it was ever transmitted and I believe it reflects gravely on the judgement of 
the BBC and those responsible’ (cited by Curtis, 1998, p.164). Despite 
challenging the comments of the INLA spokesman in the interview, 
contradicting his allegations frequently and strongly defending Neave’s 
stance on torture, the printed press joined the Prime Minister in criticising 
the BBC. However as Roger Bolton, producer of Spotlight, notes  
The public has a right to know what is happening in Northern Ireland, and 
what motivates those involved, including the paramilitaries. Such interviews 
should be rare, thorough and carefully planned in context but they should be 
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done. The emotional reaction of politicians ought not to be the decisive factor 
(Bolton, 1990, p.50).  41
At the point of broadcast then, security forces had been operating in 
Northern Ireland for a decade. Army assessment — shared by several 
politicians — was that terrorism could be contained but not eradicated. The 
INLA was emerging at this point as a new terrorist organisation (not yet 
proscribed) with a Marxist ideology. Tonight sought to examine this 
emergent threat in light of the current political situation, with context 
provided by the subsequent discussion. Therefore whilst audience 
aggrievement was muted, a concerted effort by a vocal minority led to 
significant uproar against the BBC. Such was the intemperate feeling fostered 
by this group and elements of the printed press, the Board of Governors 
issued a statement in the 1980 annual report:  
The Board recognised the existence of two legitimate viewpoints on this 
matter. It respected the feelings of those who considered the interview and 
others like it to be abhorrent, but believed in balance it was right for the BBC 
to give the audience this insight into the mentality of terrorists. This 
informative aspect weighted more with us than the suggestion that the group 
might gain propaganda advantage from the interview. We believe our 
audience to be adult and intelligent in these matters (1980).  
Centring coverage of terrorist acts around a human interest angle, however, 
promotes a tendency to exaggerate the actual terror qualities of such events: 
unpredictable and irrational. The lack of attention to possible explanations of 
the motives and politics of those responsible, results in an associated framing 
 Bolton would produce Panorama, and Nationwide, being fired twice over his coverage of 41
Northern Ireland. He would later move to Thames Television (ITV) where he would edit This 
Week, including the famous episode Death on the Rock, regarding the deaths of three 
Provisional IRA members in Gibraltar as part of Operation Flavius. 
 210
of those involved as similarly unpredictable and irrational. In turn then, there 
is a movement towards placing the relevant individuals/groups as outside 
society, and the most appropriate responsive strategy is one of defeat 
(destruction) as opposed to dialogue. This sits with the response of Thatcher 
throughout the Troubles, who subscribed to the maxim there can be no 
dealings with terrorists.  Selected politicians in turn attempted to impress 42
on the media — particularly broadcasting since it is the visuals which grant 
credence to any cause — a similar view, and refrain from granting publicity 
(Thatcher’s oxygen) to terrorists. The media then can be seen as being 
generally dependent on the governmental/political situation in which they 
operate. Stepping outside this sphere leads to concerted attacks by a 
political/printed press dualism.  
Carrickmore 
Described by Ed Moloney as ‘one of the IRA’s most spectacular propaganda 
coups to date’, and just six months after Margaret Thatcher’s election, the 
Carrickmore incident further set the BBC against the Conservative 
government (cited by Curtis, 1998, p.166). Exaggerated reporting prompted 
allegations of collusion between the BBC and IRA, and as such, the planned 
Panorama programme, intended as a historical study and critical assessment 
 At least in public. Of interest here in the recent kidnappings of Westerners in the Middle 42
East; several countries, including many in Europe, have paid ransoms to terrorist 
organisations to secure release of citizenry. Britain and the USA continue to refuse to 
negotiate any such financial settlements. See Alexander and Alexander (2015). 
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of the organisation (including interviews with senior Republicans) was 
cancelled.  
In the midst of filming the episode, BBC reporters were directed to 
Carrickmore, where they filmed an IRA roadblock for approximately ten 
minutes. No interviews were conducted, and the footage available online now 
shows children cycling around and through the sequence, locals casually 
leaning on walls observing and armed men, wearing duffle coats and 
balaclavas stopping cars asking for driving licence identification. It was a 
clear publicity stunt, an attempt to present an air of legitimacy as a 
organisation, yet wildly distorted press reportage caused concern. Liz Curtis 
details the London Standard as describing 140 armed men occupying the 
village for three hours and offering to hold the village if it was better 
television (Curtis, 1998, p.166); producer David Darlow, interviewed in the 
Ulster Herald, recounts other printed press headlines:  
According to one paper we had marched with gunmen into the post office in 
Carrickmore, filming the holding up of the staff. Another had us directing the 
IRA men like actors on a film set (2013). 
In the House of Commons Margaret Thatcher condemned the BBC and 
reminded the corporation that it was not the first time she had asked it to ‘put 
its house in order’, whilst the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, James 
Molyneaux, spoke of the BBC’s ‘treasonable activity’ (both cited by Curtis, 
1998, p.167) . At the end of the decade then, the BBC was in open conflict 
with the Government. This would continue with the Hunger Strike, as the 
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BBC faced a choice between representing a global incident and representing 









He has chosen death: 
Refusing to eat or drink, that he may bring  
Disgrace upon me 
W. B. Yeats 





Communication is everything. Skype, Google Chat, e-mail, text messages, and 
video were all part of our daily crisis-management response.                                
We are wired to support each other.                                                                             
A turn in history across an ocean felt as though it was next door. 
(Malloni, 2014). 
In February 2014, violence exploded in Kiev, Ukraine. Part of the Euro-
maidan movement, the protests called for the resignation of President Viktor 
Yanukovych and his government. In the space of one forty-eight hour period, 
eighty-eight people were killed. Amateur cell phone footage, released online 
and through news organisations, showed incredible images of uniformed 
snipers shooting protesters using makeshift shields and home-made armour.  
The origins of the violence can be traced back to the previous November and 
a governmental decision to abandon a trade deal with the EU for closer 
relations with Russia. This can be traced back to 2010 and the arrest and 
imprisonment of Prime Minster Yulia Tymoshenko, and in turn, back to the 
Orange Revolution of 2004. The overall root cause however, must include 
examination of the 1991 declaration of Ukrainian independence from the 
USSR.  
For media organisations, this was an extraordinary period, with strong 
visuals and graphic footage being released daily. Yet, they were each unable 
to summarise the background effectively in a three minute report at the head 
of the news. The BBC attempted to explain the origins through an online 
explainer video, The Ukraine Crisis explained — in 60 seconds, which also 
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appeared on the BBC News 24 channel frequently. Yet amidst images of 
flames, violence, gunfire and riots, overlaid text explains ‘protests started 
when the President refused to sign a trade deal with the EU’. No further 
background is offered. What is, reveals very little, and raises more questions 
then answers.  
Initial Failings and the  Propaganda War 
Since the mid 1970s media interest in Northern Ireland diminished 
significantly. As a consequence, events — particularly in relation to those that 
can euphemistically by reduced to “routine” acts of violence — would garner 
limited news coverage. Indeed, in a number of instances, post-1974 UWC 
strike, it was obfuscated, with important moments, including the rare 
appearance of IRA leader David O’Connell, completely erased from the wider 
British audience on BBC One nightly news.  
According to Jonathan Dimbleby, 
There has not been a serious detailed account of the history of Northern 
Ireland because it is a delicate political issue…the reason is because the  
political institutions, BBC, IBA and the British Government don’t wish us to 
know about the situation in Ireland (cited by Schlesinger et al,. 1983, p.132). 
Dimbleby is also quoted as speaking at the inaugural public meeting of the 
Campaign for Free Speech on Ireland in March 1977: 
Those who have access, anywhere, at any time, to our media, should be 
pressing to ensure that in those media Northern Ireland is put in context, the 
events are explained, the possible future analysed. Otherwise we will 
continue to deny the British public the kind of information it need on which 
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to form a judgement about the most important political issue                                   
that any government has had to face  
(The Campaign for Free Speech on Ireland, 1979, p.3). 
The media consistently failed to explain the situation and its developments in 
an appropriate manner. As in Kiev, once original failings were made, it would 
become increasingly difficult for the media to accurately and appropriately 
delineate events. Instead, a short-hand came to dominate, with a civil rights 
origin offered as a common explainer.   
TV companies and newspapers must start to provide the in-depth coverage 
that is needed. They must put the situation in its historical perspective, fully 
explain the motivation of all parties to the conflict, and ensure that all views 
on how lasting peace can be achieved are given a full and equal hearing 
(Clark, 1977) 
Certainly within news bulletins, it was impossible to preface each three 
minute  report with a summary of Irish History, from plantation to the Battle 
of the Boyne and beyond. Since such motivations were however never fully 
detailed and explored, there was a resultant cascading effect on all news and 
current affairs programming. The news would instead be reduced to a series 
of snapshots, a nightly catalogue of death and destruction unrelieved by 
explanation and isolated of wider context. Current affairs would seek answers 
to questions never posed. Television as a medium — with the advantages it 
provides — then becomes particularly culpable. As Clark would state,  
it is hard to understand why the BBC for example can…clear BBC  
for four and a half hours to show a complete investigation of the  
French resistance and the role of the French public…and yet not devote its 
resources to a similar exercise on Northern Ireland (1977).  
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Whilst many politicians believed reportage would contribute to an increase in 
terrorism, Anne McHardy, The Guardian’s Northern Ireland correspondent 
during the 70s, interviewed on BBC One’s The Editors would instead argue it 
is  
a fallacy to think that the situation would go away if it wasn’t reported. I don’t 
think that it will ever go away unless it’s thoroughly and deeply reported…I 
recommend more reporting of the background, if the reasons why people do 
these things, which inevitably means more talking to terrorists (28.6.1981). 
As detailed in earlier chapters, such a practice did (and could) not occur. 
Instead, there was a tendency to equate terrorism with violence and 
criminality. 1985’s At the Edge of the Union documentary for example, 
received significant criticism and was delayed for two months. As a 
documentary, and not a straight news broadcast, it utilised a different 
interview approach, allowing the two key participants, Martin McGuinness 
and Gregory Campbell, to speak for themselves entirely unchallenged. 
However footage of McGuinness at home with his children was seen as 
indicative of this humanising concept. The Government encouraged, and 
ultimately the BBC acceded to, the addition of 19 seconds of aftermath 
footage of an IRA bombing in Belfast, undercutting a nonviolent portrayal 
and retuning representation to the familiar iconography established. 
The overarching nature of the conflict then, is as a propaganda war. The 
public functioned as an asset desired by all participants, with each seeking to 
manipulate media representation. The position of the BBC — as a national 
(state) broadcaster — therefore situated it on the front line, as a target for the 
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RUC, the Army, paramilitaries, political parties, opinion leaders, lobby 
groups, and the viewing public itself, each with their own intrinsic beliefs and 
alliances. All of these — including the public — fight the propaganda war with 
varying degrees of skill and success.  Every story, whether directly related 43
(i.e. a bombing or murder), or “simply” a housing crisis/industrial dispute 
would instead became a minor engagement for each group, and a new 
dilemma for the reporter. The concept of news values is in turn distorted by 
the very nature of what is being reported and subject to a series of filters prior 
to broadcast. 
Peter Taylor, reporter on ITV’s This Week throughout the 70s, and BBC’s 
Panorama from 1980 onwards, encountered difficulties when covering 
Ireland, including a decrease in ratings.  
What I have to try and do, is to explain a highly complex situation to a British 
public which increasingly knows little and cares even less about what is going 
on there…It’s still a foreign war to some of our audience (Clark, 1977).  
The Irish Sea divide can certainly be held partially accounted for this nature; 
despite the IRA initiating attacks on the mainland, for most, it was an “over 
there” phenomena. News and political analysis was contained within the 
environs, only occasionally engaging with the mainland public and media, i.e. 
with particular shootings, bombings or acts of violence. ‘Even when such 
events hijack the headlines they are reported in an inadequate and partial 
way, explanation and context are omitted’ (Curtis, 1998, p.275). This 
 The public in the sense of a pressure group (whether individual or collectively). 43
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underlines Richard Francis’ notion of a divided community, where multiple 
levels of coverage were necessary and simultaneously occurring.   
It was a unique situation for all parties: the population, the government, the 
media. Within Britain, whilst political divides exist, there was, and is, a 
general agreement on the institution of Government, its role in society, and 
indeed the very existence of the state/the fact that the state should exist. 
Within Northern Ireland however, that consensus was absent. Violence and 
political upheaval of grand proportions followed.  
At the outbreak of violence, the BBC had neither the newsroom or the staff to 
copy with the story; ‘we were not equipped in any way for a story of such 
magnitude’ (Baker, 1996, p.119). Once such difficult was in how to frame the 
visuals emanating from the environment, with no previous standards to judge 
content against. Initial visuals were graphic, brutal pictorials of the reality of 
violence, however this was soon followed by a movement away from such 
sights towards a more neutral series of motifs and recurrent tropes, where 
reality was sanitised. 
Body Horror 
According to Taylor’s This Week producer David Elstein ‘We aren’t supposed 
to broadcast things which will offend, outrage or conflict with the sense of 
decency of the public’ (Clark, 1977). On a surface level this can initially be 
interpreted as related to interviewing and broadcasting those belonging to 
proscribed terror groups or organisations (witness the frequent, organised 
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and vocal criticism that would accompany early instances of reportage), 
however, it must also be analysed as prohibiting graphic coverage and 
attempting to impinge representation. Whilst “the sense of decency of the 
public” is inherently an abstract concept, it is frequently cited as the 
overarching concern for not showing graphic depictions (ergo the reality), of 
terrorism (and warfare).  
John Berger believed that whilst images of violence ‘record sudden moments 
of agony—a terror, a wounding, a death, a cry of grief,' they are ‘at best 
useless…at worst, narcissistic, leading the viewer to a sense of self-conscious 
helplessness rather than to enlightenment, outrage or action… the issue 
which has caused the moment is effectively depoliticised’ (cited by Linfield, 
2011, p.6). Linfield however stresses, imagery of the Vietnam War (which 
Berger was commenting on) did not foster feelings of moral inadequacy. ‘On 
the contrary, they mobilised political opposition’ (ibid).   44
Particularly in relation to warfare, there has been an overt synthesis of the 
military and media, with a desire to portray a certain “image” of warfare (as 
just, virtuous and necessary) and terrorism (as criminal and outside cultural 
norms). There was, and is, repeated attempts to present the military as 
clinical, with death for the “enemy” quick and painless. Civilians are the 
euphemistic “collateral damage” within warfare (and state terror), where to 
detail their death would make them real. Instead they may only become 
 I would however suggest that this mobilisation of opposition merely echoed an overall 44
trend in American culture that was politically turning against the Vietnam War. Images alone 
cannot be attributed as the root cause (see also Hallin, 1986).
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visible when deemed necessary (i.e. as a propaganda tool in relation to 
terrorism). As society progressed to a multi-programme/multi-channel/
multi-media age, audiences became incredibly fragmentary; the media then 
argue they resist showing such images since it can lead to audiences turning 
off (a corporate concern) or result in overexposure. This is what Thomas 
Keenan calls the ‘dark side of revelation…sometimes we call it voyeurism, 
sometimes compassion fatigue, sometimes the obscenity of images’ (2004, 
438). Invoking the notion of compassion fatigue, Keenan is here echoing the 
language of Susan Sontag and Barbie Zelizer. For Sontag, such imagery can, 
vivify the condemnation of war, and may bring home, for a spell, a portion of 
its reality to those who have no experience of war at all…yet they may [also] 
give rise to opposing responses. A call for peace. A cry for revenge. Or simply 
the bemused awareness…that terrible things happen (2003, p.12). 
Yet, as Susie Linfield explains: 
it is the camera — the still camera, the film camera, the video camera, and 
now the digital camera — that has done so much to globalise our consciences; 
it is the camera that brought us the twentieth century’s bad news.  
Today it is, quite simply, impossible to say, “I did not know”:                                         
photographs have robbed us of the alibi of ignorance (2011, p.46). 
However, whilst denouncing the desensitisation argument of Alfredo Jaar — 
the ‘bombardment of images…has completely anaesthetised us’ — as wrong, 
Linfield’s alibi of ignorance is inherently problematic (ibid). She suggests,  
We know of suffering in far-flung parts of the world in ways that our 
forebears never could, and the images we see — in some places, under                           
some conditions — demand not just our interest but our response (ibid). 
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Sontag’s Regarding the Pain of Others — qualifying and largely retracting her 
earlier On Photography work — seeks to stress ‘harrowing photographs do 
not inevitably lose their power to shock’, but are instead undercut by this 
bemused awareness (2003, p.76).  The complexity of mediated scenes of 45
terrorism, violence and horror then is problematised by the structure of 
broadcast news. Granting precedence to one shot, image or sequence can 
imply a hierarchy exists whilst the very need for some contextualisation and 
hermeneutical analysis is limited by the organisation, journalist and time. In 
the case of Kiev, twenty years of history and months of violence are unable to 
be summed up in a sixty-second video where the visuals strongly outweigh 
and supplant the associated narrative. In the case of Ireland, several years of 
violence and decades of injustice could not reach a consensus in a three hour 
staged trial where the rhetoric outweighs and supplants a complete absence 
of visuals. What then would our understanding of warfare, terrorism and 
conflict be if we had never seen reportage? Would the language of cinema 
dominate?  ’What is wrong with revealing such suffering: what is right with 46
hiding it? Why is the teller, rather than the tale, considered 
obscene?’ (Linfield, 2011, p.41). 
Pre-censorship, to borrow a term from Walter Cronkite, results in 
Baudrillard’s precession of simulacra, ‘a real without origin or reality: a 
 On Photography was pivotal to the idea of compassion fatigue as a concept, detailed in 45
chapter one. 
 Such questions are beyond the scope of this work, however it is important to note the 46
impact of cinema on both media reportage of conflict and the conduct of warfare itself. See 
Paul Virilio, 1989. 
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hyperreal’ (1994, p.1). The military and media, uniting for such projects as 
embedded reporters, create hyper-real war, devoid of reality. There is ‘the 
capture of death itself in the inescapable confines of rhetoric’; death is denied 
a material referent. The conditions imposed upon embedded reporters create 
unspoken forms of censorship; as Gay Talase argues, ‘correspondents who 
drive around in tanks and armoured personnel carriers who are spoon-fed 
what the military gives them...become mascots for the military’ (2007). 
Escorted into green zones and fortified compounds, where reporters cannot 
function as eyewitnesses, results in a cloud of obscurity settling over the 
battlefield. 
According to one photographer, images of conflict and warfare ‘convey a 
useful moral: It shows the blank horror and reality...here are the dreadful 
details! Let them aid in preventing such another calamity’ (quoted by Narcos, 
2014, p.44). In May 2011, the Taliban killed Pakistani police recruits at a 
paramilitary training centre in Shabqadar, northwest Pakistan. The BBC 
evening news report explained ‘Human body parts could be seen scattered 
about. There was a lot of blood’ (13.05.11), yet not one of the eighty dead was 
visible in coverage. The raw imagery forever remained obscured, 
fundamentally obfuscating terror, war and reportage. Conversely, pictures 
from the Hezbollah media unit during the Israeli incursion in 2006 were 
‘bloody, clear illustrations of the situation’; pictures of ‘mother’s sons dying’, 
of ‘wounded soldiers so close up we could hear their moans’, helped change 
public opinion (Harb, 2011). In the Western World, such footage — the image 
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of the dead — is to paraphrase reporter Martin Bell a “postage stamp-sized 
cameo” (2008, pp.221-231). The most vivid pictures of terrorism, the imagery 
of the dead, was redacted from the majority of coverage, particularly after 
1973. A disparity existed (and remains today, particularly regarding cinema) 
in the limits allowed for fictional violence and news violence. The horrors of 
terrorism (and the horror of war) were sanitised, undercutting any news 
account. A rhetorical account of death does not hold the fullest impact, 
lacking the actuality of representation.  
The camera then is an instrument of evidence, for Roland Barthes, David Levi 
Strauss and Susan Sontag. All were writing regarding the still picture camera 
however their comments are relevant to any consideration of the visual. A 
connection exists between the image and its origin; for Roland Barthes, 
“every photograph is somehow co-natural with its referent”.  
What the photograph assets is the overwhelming truth that “the thing has 
been there”: this was a reality which once existed, though it is “a reality one 
can no longer touch” (cited by Tagg, 1988, p.1). 
According to Tagg however, this connection is somewhat tenuous. He posits 
photography to have no identity of its own. Rather, it depends entirely on the  
institutions and agents which define it and set it to work…its products are 
meaningful and legible only within the particular currencies they have. it is a 
flickering across a field of institutional spaces (ibid, page 63). 
This is particularly useful to consider in light of imagery of terrorism (and 
war), with Tagg suggesting an alliance between the nascent state and image. 
The camera becomes a mimic, and 
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like the state, the camera is never neutral. The representations it produces 
are highly coded and the power it wields is never its own. As a means of 
record, it arrives on the scene vested with a particular authority to arrest, 
picture and transform daily life, a power to see and record; a power of 
surveillance that effects a complete reversal of the political axis of 
representation (ibid, p.64). 
The power implied here is then the power of those who both wield and deploy 
the resultant images and visualisations. In airing footage, of the aftermath of 
a bomb or the burning of a street, the BBC is seeking to elevate the imagery 
whilst simultaneously endorsing the images constructed, framed and 
represented, as evidence or register [of] a truth. 
Whilst images and footage then stand as a symbol of the camera’s privileged 
presence, challenging the viewer to replicate the act of observing this 
“guaranteed” event, Tagg believes photo-journalism only partially holds the 
power of authority. Susan Sontag would suggest photography (and the 
moving image) offers itself as an object of manipulation, and Tagg instead 
believes that the mass media are not categorised as one such ideological 
apparatus, being unable to provide the necessary binding quality. The mass 
media, in the reportage of conflict in Northern Ireland, served multiple roles, 
particularly that of ideological apparatus as extension of government. 
However, there was an overt failure by many, including the BBC, to even 
attempt to provide this “binding quality,” whether it was through the 
obfuscation of footage, moving away from a realist aesthetic and towards a 
series of motifs and symbols that communicated little, or simply through the 
(re)framing of a visual narrative. 
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Originally published in 1968, Understanding a Photograph saw John Berger 
similarly argued that images are an (automatic) record of events, and that 
they have no language of their own, relying instead on that which may be 
assigned to them (2013). The only relevant decision — particularly 
appropriate for a news cameraman — is the choice of moment to isolate and 
record. This is crucial in regards television news, mediated through a number 
of levels. Before an image can even reach consideration of a censor or the 
authorities, a mediating agent (the cameraman, often accompanied by a 
reporter) must make their own decisions, influenced by framing and news 
values, regarding what to film (what not to film) and precisely how to film it: 
from what angles, what distance, what direction. It is then subject to further 
mediation in the editing process, where a sequential clip can become non-
linear, ordered to accompany a narrative, an agenda.  Every sequence of 47
events, including a complete news broadcast, has been ordered, and 
intertwined, depending on ‘code, caption and context’ (Griffin, 2002, p38). 
Umberto Eco similarly situated a rendezvous between photography to 
perception, with both coded, and existing in a world of objects, already  
constructed as a world of uses, values and meanings…the meaning of the 
photographic image is built up by an interaction of such schemas or codes 
which vary greatly in their degree of schematisation. The image is therefore 
to be seen as a composite of signs, more to be compared with a complex 
sentence than a single word. Its meanings are multiple, concrete and most 
importantly constructed. In common too with other language like systems, 
photographs may be exhaustively analysed as protections of a limited number 
of rhetorical forms in which a society’s values and beliefs are naturalised 
(Tagg, 1993, p.187). 
 On this occasion, intended in the pejorative sense. 47
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With television news existing as a rhetorical form (which seeks to naturalise 
society’s values and beliefs), a useful analogy here is that suggested by Neil 
Postman.  
As an example, consider television’s presentation of the uprising by Chinese 
students in Tiananmen Square…it was television journalism at its best. But if 
that were all someone knew about the student uprising, it wouldn’t be very 
much. One would have to know something about who rules China, and where 
those rulers came from, and by what authority or ideology they claim to rule, 
and how the students interpreted the meaning of freedom and democracy. 
These are complex matters that are beyond the scope of simple newscasts 
(2008, p.x). 
This then links the idea of visuals (either photographic or video) as 
‘constructed as a world of uses, values and meanings’ through its 
relationships (either existing or to be established) with ‘schemas or 
codes’ (Tagg, 1988, p187) provided by the institution. Meanings, in regard to 
the photography of Trevor Paglen, an image in a newspaper, a sequence on a 
news bulletin, a digital video on YouTube, are both multiple and constructed. 
A BBC news sequence, analysed with the visuals at the forefront, demands 
comparison with, to adapt Eco’s statement, a complex series of movies as 
opposed to a single motion picture. Each BBC broadcast news report does not 
exist alone, instead building on that which preceded it; the institutional 
frame it occupies connotes authority whilst simultaneously establishing codes 
for the future.  
Of course precisely what is news, is a crucial question. If the definition 
attached is one of important and interesting events, a subsequent 
clarification on exactly what these important and interesting events are is 
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created. Embedded within an understanding of this notion, is an individual’s 
definition of news and therein lies a central aspect: this judgement is made 
on the basis of what the journalist believes important, or perhaps, what the 
journalist believes their audience thinks is important. Once a story/event is 
then selected, what details are to be included? The journalist must  
choose what about it is worth seeing, is worth neglecting, and is worth 
remembering or forgetting. This is simply another way of saying that every 
news story is a reflection of the reporter who tells the story. The reporter’s 
previous assumptions about what is “out there” edit what he or she thinks is 
there (Postman, 2008, p.14).  
It is then fruitful to adjust Postman’s original analogy: 
Let us suppose that a fourteen-year-old Catholic boy hurls a Molotov cocktail 
at two eighteen-year-old British soldiers. The explosion knocks one of the 
solders down and damages his left eye. The other soldier, terrified, fires a 
shot that kills the Catholic instantly. The injured soldier eventually loses his 
sight in the damaged eye. What details should be included in reporting this 
event? Is the age of the Catholic relevant? Are the ages of the British soldiers 
relevant? Is the injury to the solider relevant? Was the act of the Catholic 
provoked by the mere presence of the British soldiers? Was the act therefore 
justified? Is the state of mind of the shooter relevant? 
The answers to all these questions, as well as to other questions about the 
event, depend entirely on the point of view of the journalist (ibid, p.15). 
The point of view of the journalist, the strictures they operate within as a 
member of a broadcasting corporation, and an awareness of the “values” and 
“desires” of said organisation, fundamentally affected the visual 
representation of domestic terrorism regarding Northern Ireland.  
In May 1980, British public attention was fixated on the Iranian Embassy 
siege in London. An act of international terrorism, the final moments were 
screened with a short delay by the media (4 minutes by ITV/8 minutes by the 
 233
BBC) due to an awareness the terrorists had access to televisions inside the 
embassy. Such an incident, an almost live presentation of the “dramatic 
end’”, showing black clad special forces of the Special Air Service (SAS) 
assaulting the embassy in glorious colour, replete with gunshots, screams, 
and explosions “ripping through the building, a pall of smoke cover[ing] the 
front”, brought ‘the conflict between terror and counter-terror to the centre of 
the media’s attention’ (dialogue from BBC One News, 05.05.80; Schlesinger 
et al., 1983, p.24). The 1981 Irish hunger strike would similarly gain media 
prominence, returning the Troubles to the forefront of the news agenda with 
a series of stark visualisations. It is also important to note here the masked 
man in black, the anonymous state agent deployed in the Iranian Embassy 
siege, who became the quintessential symbol of counter-terrorism. Identity 
shrouded for reasons of national security, this “image”, promoted by the 
state, exists on a similar level to the masked members of the IRA.  
Ten Men 
It was over ten years before television began examining the background of the 
conflict. For many, this would be ten years too late. The intervening period is 
then dominated by superficial coverage. Instead of endeavouring to educate 
the audience on the origins, it in essence toed the establishment line, notably 
in regard to ‘iconic’ events such as Bloody Sunday. By 1981, and the Hunger 
Strike, the background would be considerable.   
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Within Britain, the mass media would proclaim the end of the Hunger strikes 
as a victory for Margaret Thatcher and her hard line policies. However, as 
Moloney suggests, in Ireland, it was viewed as a significant defeat for the 
Conservative government; whilst Thatcher did not concede political status, 
prisoners were granted the trappings (the associated rights in all but name), 
and the IRA as an organisation gained political legitimacy, increased 
recruitment and significant support, funds and armaments (Moloney, 2002). 
This dichotomy then, between general public sentiment and the mass media 
must be examined.  
Journalists within the British press reported events in alliance with the 
Governmental position; indeed there was considerable exasperation at the 
global condemnation of Margaret Thatcher’s intransigence. At its conclusion, 
The Daily Telegraph would declare the deaths “senseless”, The London 
Times “wasted” whilst The Sun believed the demands in the first instance 
were “absurd”. Yet whilst Thatcher declared ‘I shall never give them political 
status, never’, the Government acceded to every demand: prisoners wore 
their own clothes within two weeks, prison work was eventually dropped, the 
men were allowed to associate freely, and they were given educational 
facilities. ‘The strike was hugely influential outside the Maze. Again, the 
British people did not realise that, because their newspapers did not tell 
them’ (Greenslade, 2011). 
On the BBC, the death of Bobby Sands, the first hunger striker, received 
significant coverage. As the strike progressed, and deaths increased, there 
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was less coverage; this indicates a belief the news value of each was 
decreasing. Whilst print journalists reported on the funerals in considerable 
detail, the media encountered the problem of visual propaganda: members of 
the IRA conducting ideologically potent performative rituals: full dress 
uniform (military fatigues and balaclavas), graveside orations and volleys of 
gunfire.  
This was the full pageantry of a republican funeral, both for the community 
and the cameras: the primary audience (participants and those present) 
informed a secondary audience receiving images through the mass media. 
Conceived then as events, to be consumed in both a mediated and mediatised 
sense, the funerals carried meanings not limited to the immediate primary 
audience. They were instead simultaneously directed towards the mediated 
macro-political arena. In a performative sense, especially taken from the 
standpoint of reading the propaganda war as a mediatised conflict, the 
Hunger Strikes marked a success for the Provisional movement. Images of 
dead hunger strikers coffins draped with the Irish Tricolour, the open casket 
at their wakes, adorned with beret and leather gloves, and volleys of gunfire 
at the graveside, exist as internal and external shows of defiance captured 
and reproduced by the global media. Crucially, they also contributed to a 
period of mass support for the republican struggle from the Catholic 
community, representing ‘a means of rallying the faithful and presenting an 
image to the world’ and thus holding ‘a number of social functions and 
multiple meanings for participants and observers’ (Bean, 2007, p.126). The 
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mise-en-scène of the republican funeral is then important in this instance, 
connoting the symbolically performative nature of events. Indeed as 
McLoone notes, the ‘funerals reflected the military nature of their 
struggle’ (2005, p.211). The resonance of the funeral rites of republican 
martyrs remain powerful symbolic presences within established republican 
identity, with Bobby Sands particularly central to the modern republican folk 
memory. 
In broadcasting footage from the funerals — so carefully were they staged — 
the BBC received fierce criticism that it was indulging the propaganda 
machine of the IRA. A dilemma then exists for the press: how can such a 
moment be framed and represented? In reporting the salient points, there 
will inevitably be a contribution towards the propaganda value of the 
moment; as the pre-eminent story of the period, returning the Troubles to 
wider prominence, if the Hunger Strikes were to be reported, what took place 
must be presented, regardless of the ultimate impact.  
To quote Greg Philo and Mike Berry, regarding the Israel and Palestine 
conflict: 
Funerals are often linked to the fighting/conflict and the coverage of them 
frequently included powerful and emotionally charged images. The screen is 
filled with images of passion and rage but with little opportunity to 
understand how the situation has come about (2004, p.103). 
Whilst BBC television coverage of the Hunger Strikes was extensive, with 
these “powerful and emotionally charged images”, there was little 
opportunity (or endeavour) to explain the complex background (i.e. the 
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blanket protest stretching back to 1976 or the wider socio-political context). 
Reporting was extensive but descriptive; BBC One News on May 5th devoted 
16 minutes (of 30) to the Strike/Sands, whilst BBC Two’s Newsnight 
allocated 33 (of 50) minutes. Both avoided the analytical, but with the 
movement of Sands into Westminster, there was a direct engagement and 
confrontation with the British State (unlike the 74 UWC Strike). At this point, 
‘however much they disliked it, the Sands affair became an international 
event which had to reported to the British public’ (Butler, 1995, p.74). As 
Curtis notes,  
the world’s press flooded into Belfast. Some 23 nations sent camera crews, 
and the American TV networks, ABC, CBS, and NBS, sent 16 camera crews. 
There were at least 400 reporters in the North, and 300 photographers 
covered his funeral (1998, p.202).  
Of import here is BBC meeting minutes expressing concern with the 
misleading impression a ‘combination of Bobby Sands and a smiling 
photograph gave…of a convicted felon’. (ibid, p.204). Whilst Curtis then 
proclaims this to be representative of ‘the anxiety of BBC chiefs to discredit 
the Hunger Strike’, it must instead be considered in the context of the 
previous decade and the repeated failure of visual representations of IRA 
members on BBC broadcasts. The use of “Bobby”, and the availability of a 
smiling image, certainly can be interpreted as humanising, but at that point, 
the sheer symbolic nature of coverage had supplanted such a notion.  
In the aftermath of the “incident” at Carrickmore, a modified code of practice 
was established, forcing journalists to seek explicit approval prior to any 
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investigation of Northern Ireland related affairs. Such a rule extended 
existing directives, expanding out from prohibiting contact with terrorist 
identified groups, to now include all those who may be associated with such 
organisations. Martin McGuinness for example, in the years leading up to the 
Hunger Strike, could not be interviewed on either NI or mainland BBC 
television.  
Yet the nature of the Hunger Strikes, existing as a local, national, and 
international news event, forced an engagement with those previously 
prohibited.  
Amongst republican sympathisers and anti-H Bock campaigners appearing 
onscreen, Sands election agent Danny Morrison and Owen Carron were 
unambiguously persons who may be associated with the IRA…Through 1981, 
official broadcast positions were thus overtaken and outmoded by an 
extraordinarily newsworthy turns of events (Butler, 1995, p.75). 
The Hunger Strikes generated a massive amount of media coverage, 
particularly for the Republican position. Simultaneously there was a political 
breakthrough, with Bobby Sands being elected to Westminster as MP for the 
constituency of Fermanagh and South Tyrone. In entering the legitimate 
political sphere, there was also an overt movement of the Republican 
philosophy and strategy to one of violence and politics: by ballot and by 
bullet (see McAllister, 2004). It was a deliberate attempt to counter the 
growing sophistication of propaganda by the British Army and the 
Government. 
 239
The period then, replete with international coverage, contrasts the 
conspicuous absence of the previous decade. However, coverage, particularly 
radio and television was dominated by what was happening, the descriptive 
style. It was akin to the commentary on a sporting event, with the rare 
occasional foray into speculation about what might happen. Reports on the 
condition of the hunger strikers were interposed with statements from British 
and Unionist politicians. Indeed during much of the coverage, there was a 
repeated stress that the events were part of the IRA propaganda war, and 
therefore warranted a degree of scepticism. Conversely, the statements of 
Unionists and the Government itself were presented as straight, with no 
related corollary. Repeated highlighting of the IRA propaganda machine, and 
a stress that it was manipulating and managing events, could in turn be 
recognised as itself an act of the British propaganda machine. 
Fintan O’Toole of the Irish Times would identify the strike, in Peter Taylor’s 
25 Bloody Years, as a struggle over self-definition (16/08/1994). The Hunger 
Strikes were calculated as an attempt to impose a definition of Republicanism 
on the media and in turn the world. It sought to semantically, semiotically, 
and visually move away from associations with criminality and towards a 
notion of a freedom fighter.  
The death of Sands, as detailed, resulted in phenomenal levels of coverage, 
and his death was exploited by Sinn Féin. Particularly throughout this period, 
Sinn Féin learned a vast degree of media control, and an awareness of 
straightforward propagandistic purposes. There was also a recognition that 
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the story was so powerful it did not matter how it was presented by most 
elements of the media. Instead, it functioned on an emotional level, where an 
orchestrated public show of ritualised funeral proceeds was able to dominate 
BBC proceedings. The Hunger Strikes brought with them massive funeral set 
pieces and a high level of street violence. With media attention already 
focused on the province, such events carried strong visuals that captured and 
dominated coverage, replacing the staid motifs and symbols that had come to 
symbolise terror and conflict in the latter half of the decade.  
The  Origins 
This harnessing of the media can be traced in exploring the origins of the 
Hunger Strikes. Initially, paramilitary prisoners enjoyed a special status and 
a number of privileges, including wearing their own clothes as opposed to 
prison uniforms. A 1975 committee identified such concessions as 
problematic; in offering a degree of legitimacy to acts, this conceded they 
were committed for a political cause.  
In removing the Special Category Status in 1976, a five year campaign began, 
with progressive escalation from Blanket to Dirty to Hunger. This final stage 
sought to restore political status for paramilitary prisoners, focusing on five 
key demands: 
1. The right not to wear a prison uniform; 
2. The right not to do prison work; 
3. The right of free association with other prisoners, and to organise 
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educational and recreational pursuits; 
4. The right to one visit, one letter and one parcel per week; 
5. Full restoration of remission lost through the protest. 
The Hunger Strike then, according to one participant quoted in a BBC 
Timewatch production in 1993, was a weapon of raising the political stakes 
(13/10/93). Whilst seeking to garner media attention, the strike sought to 
move towards a theoretically unacceptable moral limit. Indeed the initial 
blanket strike can be identified as a refusal to conform and was initially 
confined within the prison system. With no strategy to mobilise sympathy or 
develop the cause outside the prison environs, there could be limited impact; 
the lack of visuals hindered the cause. Escalation was then a natural 
progression, with the media strategy a central component. Failure of the 
prison protest to change Governmental policy or gain public sympathy led 
directly to this point.  
Indeed during the first series of hunger strikes, from October to December 
1980, there was no staggered beginning and so seven of the men reached 
death at the same time. The media were unable to concentrate on each and 
the impact was diluted; in beginning the second strike at phased intervals, 
the media were forced to focus on one individual in turn, making each human 
and transitioning them from imprisoned criminal to human being; there was 
an overt making visible of the body. There would then also be a related period 
after each death and funeral where the British government could attempt to 
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resolve matters. The strike, as a coordinated and calculated media event, was 
therefore targeted at multiple audiences, initiating decoding on various 
levels.  
The Media 
100,000 people attended the funeral of Sands with the drama played out in 
front of the world’s media. BBC News coverage of the event was juxtaposed 
with Ian Paisley declaring each vote for Sands ‘a vote for the gun, bullet and 
bomb and a vote against the Protestant population’ (07.05.81). During the 
following month, three more hunger strikers died and after each, there was a 
wave of associated rioting. News coverage of each death was then dominated 
by footage of rioting, ferocious noise and flames illuminating the night sky. A 
petrol bomb is shown in one bulletin striking a policeman and setting him 
alight. Despite his colleagues quickly extinguishing the flames, the footage is 
astonishing in its visceral impact, a return to the early uncoordinated and 
unexpected footage of the Troubles.  
BBC News coverage during the Hunger Strikes utilised the existing visuals 
created within the community: the murals and images of Bobby Sands on 
street walls. Crowds of people were shown on buses going to the funeral, and 
the narration specifically mentions moderate middle-class Catholics. A 
sequence of shots shows the coffin of sticker Patsy O’Hara in a house, the 
surroundings turned into a ‘shrine, to heighten emotion and play on Catholic 
reverence for the dead’ (23.06.81). Paramilitary guards surround the open 
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coffin but there is no visibility of the body. Rather, a lingering shot of a single 
guard serves as a mythic replacement of the dead.  
The night of Sands’ death, during riots, the report opens with a sequence of 
dustbin lids being beaten (&05/05/81). Sharp cuts show the event from 
different angles and mimic the auditory sensation of a cacophony of noise. 
The sequence is then intercut with shots of crowds of women saying the 
rosary, and youths erecting barricades. A close up shows a number of petrol 
bombs being made. The voiceover narration leads on to the next sequence: 
“Thrown in their hundreds at the army/police who had moved in to the fringe 
of the area at first with discretion. Youths are often able to find their target 
[cut to shot of an armoured vehicle catching fire] and so were the army” [cut 
to shot of a youngster being carried away]. There is no blood visible, no 
apparent injury, and no explanation, however the narration states “he was 
shot in the leg by the army”. The framing is of the dominant ideology. The 
sequence ends with more footage of rioters, deliberately framed in a similar 
fashion to previous riots (the Falls Road Curfew/Internment Riots), and 
finally, several army vehicles travelling in procession along the road and out 
of shot. This final aspect, denotive of the security services but connoting 
order, concludes the news report. There is a tacit suggestion that order will 
prevail and authority persevere; the slow, cyclical movement of the vehicles 
suggest gradual movement toward solution, out of sight of the media and 
public gaze.  
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In the four months since the strike began, nineteen police officers were killed. 
One nightly BBC bulletin feature the widow of one officer making a statement 
that the strikers had chosen to die whilst her husband had no such choice. 
Her language echoes that of Secretary of State for Northern Ireland 
Humphrey Atkins who would remark ‘If Mr. Sands persisted in his wish to 
commit suicide, that was his choice. The Government would not force 
medical treatment upon him’ (Taylor, 1999, p.282). During the same nightly 
BBC news bulletin, the reporter would conclude the report stating ‘Violence 
to the self is violence. The problem in NI is how to break the cycle of violence’ 
(12.05.81). 
The Hunger Strike of 1981, a major component of this cycle, secured steady 
coverage, and at this point, the media was in a position to place The Troubles 
into their proper context, explaining to the audience why the British public 
and military have been involved in such a protracted and seemingly 
unresolvable conflict for some twenty years. The BBC failed to do so, building 
a (re)new(ed) visual library of Republican visuals that served to illustrate, but 
not illuminate, a spectacle. 
Northern Ireland again became a lead world news story during this period. As 
violence decreased during the late 70s, accompanying media interest, and 
representation declined, settling into a comfortable existence of dominant 
tropes. With the passage of time, even coverage of the Hunger Strike became 
dominated by its own self-consuming series of visuals, reaching critical mass 
where it too failed to generate attention. Padraig O’Malley explains the death 
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of Mickey Devine, the final hunger striker to die, was ‘a statement of futility 
and meaningless rather than purpose. Nor did his death excite much interest. 
Media coverage was cursory’ (O’Malley, 1990, 133). Two further key moments 
during the decade can be identified as integral to a consideration of 
representation; the 1982 Hyde Park bombings, and the 1987 attack on 
Enniskillen.  
Bandstand 
When a major incident occurred, the news would “lead” proceedings with a 
short summary, explaining the “who, what, where and when”. On the early 
evening BBC One News of 20th July 1982, the reporter began with a headline 
announcing ‘IRA bombers return to London’:  
Their target — British soldiers, but civilians die too. At the bandstand in 
Regent’s Park six people are killed at an army concert and three more die in 
Knightsbridge as the household cavalry ride past to change the guard, 
Injuries are terrible. Nearly 50 people are taken to hospital (20.07.82).  
Other headlines are quickly presented, a mini-summary that essentially 
functions as a “contents” for the programme, before returning to the main 
story. Additional details are provided before an on-the-scene report from 
both locations. There is an emphasis on the death of both animals and 
humans, the latter repeatedly referred to as people (and not soldiers).  48
An aerial shot and map show the location and proximity of the locations, and 
subsequent images show the aftermath. The road seeps with blood. Cars can 
 No civilians did in fact die in the two explosions, despite the reporter’s initial hook. 48
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be seen damaged, with their windows destroyed whilst the warped and 
heavily distorted charred frame of another vehicle can be seen in one shot, 
with the camera slowly zooming in; there is an insinuation this was the car 
concealing the explosive device. The sequence ends with a static shot of a 
nearby building, zooming in on the shattered window panes. As Schlesinger 
et al. note, ‘the bulletin, therefore established the dreadful effects of the 
bombing, the loss of both human and animal life, the disruption of everyday 
life and the destruction of property’ (1983, p.43). This final image section 
points towards the more general movement in media representation of 
terrorist attacks to an economic and structural focus in the post-Cold War 
period. During the report a voiceover provides further illumination, focusing 
on the publicity aspect of the attack on the mainland, ‘worth several in Belfast 
or Londonderry’. This initial report then, ties the incident to the dramatic 
visuals, underscoring both its symbolic nature and propaganda value but 
providing little narrative framework, interpretation or analysis.  
The late evening broadcast of Nationwide (a news magazine), however did 
seek to explore the “why” aspect. Avoiding a focus on the visuals, it instead 
utilised guests to consider the reasons and implication of the attack. Space 
was available for an alternative view to be presented, supporting 
Schlesinger’s thesis that a movement from relatively closed to relatively open 
spheres opens up a different space for consideration. Whilst both 
programmes facilitated exploration through a human interest avenue, the 
news broadcast harnessed attention through its strong visuals. Thus, it lacked 
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an effective space for articulation of theoretical and academic questioning. 
Conversely, such opportunities existed on Nationwide, yet the thrust of the 
interview would remain consistent with an “official premise of irrationality, 
inhumanity’ (Altheide, 1987, p.170). Overall, the visuals deployed by the BBC, 
and their methods of framing (literally and metaphorically), continued to 
implicitly endorse the official Governmental discourse through 
representation of terrorism as criminal and societally perverse.  
Enniskillen 
Throughout the Troubles, several incidents occurred in Enniskillen, a small 
town in County Fermanagh. The early 80s saw a number of shootings, and 
near the close of the decade, a Provisional IRA bomb exploded near the 
town’s war memorial during a Remembrance Sunday ceremony. Eleven 
people were killed (ten civilians) and a large number injured. The bombing is 
seen as a turning point, ‘undoubtably the single incident of terrorism within 
the province which made for a prolonged period the greatest impression on 
British public and politicians alike’ (Parkinson, 1998, p.51). Richard English, 
interviewed by Peter Taylor for the 2007 documentary The Poppy Day Bomb 
would state: 
There is no doubt the Enniskillen bomb was a disastrous own goal for the 
IRA. They were an organisation that presented themselves as being a non-
sectarian guerrilla army fighting against a military opponent and here they 
were killing Protestant civilians at a religious service, it ran contrary to 
everything they presented themselves as doing. There were clearly       
supporters in the United States who felt that this was a disastrous                           
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event, in terms of being the wrong kind of operation                                               
(BBC  11.11.07)  
The Background 
Enniskillen can be identified as a garrison town since the mid-17th century, 
holding a long history as an army base and home to two regiments. With IRA 
morale low following a number of arms interceptions, impacting the 
organisation both militarily and in a propaganda sense, they deigned to 
commit a terrorist act rooted in the “spectacle”, attacking both the literal 
military town and the symbolism of the Remembrance Day parade.  
The device was relatively small, 30-50lb yet its placement, in St. Michaels 
Catholic memorial hall, magnified the devastation, with falling masonry and 
collapsing buildings. As David Hearst would write in The Guardian:  
For a few seconds it looked as if the town had suddenly been plunged into a 
thick fog. But the fog was dust settling on a scene of carnage. Children 
screamed for their parents and the injured screamed for help. Those who 
were still on their feet began to pull frantically at the rubble to free bodies 
(cited by Parkinson, 1998, p.53).  
Daily Mirror photographer Michael Martin was also an eyewitness and his 
visual eye is betrayed in his account: 
Smashed wreaths were trampled under foot, old soldiers were helping 
rescuers in the rubble and children were wandering in a daze looking for 
friends or parents. They’d all been spruced up in their smartest Scouts, 
Guides and Brownies uniforms. Now they were covered with dust and blood. 
The dust coated everything like shroud and through it all the cries of the 
wounded drifted like some terrible nightmare (ibid). 
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The bombing garnered such attention due to a recording of the immediate 
aftermath, filmed on VHS by a local shopkeeper and revealing powerful 
images of confusion and chaos. This ‘catastrophic event, had a profound 
effect, particularly on external audiences whose experience of such an event 
would have been minimal’ (ibid).  
A curious combination of factors combined to elevate the impact of the 
incident and ensure its longevity. During BBC news, it received the contextual 
analysis (the arms interception) commonly absent from the closed news 
bulletin. This provided some depth, including the signing of the recent Anglo-
Irish agreement. The BBC One evening news on 8th November was devoted 
entirely to the bombing, divided into five sections, or mini-reports, as 
detailed by Alan Parkinson: the scene in the town as darkness fell on the 
aftermath, the amateur video recording, the political response, a memorial 
service in the town, and the security background to the attack (1998). The 
second of these segments will be the focus of the subsequent sustained 
analysis.  
The Media 
The news bulletin opens immediately on the amateur video footage, with 
presenter Nicholas Witchell stating in voiceover  
A remembrance day atrocity in NI, a bomb has killed eleven, and injured 
more then sixty. It was planted a few yards from the war memorial in 
Enniskillen. It went off without warning, as the crowds were gathering.  
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The video continues to play throughout, with the audio slightly muted but 
still audible; the footage has been edited somewhat, with cuts evident. A still 
image of Buckingham Palace is shown whilst a comment of the Queen is 
relayed and then Margaret Thatcher gives a piece to camera condemning the 
attack.   
Human interest is stressed by Witchell in the BBC studio, particularly 
regarding the number of children and married couples involved. The BBC 
pinpointed the military significance of the town early in their coverage, 
highlighting its role in British military history. The first report from an on-
the-scene reporter is then played, with the amateur video footage 
immediately repeated. Chaos, rubble and ruin are the dominant images, with 
the camera constantly moving, almost unsure where to look. Here is the form 
of evidence, as detailed previously, with the camera functioning as both 
witness and recorder.  
As the time of the explosion is detailed, the visuals changes to the very start of 
the footage recorded by the shopkeeper. People can be seen at the far end of 
the street confused but there is no sign of panic. The dust and smoke, as 
identified by Hearst and Martin, can be sign in the extreme distance. As the 
cameraman progresses towards the scene of the blast, it pans left and right, 
scanning across the injured sitting and standing on the pavement edge. 
Voice-over narration again seeks to underscore the human interest angle, 
explaining ‘they were pensioners, woman and children, the respectful 
onlookers’. The camera reaches the blast site, strewn with rubble and debris. 
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A number of individuals, including soldiers with torn clothing, can be seen 
digging by hand through the ruins. The voiceover details, the air was filled 
‘flying rubble, which killed most of those who were buried’. At this exact 
moment, the camera has panned from the building, to an injured female 
being tended to at the side of the road, and back around, looking directly 
down at the street. A single body can be seen, lying face down, the upper half 
concealed by a tarnished jacket. The footage has been edited here (by the 
BBC) and it cuts to a shot of the destroyed buildings roof, an amorphous 
mass of gnarled timber. The voiceover fades out, and the on-scene sound is 
raised slightly; a number of voices can be heard shouting calmly, organising a 
means of removing the rubble. As the camera pans back and forth a number 
of times over the main blast site, several individuals can be seen approaching 
from out of frame and assisting with a search for survivors.  
Two further edits have been made, the first moving the footage on to an 
ambulance departing, and the second showing a civilian being carried away 
by a number of others. As the camera follows, a pensioner, with long red wool 
coat and black leather gloves, reaches out a hand whilst simultaneously being 
supported by an elderly male.  
The voiceover fades out one last time, with the video audio again increasing 
in volume. In this instance, as the video cuts back to a shot of the ruined 
school, a police officer can be seen to the left of the frame holding an intact 
poppy wreath, whilst the sound of piercing screams and crying can be heard. 
The final words of the reporter, explaining the bomb was hidden in a place 
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‘no-one thought to look’ is represented visually by one final cut showing a 
juxtaposition of the War Memorial soldier sculpture and the destroyed 
Catholic memorial hall in the background.  
To further endorse the power of these visuals, and at the same time confirm 
the IRA were aware of their propaganda value to the dominant hegemony, it 
should be noted that in the immediate aftermath, no IRA representative was 
prepared to provide a response or attempted justification. The images 
denoted terrorism in its basest form; little connotations existed beyond sheer 
horror. In this moment, the images were, to adapt Margaret Thatcher’s 
proclamation, the carbon monoxide of publicity. The media coverage of 
Enniskillen, particularly the amateur video presenting a vivid, objective, first-
hand representation of the aftermath, carried a particularly strong resonance. 
As Miller notes, ‘coverage of this was an important element in allowing 
British people to identify with the experiences of victims of violence’; 
consequently ‘In 1987 support for British withdrawal dropped from 61% in 
January of that year to 40% by November. Enniskillen appears to have had a 
marked impact’ (1994, p.279). Initial outbreaks of violence were unexpected 
and the BBC were unsure of how to visualise them, leading to an initial 
exuberance of images and representation of reality; similarly, the bombing in 
Enniskillen was so shocking, so removed from events which preceded it, that 
the BBC again lacked an understanding of how it should be reported. Using 
only the setting of a live on the scene report, they allowed the amateur video 
— grainy and unsure where to look next — to speak for itself. In so doing, it 
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stands as one of the few moments during the Troubles where the thesaurus of 
terrorism, so carefully cultivated by the institution, was unable to signify an 
event.  
Ballygawley 
The importance of visuals to a news story can again be highlighted by the 
Ballygawley bus bombing in 1988, less then a year after the Enniskillen 
attack. Just after midnight on the 20th August, an unmarked 52-seat bus was 
destroyed by a roadside bomb whilst transporting 36 Light Infantry troops 
from RAF Aldergrove to a military base near Omagh. The bomb contained 
200 pounds of semtex, catapulting the bus thirty metres and leaving a crater 
six feet deep. Eight soldiers were killed and a further 28 wounded. In the 
immediate aftermath, and with no images available in the dark night for the 
morning bulletins, pieces to camera were recorded by the on-scene 
journalists. Two local farmers, ‘both literally shaking…gave moving accounts 
of their attempts to help the survivors, but we still had no pictures to match 
the horror of the accounts we were hearing’ (Devenport, 2000, p.50). Ken 
Maginnis, Ulster Unionist MP and representative of the district would later 
arrive and according to BBC journalist Mark Devenport,  
he’d been on the phone to the Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, telling her 
what had happened and he said she wanted the world to see and hear it too. 
He lifted the [police] tape and marched us through…We drew close enough to 
see the wreckage of the bus thrown across the road and the debris still strewn 
all around…we had gathered enough pictures to tell the story’ (ibid). 
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Alan Rainey, the first of the two farmers to arrive would describe the scene on 
the morning BBC bulletin and in daily newspapers: ‘I heard screams of 
agony…the road was littered with the dead and the dying, they were scattered 
and sprayed across the road, behind hedges; and one poor soul I found 
wrapped around a telephone pole’ (Lohr, 1988).  Macginnis would quickly 49
and vocally endorse selective internment as a response (targeted against 
individuals and not communities (as in 1971)), whilst the BBC evening news 
bulletin the following day would detail alternative possible measures:  
The government is thinking of other options: copying the anti-drugs 
legislation in the United States to seize terrorists lifeblood: money; they 
might change the law on a suspects right to silence in terrorist cases, and 
there could be efforts to make it difficult for Sinn Féin to stand at elections by 
introducing an anti-violence declaration for all candidates (22.08.88).   50
The 1980’s would see the conflict descend into a propaganda war, largely due 
to the Hunger Strike in Maze Prison. In published material, the Northern 
Ireland Office went to great lengths to depict the Hunger Strikers as mere 
criminals; the Provisional IRA similarly sought to depict each as a freedom-
fighter martyr.  They tried to utilise the children of hunger strikers as a 51
image weapon, yet this is itself an appropriation of the media’s use of a 
human interest angle as an avenue of interpretation. Further, they are 
directly mimicking the tactic of the NIO, who, in the 1972 document The 
Terror and the Tears, published by the Unionist government (in the wake of 
 Rainey would be flown to London the following day to meet Margaret Thatcher. 49
 All were introduced over the coming months. 50
 The act of a Hunger Strike also has significant symbolism within a Celtic perspective; (see 51
Fields, 2004)
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Bloody Sunday), would present a series of photographs of victims of the IRA, 
notably children, on the front page. According to one information officer,  
we thought that the IRA were being portrayed as freedom fighters — glamour 
boys in trench coats. We hope this dossier will show them to be what they 
really are — thugs with blood dripping from their hands  
(Miller, 1996, p.228).  52
Whilst there was sustained support of an official perspective the BBC would 
typically avoid overtly stylistic and aesthetic choices, moving it away from a 
news focus and towards an emotional interpretation. In 1989, in the 
aftermath of a Royal Marine bombing, the BBC One main evening news 
concluded with visuals of slow motion footage showing a young boy laying a 
wreath in memory of the dead. Carefully edited, overlaid audio features the 
Royal Marine’s brass band playing (23.08.89). Television news then directly 
(or indirectly in this case) highlighted the perpetual violence; it did not create 
it but it did highlight it, hinting at the symbiotic relationship so popularly 
theorised. Instead, due to the series of short-comings exposed at the 
conclusion of the decade, it was the only means of representation available. 
The Ballygawley bombing can be interpreted as a fragment of twelve months 
that represent the apogee of violence and would ultimately contribute to 
imposition of the broadcasting ban, ‘one of the most embarrassing attempts 
to censor coverage of the most important domestic political story of post-war 
years’ (Williams, 1994).  53
 Miller notes that whilst some 120,000 were distributed, and a further 130,000 printed, 52
they were viewed with “distaste” by the British government. General distribution was ceased 
the day direct rule was introduced (1994). 







Terrorist violence is merely the springboard for real terrorism,  
which is communicated terrorism. 
José Desantes Guanter,  




Post Cold-War War 
The moment of euphoria at the end of the Cold War generated an illusion of 
harmony, which was soon revealed to be exactly that. The world became 
different in the early 1990s, but not necessarily more peaceful.  
(Huntington , 1996) 
For Zaki Laïdi, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the revolutions of 1989 and the end 
of the Cold War ‘saw an empire collapse…in no time at all and with a limited 
cost — in historical terms — in human lives’ (1998, p.3). The Gulf Conflict 
signalled the end of this brief ‘moment of euphoria’ (Coker, 2001, p.47). 
Ironically designated the “perfect” war by Douglas Kellner, it exposed a 
collapse of global narratives where traditional methods and conduct of 
warfare did not apply (1992, p. 386). It was not a conflict between adversaries 
and did not satisfy the dialectical model of Clausewitzian war; Noam 
Chomsky highlights, ‘as I understand the concept “war”, it involves two sides 
in combat, say, shooting at each other. That did not happen in the Gulf’ (cited 
by Stahl, 2010, p.32). With no declaration of war, the US-led invasion of Iraq 
in 1991 was implemented by UN mandate and the military/media synthesis 
launched “modern war”, presented not as ‘blood and guts spilled in living 
colour on the living room rug’, but through a ‘radically distanced, 
technologically controlled, eminently “cool” postmodern optic’ (Cummings, 
1994, p.103). 
Marshall McLuhan posited that Vietnam saw America ‘in the midst of our 
first television war, the television environment [is] total…it has altered every 
phase of the America vision and identity’, however it was not until the live 
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coverage of the Gulf, that there was a true shift in the visualised, and actual, 
nature of warfare (2001, p.134). Citizen access to the event was mediatised 
with real-time coverage transforming warfare to spectacle. Jean Baudrillard 
believed the primary cause of this to be the deluge of images provided by the 
mass media, a virtual, sanitised, pure media event (1995). In addition, the 
new means and manner of conducting military operations saw the utilisation 
of technologies granting force dominance, superiority and death from a 
distance. In Strategy of Deception, Paul Virilio points to the government-
military-media synthesis and the reduction of modern warfare to ‘flickering 
images on a screen’ (2007). The Gulf conflict could not therefore be 
understood as war in any sense of the traditional. What occurred was rather 
an unreal experience, a deadly video game that, despite a surfeit of imagery, 
was carefully conducted, composed, represented and presented. ‘Video 
footage of the “real war” merged seamlessly with computer-generated 
simulations, both appearing as real, unreal, or “hyper-real” as the other’ 
Carruthers, 2000, p.133). Allied with the military, and the official/
governmental dominant discourse — this notion of Schlesinger, Murdock and 
Elliot’s “official perspective” — the media were promoting ‘promotes…
bloodless, humanitarian, hygienic wars’, utilising identical technology to that 
of the defence industry and mediating vision on a techno-cultural level (Der 
Derian, 2009, p.xxxi). 
The revolution of military affairs (crucial to Paul Virilio’s work), alongside 
what James Der Derian terms the “military-industrial-media-entertainment 
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network” (MIME-net), has affected not only how war is conducted, but its 
presentation to the third core element of Clausewitz’s “remarkable trinity”: 
the populous. Chad Harris (2006) highlights the media’s capacity to 
commingle ‘the mundane and the monstrously violent’ where a ‘cascading 
series of translations’ from ‘images into data, data and images into targets, 
targets turned back into data, and thus back again to images’ serves as an 
obstruction to violence, effectively obfuscating it from public view (2006, p.
102). What can then be termed the “pixilation of war” involves the 
replacement of projectiles and missiles with pictures and a digital soldier. As 
the Western world entered this post-Cold War period, a new form of warfare 
developed. This was ‘one sided [war]…without an enemy, without 
resistance…without Western casualties’ (Merrin, 1994, p.451). 
It was instead a spectacle created a priori by the military-media synthesis: 
pre-planned, pre-determined and pre-visualised. The media promoted the 
war, the war in turn promoted the media. Both Baudrillard and Virilio hold 
modern warfare to be unimaginable without the visual, caused and 
strengthened by the mass media. As early as 1984 Virilio wrote that ‘a war of 
pictures and sounds is replacing the war of objects’ (1989, p.4). Seven years 
later he would ask ‘how can we fail to recognise, after a month of standoff, 
that the true intervention force in the Gulf is television?’ (2002, p.20). 
Extraordinary numbers of journalists and depths of technology were 
deployed during the media sustained (and sustaining) event, occurring (and 
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won) on the television screen. With this, the Gulf War became Virilio’s global 
real-time international war, 
thanks to CNN and The Pentagon. This is a new form of war,  
and all future wars…will be live wars  
(quoted by Wilson, 1994).  
Interventionism and the Humanitarian Spectacle 
The Gulf Conflict initiated this ‘drug for the eyes’ and military action without 
coverage (to this day) cannot hold any form of meaning (Virilio, 2002, p.92). 
A disproportionate focus on the spectacle dominates the “newsworthy” 
nature of an event. As Thomas Keenan notes for example, ‘we cannot talk 
about what happened in Bosnia or Somalia or Rwanda without talking about 
the media…  
Contemporary military strategy now counts on the presence of  
the cameras, the light of the flash and the green glow of the night-scope,  
as a fundamental component of armed operations (no date).  
The deployment of US Marines to Somalia was met by the international 
media, at the invitation of the Pentagon, who ‘made little effort to disguise 
the fact that the dawn landing had been set up’ (Hammond, 2007, p.39). 
Visualisations of the humanitarian crisis initially provided catalyst for 
intervention, before ‘military debacle’ ultimately forced withdrawal. As Mark 
Bowden suggests:  
On Oct. 4, 1993, mobs of outraged Somalis dragged the bodies of American 
soldiers through the streets of Mogadishu, mutilating and dismembering 
them…The crowd, no matter how enraged, welcomes the camera — Paul 
Watson, a white Canadian journalist, moved unharmed with his camera 
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through the angry mobs in Mogadishu on Oct. 4, 1993. The idea is to spread 
the image. Cameras guarantee the insult will be heard, seen and felt. The 
insult and fear are spread across continents (2004).  
The Clinton Administration subsequently became increasingly reluctant to 
intervene militarily in conflicts, particularly in “failed states” where they had 
little control over the resultant visualisations. Failure to intervene in Rwanda 
the following year can in part be attributed to the visuals of Somalia. Clinton 
also refused to deploy ground troops in Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999). 
The latter conflict is the first in history conducted solely from the air and it 
has been analysed on several levels. For Virilio it was orbital, waged solely 
with aerial power; Michael Ignatieff is in agreement, declaring it a ‘virtual 
war’, where the visual presentation meant it ‘looked and sounded like a war’ 
yet people were ‘mobilised, not as combatants, but as spectators’ (2001, p.3).  
Pilots therefore occupied a similar space to the television viewer, with a 
particular level of perception, powerless to intervene and reduced to the role 
of spectator. The risk-averse manner of virtual warfare, and the virtual 
consent provided by those watching, could not save human life and uphold 
human rights in a supposed humanitarian war. Throughout the 78-day aerial 
campaign, no coalition personnel were killed; here Ignatieff states his 
conclusion that the war must therefore have been virtual: ‘war without 
death…is war that ceases to be fully real to us: virtual war’ (ibid, p.5). 
Removing death from visual presentations — this fascination with a supposed 
“clean” war — seeped into reality, where any possibility was isolated and 
eliminated. Footage similar to that of the Gulf War dominated proceedings:  
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…everyone remembers the television images of bombs going down the 
ventilation shafts of buildings and long-range cruise missiles turning street 
corners on the way to their targets (BBC News Online, 20.02.1998). 
Whilst the army 'watches the battle from the barracks', complicit television 
viewers suffered from inertia, ‘the imprisoned and impotent state of…
technological monks’ (Armitage, 2001, p.191). The excess of information and 
a desire for real-time footage and instant updates made critical distance and 
analysis impossible. The media lacked the space or time to conceptualise and 
comprehend world events.  
Amidst this new form of conflict then, time and space are distorted, in both a 
military and mediatised sense. Satellite technologies would allow immediate 
awareness of violence and terror attacks across the globe, Baudrillard’s 
“instantaneous global diffusion”, an effect that, by the close of the decade, 
would reach hyper-real proportions with the advent of the internet.  
The image consumes the event, that is, it absorbs the latter and gives it back 
as consumer goods. Certainly the image gives to the event an unprecedented 
impact, but as an image-event (Baudrillard, 2001). 
Perceptions of terrorism (and increasingly modern warfare) were/are shaped 
by television.  Perception is vital, to the public, to politicians, and to 54
participants. ‘It is through media’, as Hoskins and O’Loughlin note, ‘that 
perceptions are created, sustained or challenged’ (2010b, p.5). They draw 
here on Virilio’s notion of ‘“appropriating” the immateriality of perceptual 
fields’, a replacement for territorial or material gains. What increasingly 
 And increasingly the online environment.54
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mattered, as exhibited in the Gulf War and during the propaganda battles in 
Northern Ireland, was the battle for ‘symbols and representations’ (ibid).  
For Mary Kaldor, ‘We are more aware then ever before of violence taking 
place in different parts of the world and often know more about what is 
happening far away than is taking place in our immediate vicinity’ (2006, 
p.vii). This violence, on a political level, is now omnipresent, and, according 
to Kaldor, directed at civilians. Yet she avoids recognising precisely how (and 
why) it is directed in this manner. ‘Terrorism has to be understood as one 
variant of new wars, the logical outcome of the tactics developed in 
contemporary conflicts’ (ibid, p.ix). The tactics of note here are the digital 
and media technologies that have subsumed representation of a terrorist 
event, ‘the battle for how things are seen and perceived’ (Hoskins and 
O’Loughlin, 2010b, p.5). Attacks are directed at civilians at the level of a 
victim, but more importantly, at the level of an audience, where the outcome 
is “consumer goods”.  It is with the image — as repeatedly stressed — that an 55
event gains the Baudrillardian “unprecedented impact”.   
Kaldor uses the term “new war” to as an overall descriptor, foregrounding 
identity politics and centring around organised violence, whilst seeking to 
move away from an overemphasis on technology and the media. Each word 
can be broken down further; new to simply identify these terrorist acts and 
 Hoskins and O’Loughlin also highlight a third audience, that of the wider terrorist/military 55
group. This is particularly apparent and highlighted in analysis of the Enniskillen bomb 
(chapter five), conducted partly as a symbol for IRA morale in the aftermath of high profile 
arms interceptions (in turn a symbolic victory for the security services). Similarly, the 
internal logic of the RIRA splinter group bombing of Omagh (1998) can be analysed as 
directed against a town with a Sinn Féin mayor and traditionally Provisional in support. 
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warfare as different from previous perceptions, and war to signify the 
political nature of such violence, where there is an overt blurring of 
boundaries, with crime, terrorism and warfare seeping together.  56
By 1999 and Operation Noble Anvil in Yugoslavia, the world had descended 
into a form of warfare that was no longer war. ‘War as a phenomenon 
disappears from the eyes of the world’ (Virilio, 1989, p.66). It would be 
replaced by a global terror that was no longer domestic in nature and no 
longer directed towards a domestic audience. A series of bombings on 
mainland Britain: Warrington and Bishopsgate (1993), London Docklands 
and Manchester (1996) would mark a resurgence in the IRA terror campaign, 
a movement towards an economic campaign with both symbolic and 
deleterious effects. Combined with  
emergence of the Hume-Adams process and the revelation of government 
contacts with the Republican movement, media reporting entered a new 
phase…there was a real sense in which the story changed. Northern Ireland 
became an attractive news story once again (Miller, 1994b, p.283). 
Malaise 
Chris Dunkley, television critic for the Financial Times, would suggest that by 
the late 70’s, ‘viewers have watched as television has contained its Irish 
coverage more and more tightly within a catalogue of bomb blasts, casualty 
 The three have effectively merged in 2014 with the rise of the Islamic State (IS, also 56
referred to as ISIL and ISIS) as a military force in the Middle East and Libya. IS earns 
significant revenue from oil operations, kidnaps and executes Western journalists and aid 
workers, and is in open military conflict with Kurdish militia in and around the city of 
Kobanî. The group has harnessed social/new media to distribute its (graphic) propaganda 
and circumvent traditional media outlets. Cockburn (2015) details the background and rise 
of the organisation. 
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figures, and laundry lists of sectarian murders’ (1979, p.8). With notable 
exceptions, including the violence accompanying the initial Civil Rights 
marches (so unexpected it can be situated as an anomaly) and the Enniskillen 
bombing (unique due to the amateur video aftermath) — instances of 
concerted violence that attracted significant representation outside the 
system of iconography established — very few graphic images of violence 
have been broadcast. Invariably, coverage has trended towards a litany of 
what can be termed the event spectacle: the pageantry of a “military” funeral, 
tropes of the troops, marching bands, and generic shots of destruction, 
(initially) burning houses and progressing to more passive shots of ruined 
buildings and destroyed cars (where there is no “action” occurring in the 
frame). Such images are visually arresting (in an aesthetic sense) whilst being 
devoid of the human reality of the conflict and terrorism.   
This became the visual shorthand for the Troubles. What was shown instead 
became ‘a very skewed and unintelligible picture of the conflict’ (Heskin, 
1986, p.97). This can also be read as sitting within Maudling’s notion of “an 
acceptable level of violence”. Since 1969 however, 3568 people have been 
killed due to the conflict, including 1879 civilians and 1117 British security 
(including 502 soldiers). A further 47541 have been injured.  How was each 57
death represented? How is it remembered? For Susan Sontag, ’Remembering 
is an ethical act, has ethical value in and of itself…Memory is, achingly, the 
only relation we can have with the dead. Heartlessness and amnesia go 
 All figures are taken from the Sutton Index of Deaths, a digital archive that is part of CAIN. 57
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together’ (Sontag, 2003. p.73). Such amnesia was prevalent as the years 
passed and each death became relegated to a small footnote on the printed 
page, or a brief mention in the broadcast news. By removing the human cost, 
the public was unable to comprehend events, visualise the dead and seek a 
form of resolution. Just as during the Hunger Strike period, images were 
sanitised with justification on grounds of taste and decency; a fact that 
continues today with broadcasters announcing they are ever ‘mindful of the 
sensibilities of our audience’. Lester Crystal, executive producer of The News 
Hour with Jim Lehrer would use a similar argument in relation to the Iraq 
Conflict in 2004 saying ‘for taste purposes, you don’t show people in agony 
on the air. You don’t show a lot of dead bodies’ (cited by Amy Goodman, 
2004, p.199).  A visual discourse of the full human consequence of terrorism 58
in Northern Ireland was similarly absent, with reality obfuscated.  
Indeed coverage of military personnel was frequently restricted to that of the 
noble warrior, Mary Holland’s brave soldiers. Footage would show 
celebratory montages of heroic soldiers whereas the dead remained 
perpetually absent. Similarities are often highlighted between Ireland and 
Vietnam; ever present in the Government’s mind were the 
assertions that the war was going well were undercut by the nightly pictures 
of bloodied soldiers on stretchers being evacuated by helicopters, other 
scenes of carnage and reports from the battlefield (Liebovich, 2000). 
 However it must be noted that a dichotomy exists. The US Government in particular utilise 58
the body as a weapon, publishing photographs of those killed under the auspices of the 
Global War on Terror, utilising such images as this notion of “evidence”. The mutilated 
visages of Uday and Qusay Hussein for example were released, along with images of their 
reconstructed cosmetically repaired faces a day later. 
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David Carr sought to stress in The New York Times,  
If the government chooses to over-manage the wages of war in Iraq, there is a 
real danger that this new generation of veterans, whose ranks grow every day, 
could come home to a place where their fellow Americans have little idea 
what they have gone through (2007).  
Whilst the American press therefore covered the 4,000th combat death, it 
meant little, a theoretical number of the haunting dead.  Sontag, echoing 59
Barthes, suggested a ‘photograph may be both a pseudo-presence and a token 
of absence’, representative of the return of the dead (2003, p.12). Such a 
notion was recognised as early as 1862. In an article regarding the Civil War 
images of Matthew Brady, The New York Times wrote: 
We see the list [of the dead] in the morning paper at breakfast, but dismiss its 
recollection with the coffee. There is a confused mass of names, but they are 
all strangers; we forget the horrible significance that dwells amid the jumble 
of type. Mr. Brady has done something to bring home the terrible reality and 
earnestness of war. If he has not brought bodies and laid them in our 
dooryards and along the streets, he has done something very like it  
(cited by LARB, 2013). 
As Neil Postman notes,  
the whole problem with news on television comes down to this: all the words 
uttered in an hour of news coverage could be printed on one page of a 
newspaper. And the world cannot be understood in one page. Of course, there 
is a compensation: television offers pictures and the pictures move. Moving 
pictures are a kind of language in themselves (2008, pp.106-107) 
 According to photographer Zoriah Miller ‘During the entire Iraq war, only five images have 59
been published showing dead US service members…With over 4,000 US service members 
dead, and countless Iraqi civilians, it is shocking how little of this reality has been presented 
to the public’ (New York Times, 2008). 
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The Media 
The Troubles then exists as the first instance of a conflict where the British 
public received television coverage, this moving pictures (of violence and 
terrorism) affecting and involving British troops on home territory. Yet this 
notion of “the terrible reality” was absent from an overwhelming majority of 
coverage. An analogy with Vietnam, raised on numerous occasions by 
journalists and politicians, is also not quite ideal. The conflict occurred on 
British soil, and, to some extent, was a civil war. The problems this created 
resulted in confusion for the public (and media) as to the nature of coverage. 
It was the first time that the British Army was subjected to reporting of its 
actions. The implication here is that the public were not suited to the idea of 
the British army being held up to a microscope. Despite there being limited 
questioning of their conduct, increased attention, in the eyes of the 
Government, raised the possibility of judgment. There was now a need for an 
army propaganda office. 
The issue then complicating factors was this divided community. Whilst self-
imposed censorship, and later the Broadcasting Ban, would limit such voices, 
there was a constant underlying question: how much airtime should be given 
to terrorists and their sympathisers. The Catholic third of the Northern Irish 
populous, were unable to have a voice heard. ‘They are still entitled to be 
heard, and anyway, it is presumably in the national interest that the views of 
the IRA be known’ (Winston, 1979). As Winston stressed,  
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the BBC has to perform an unenviable balancing act, such as no newspapers 
has to perform…between…the men who are making the news — the gunmen, 
terrorists, demonstrators, stone throwers, objectors and pamphleteers — and 
the social pressures upon it to support law and order (ibid). 
Repeatedly the images deployed, tropes of the troops, would give an 
impression of favourability to the army; footage would regularly present 
mobs hurling stones at soldiers, the latter crouching behind shields whilst 
holding automatic weapons yet restrained from engaging. The army 
propaganda office, finely practiced and honed in the art of propaganda, 
would quickly offer spokespeople to answer question and question 
allegations. Over two decades, they became media literate and adroit at 
publicity.  
The reportage of violence changed considerably from the early period of Civil 
Rights and Burntollet Bridge. At that point, the violence was open, emotive 
and easily interpreted by an uninvolved and passive observer. What was a 
civil rights issue, arising during a similar period worldwide, however evolved 
into a hidden form, unexpected and invariably unexplainable (and indeed 
unexplained in/by the media). Commitment became confusion as an 
acceptance to violence evolved. 
Elephant 
It is of worth here, highlighting one particular BBC dramatised production 
that sought to expose this acceptance. 1989’s Elephant, directed by Alan 
Clarke and produced by Danny Boyle, ’drew an unprecedented number of 
 273
complaints from across Britain and Northern Ireland’ (McLoone, 2009, p.
5).  A short forty minute avant-garde/experimental piece, the film re-enacts 60
eighteen murders, presented without context, narrative, structure, plot or 
motivation. The title, according to the BBC, is a reference to Northern Ireland 
and ‘that it is as difficult to ignore the Northern Ireland Troubles as it is to 
ignore the presence of an elephant in your own sitting-room’ (McLoone, 
1996, p.75). However upon examination, the film in fact suggests the 
opposite: the elephant has been present for so long, and an explanation for its 
presence continually withheld — media failure to provide an analytic function 
— then it no longer excites nor attracts attention.  
This can therefore be directly read as a commentary on news coverage, and 
its reportage of violence rendered into a nightly catalogue of aimless, 
unmotivated and unexplained atrocities. Essentially, the catalogue of 
violence, removed from any “why” framework, ‘becomes an unpleasant and 
totally misunderstood phenomenon that people accept as part of the mental, 
and social, landscape’ (McLoone, 2009, p.6). It reveals no prospect of 
resolution where representation is reduced to tropes and symbols no longer 
“extraordinary” and only the spectacle dominates.  
Indeed there is a direct engagement with the nature of news media coverage, 
with Elephant taking its criticism one stage further: the who, what, where 
and when — criteria that quickly became the foundational (and only) basis of 
 Elephant served as direct inspiration for the 2004 Gus Vant Sant film of the same name 60
(and minimalist aesthetic style) dealing with a school shooting similar to the Columbine 
massacre. 
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news bulletins — are entirely absent. Long takes, wide shots, minimal editing 
and a constantly moving camera are in contrast to the framing and editing 
techniques of news broadcasting, where each report attempts to present a 
neat package of information, rhetoric and representation. Elephant is 
observational yet does not function as an act of witnessing. Rather it presents 
a commentary, with each murder revealing nothing about the victim nor the 
attacker (beyond that which can be inferred). There is a foregrounding of the 
victim and the dead body, again in contrast to the news media. The camera 
remains stationary after each murder, lingering for several beats in a static 
shot, and forcing an engagement with the event witnessed and the human 
reality. The body is positioned in the centre of the frame, literally placing it at 
the heart of the camera’s gaze. The drama does however highlight two crucial 
aspects utilised by the media. The first is the human interest angle, where 
identification of the murderer and the victim is unclear until the pivotal 
moment, a reminder that terrorists do nor wear a hideous mask or disguise 
and that anyone can become a victim. Second, an act of terror can strike 
anywhere, with no delineated battlefield and no specific killing grounds. The 
executions happen in a variety of naturalistic, real world locations and 
situations: on a football field, in a swimming pool, on a street, or in a house.  
Clarke’s contemporary David Leland encapsulates the central thesis of the 
film:  
I remember lying in bed, watching it, thinking, “Stop, Alan, you can’t keep 
doing this.” And the cumulative effect is that you say, “It’s got to stop. The 
 275
killing has got to stop.” Instinctively, without an intellectual process, it 
becomes a gut reaction (cited by Gallagher, 2010). 
Within Ireland then, the conflict which arose manifested itself in a violent 
form. With television quickly becoming the central medium for reporting 
Northern Ireland, and for the reporting of terrorism itself, there was a need 
to address the killings and seek an alternative. Pictures are the pre-eminent 
medium for conveying violence and death, far surpassing the written word, 
yet there was no intellectual process nor gut reaction possible.  
Bombings 
Paul Virilio, in identifying the post-Cold War period as an age of imbalance, 
sets forth the 1993 attack on the World Trade Centre as illustrative of a 
“mutation of terrorism”. This evolution centred around the destruction of a 
strategic symbolic target, an ‘attempt to devastate the major cities of the 
world’ (Virilio, 2000b, p.19). What was now important was the sheer 
devastation wrought, where the resultant representation would indicate the 
impact and extent across a cosmopolitan environment. This notion of large 
scale destruction, with emphasis on levelling buildings, smashing windows 
and industrious ruination, also served a dual function of obfuscating any 
human casualties, an acknowledgement of the military-media synthesis of a 
“bloodless” aesthetic.  61
 Following the attack on the World Trade Centre in 1993, President Bill Clinton effectively 61
“smothered things” in the manner of Marshall McLuhan’s advice to prevent a catastrophe; he 
prevented the media dwelling on the event.It was the absence of a visible spectacle that 
allowed an act of forgetting; since no defining image existed there was no spectacle, therefore 
no event. 
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The truck bomb detonated beneath the North Tower was 1336 pounds 
(606 kg); in Britain, a series of bombings on either side of the 1994 ceasefire 
can be identified as continuing this trend of terrorism deployment.  On 24th 62
April 1993 a truck bomb of 2200 pounds (1000 kg) exploded in Bishopsgate, 
a major thoroughfare in the financial district of London. A series of telephone 
warnings with a recognised IRA codeword were made. The emphasis is clear: 
“[there’s] a massive bomb… clear a wide area”. 
Three years later, the seventeen month ceasefire ended with the Dockland’s 
bombing, a 1100 pound (500 kg) device in London’s secondary financial 
district. This was followed four months later by the bombing of Manchester’s 
main city centre Corporation Street, on 15th June. The 3300 pound 
(1,500 kg) detonation targeted the city's infrastructure and a major shopping 
centre. The Enniskillen bomb, as noted, was just 40-pounds (18 kg). 
Canary Wharf 
In the immediate aftermath of the explosion, reporter Peter Sissons would 
present a breaking news report on BBC One (09.02.1996). Entirely 
descriptive, the broadcast featured no on scene visuals, merely presenting a 
basic geographic indicator of the affected area. Information from a fire 
brigade commander is relayed, with the numbers of engines and firefighters 
on the scene emphasising the scale of the event. It is described as “a huge 
explosion in the Docklands area”, and with a statement of the IRA regarding 
 For analysis of the role of the media in the peace process, particularly the presentation and 62
interpretation of political change, see Spencer (2008).
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the status of the ceasefire detailed (quoting the Irish broadcaster RTE), there 
is a clear link created.  
A short time later, the main evening news aired as scheduled, in an extended 
edition. It opens with the on screen caption “17 month ceasefire over”. The 
statement from the IRA, with an emphasis it has not been verified, is detailed 
and a short sequence featuring a John Major statement and a Tony Blair 
quote is played. The IRA statement is then repeated by Peter Sissons as 
visuals from the scene begin to be displayed. This leads in to a report by an on 
the scene journalist, with their language detailing casualty information, 
security measures being introduced across the country and providing oral 
descriptions of eye-witnesses.  
The visuals featured are dominated, throughout the entire on scene report, by 
emergency service vehicles with flashing lights illuminating the night sky. 
Upon inspection, these are primarily fire engines and not ambulances. For 
the active viewer, particularly one cognisant of the blast timing (19.01) an 
understanding is then possible regarding the (literal) impact. As the damage 
is detailed, a sequence of shots show the affected buildings. Street lights 
provide ambient lighting meaning visuals are strangely subdued, with the full 
impact therefore unclear. 
The extended nature of the broadcast allows a form of analysis. This occurs 
due to the twin events of the bombing and the ceasefire, allowing a narrative 
to be created. A second report, from reporter Denis Murray in Northern 
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Ireland, then features interviews with politicians, analysis of the language of 
the IRA statement and interviews with Belfast citizens. What is essentially a 
brief historical overview of the previous period utilises iconography of British 
troops to illustrate the passage of progress and time. Visual motifs of soldiers 
on patrol in streets, beginning with armoured vehicles and followed by a 
sequence of foot patrol is repeated in a familiar loop; central framed (in both 
senses here) is the soldiers uniform. Here, a movement from hard hats and 
body armour, to berets and fatigues is evident and connotations are clear.   
The main evening news on Monday 12th of February (weekends featuring 
reduced and irregular bulletins) centres on updated coverage of the bombing. 
Opening with coverage of a John Major statement to the House of Commons, 
proclaiming there will be ‘no concessions to the bombers’, the report then 
focuses on daytime visuals of the bomb site. Beginning with a close up pan of 
one building facade, slowly progressing across a sea of smashed windows, 
narration explains windows were “shattered” over one hundred metres away. 
The next shot mimics the first, slowly panning across a road replete with 
glass fragments. One final shot again features the camera tracking back 
slowly, in a “reveal” of the full scene. This long/wide shot is sustained for 
several seconds allowing the audience to almost marvel at extent of the 
devastation.  A crater is visible however the primary focus is the previously 
seen building dominating the frame, structural intact yet a ruined shell. It 
deliberately invokes illusions of the recent Oklahoma City bombing in the 
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United States, where a similar iconic image of a bombed building because a 
visual shorthand for the bombing itself.  
Throughout these visuals, the reporters narration deliberately deploys nouns 
and verbs that echo the act: “Gaunt and shattered buildings...testimony to the 
determination to wreck the ceasefire…Five buildings devastated’ in an area 
packed with offices…A stark reminder that the ceasefire is over”. 
Underscoring these words is the perpetual diegetic sound of a high pitched 
alarm ringing. It is described by the reporter as the only sound to be heard in 
the area, an aural motif of the panic this spectacle — this image event — 
caused.  
A second report follows, highlighting the changing security situation. It 
signifies the reverse of that shown on the night of the bombing, with security 
returning to pre-ceasefire levels. Multiple shots of military checkpoints and 
police searching vehicles occur with the report concluding with a slow camera 
zoom on a policeman’s firearm. This sequence has been carefully edited so 
there is a deliberate re-framing of the weapon; it moves (by way of the 
camera) from the periphery of the frame to a central focus. The connotations 
of this, the symbol the gun represents, and the perspective the image is being 
presented from, directly suggests further violence will occur. With the 
dominant mediatised discourse critical of the act, emphasised as purely 
destructive, there is a further insinuation that the security forces are ready for 
such a development. 
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The early years of the decade were dominated by Republican issues, including 
prisoner release and demilitarisation. Coverage concentrated on violence, 
with visuals — particularly the bloodless devastation of the Docklands 
bombing — granted precedence. To offer a further clarification, reportage of 
such violence by the BBC concentrated on a Republican stance. There was a 
minimising of British army, RUC and Loyalist violence. Such paramilitaries, 
tending in the main to restrict their activities to Northern Ireland, received 
minimal coverage on BBC News bulletins (indeed across Schlesinger’s four 
categories in general). 1993 can be recognised as a transitional year in the 
Troubles, with Hume/Adams talks and the signing of the Downing Street 
declaration paving ‘the way for the 1994 ceasefires’ (Parkinson, 1998, p. 73). 
Such progress hastened the demise of the Broadcasting Ban, a rhetorical tool 
of perception by/of the government. 
The Broadcasting Ban 
On October 19th 1988, in the aftermath of the Enniskillen and Ballygawley 
bombings, Douglas Hurd imposed a ban on broadcasting proscribed 
organisations on television. What was an unprecedented restriction on press 
freedom, the broadcasting ban sought to convert Thatcher’s oxygen principle 
into codified law.  It discouraged analysis (where it existed) by further 63
limiting the expression of oppositional opinion that contested the dominant 
discourse. 
 Similarities were frequently invoked to restrictions in apartheid South Africa63
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The ban, legal due to the 1922 Special Powers Act, comprised two central 
elements, with the first largely unnecessary; the media had applied a 
voluntary prohibition on interviews with members of paramilitary groups 
(particularly Republican) with the infrequent occurrences throughout the 
1970s, including the INLA in 1979, detailed in previous chapters. The second 
element however extended censorship to a wider category, that of those 
allegedly supportive of terrorism. Speak No Evil, a 2005 BBC documentary 
subtitled The Story of the Broadcast Ban, explains “The ban affected 11 
loyalist and republican organisations but Sinn Féin, the political wing of the 
IRA, was the main target”.  
Groups that were both legal, and had elected representatives (as both MP and 
local councillors) were affected;  
It meant that instead of hearing Gerry Adams, viewers and listeners would 
hear an actor's voice reading a transcript of the Sinn Féin leader's words 
(Welch, BBC News Online, 2005). 
As Mark Devenport then notes, the ban led to ‘McCarthyite implications if we 
had to ask interviewees “Are you or have you ever been a member of Sinn 
Féin?”’ (Devenport, 2000, p.54). Whilst Douglas Hurd would declare it not to 
be a restriction on reporting, appearances of Sinn Féin, a legitimate 
democratic political party, were severely curtailed during the subsequent 
period. In the year prior to the ban, Sinn Féin representatives were 
interviewed seventeen times on the BBC; this dropped by almost two-thirds 
in the ensuing twelve months. The primary reason for the imposition of the 
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ban was the belief television granted terrorists a platform. Whilst Sinn Féin 
could therefore technically still be shown, in reality, the ban was used to limit 
their appearances, and limit their publicity. 
Health warnings were the agreed method of drawing attention to the ban in 
news coverage however these were not always used. In the minutes of a 
confidential Editorial Policy Meeting at the BBC, it states subtitles were to be 
eliminated from BBC news programmes because they ‘could sound 
propagandistic’ (cited by Miller, 1995, p.51). The ban prohibited the 
broadcasting of any words spoken by a person who ‘represents or purports to 
represent’ or whose words ‘support or solicit or invite support’ for a listed 
organisation (ibid). Upon a clarification from the Home Office, it became 
clear that reported speech was outside the prohibition; it was thus acceptable 
to quote a listed organisation or a speaker supporting a listed organisation as 
long as the originator of the words was not heard speaking them. 
Furthermore, confusion would arise as to whether an individual could be held 
to ‘represent’ their organisation twenty-four hours a day; the Home Office 
would state this was too narrow an interpretation and that ‘a member of an 
organisation cannot be held to represent that organisation in all his daily 
activities’ (Henderson et al., p.2). 
This definition would be deployed by the BBC in an interview with Gerry 
Adams regarding employment in Belfast (16.02.89). Thirty seconds of sound 
on film was broadcast (in Northern Ireland) with on-screen captions 
identifying Adams as speaking as MP for West Belfast rather than Sinn Féin 
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MP for West Belfast. In setting the ban as one which also limits those who 
“support[s] or solicit[s] or invite support[s]”, there would be a number of 
individuals who had their views cut, subtitled or eliminated entirely, despite 
not being a member of Féin. Seeking to underline the impact of the ban, the 
Channel 4 film Trouble The Calm, featured a caption explaining the strident 
editing: 
Under government broadcasting restrictions, in force since October  
1988, this woman cannot explain her husbands beliefs and                               
motivations which led to his imprisonment (ibid).  
With explanations of beliefs and motivations considered to invite support, it 
would become impossible for the media to report events in even a broadly 
descriptive sense. The ban then operated — through legislative action — as a 
weapon in the propaganda war, a rhetorical response to the visual spectacles 
committed by terrorists. The government sought to portray “enemies” as 
terrorists, lacking in political motivation; it was a tacit attempt to limit and 
eliminate any dialogue for this “opposition”. 
When the ban was introduced, David Nicholas, editor of ITN, objected. He 
stated that ITN interviews with Sinn Féin were conducted 
responsibly, because we all understand what these extremist organisations 
stand for is abhorrent to many people. British public opinion has never been 
more resolute than it is now, in my opinion, in defeating terrorism and that 
owes a lot to the full and frank reporting that we’ve been able to conduct on 
Northern Ireland for over nineteen years (Miller, 1994, p.63) . 
Howeve, such a statement asserts that the news is about portraying the 
perceived feelings of the nation, rather then reporting on events. This is 
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particularly notable when Nicholas claims that broadcasters have helped 
foster such feelings with “full and frank” coverage.  
Ten years after the Maze prison received worldwide attention due to the 
Hunger Strikes, Peter Taylor gained permission to film inside and interview 
prisoners. Some 450 inmates are interned in the infamous H-blocks; Catholic 
and Protestants only occasionally encounter each other on neutral territory. 
Inside Story: The Maze — Enemies Within (20/11/90) presented a number of 
extraordinary visual sights, including convicted terrorists and Republican 
prisoners taking part in a “hurling the welly” sports day, and an improvised 
Loyalist pipe band commemorating the Battle of the Boyne. The 
documentary, however, gained attention for ultimately highlighting the folly 
of the broadcasting ban. 
Taylor remarked it  
will allow viewers a unique chance to see those on both sides who are doing 
the killing. I think what will surprise most viewers is that underneath the 
hoods, they are very ordinary people…it is a very different place from what it 
was ten years ago. I think they hope that by letting us show that, they will 
undermine the myth that has build up around it (no date, Frayn). 
The programme, and particularly the visuals deployed, humanised 
individuals but there was a continued and repeated insistence on their true 
status; Taylor’s cold open voiceover explains 
The Maze Prison is unique. Behind its walls are almost 400 prisoners, most 
dangerous terrorists…they planted the bombs, pulled the triggers and stained 
Northern Ireland with blood. 
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This is later stressed by an interview with the prison warden: 
Taylor: Are they ordinary prisoners you guard?                                                   
Warden: No, they are out and out terrorists. 
There is also a strong emphasis placed on the number of prisoner officers — 
“1200 prison officers guard the prisoners. A ratio of 3 to 1” — with an implicit 
suggestion this is due to the clear and present danger posed by inmates.  
The programme featured Taylor interviewing prisoners in their personal 
capacity and as such, there was no requirement to re-voice their 
contributions. It was only when the IRA’s “spokesman for food” is filmed 
complaining, in his official capacity, that his words must be dubbed in a 
surreal exposure of restrictions:  
The thing with the sausage rolls...they’re getting a bit small.                                      
In terms of size and all that you know. The quality is still there.                
They’re getting a bit small you know.  
Just as Gerry Adams could therefore be interviewed on BBC radio, with his 
own voice heard as he detailed an attack on his house, an actor was required 
when there was this movement into an official stance. Sinn Féin received 
significant media attention following their response to the Downing Street 
Declaration, and the Irish government rescinded its ban the following month 
(January 1994). The disparity between governmental positions in London 
and Dublin was then combined with the media persistently highlighting and 
subverting the ban. Its status received further attention during the visit of 
Gerry Adams to the United States in 1994, where interviews aired across 
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Europe, America, Africa and the Republic of Ireland. Only within Britain was 
a voice-over utilised.  
Comparable to the manner post-Carrickmore restrictions were superseded by 
the events of the Hunger Strike, the Broadcasting Ban was rendered obsolete, 
by political events, with the Government’s stance untenable at the close of 
1993 (Butler, 1995, p.80) It would ultimately be lifted in September 1994, two 
weeks after an IRA ceasefire declaration. With the ban, there was a 
suggestion that rhetoric had now overtaken the visual. By 1988, a visual 
thesaurus of Troubles codes had been established that was dominant, 
sustained, and ultimately expected by the audience as a framing device. The 
Governmental response was an attempt to control one method of information 
output, relying on the partisanship of the media to “control” the other.  
Influence 
Ken Bloomfield, National Governor of the BBC in Northern Ireland points to 
four influencing factors which impacted the position of Governor.  
First, what I might call the ‘statutory framework’…a royal charter.                
Second there is what I might call the ‘case law’ of the BBC; the steady 
accretion of custom and practice…  building up over time to rather well-
established conventions. Third, there is the influence of the                         
working environment current at a particular time…                                                                                                       
And finally there is the influence of powerful personalities  
(1996, pp.148-149). 
I would suggest these four can in turn be loosely applied to indicate the 
primary influencing factors on BBC output, stretching from the broadcasting 
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ban, to unofficial governmental pressure. Criticism of the media, particularly 
by Liz Curtis, Alan F. Parkinson, David Miller and David Butler, concur that 
improving coverage was not a simple solution. Rather there was a belief that 
allowing greater knowledge of the situation, including greater awareness of 
the background and beliefs of all parties, would allow an audience to consider 
and discuss the problem from an informed perspective. Instead, a vocal 
minority dictated the dominant discourse, Bloomfield’s “powerful 
personalities” directing the means of rhetoric and representation established 
over twenty years: 
I have often remarked that reporting in Northern Ireland is like reporting a 
general election every day of the week. During elections, the parties and their 
supporters, wherever they are, either here or elsewhere in the UK, are               
hyper-sensitive, seeing bias at every turn, ringing up to criticise a phrase 
here, a headline there. As far as I am concerned, it is like that all the              
time. Why did you interview so-and-so and not so-and-so, why was                  
my statement not used, why did you go to that event but not this event,            
why did you say that person was a Catholic but you did not say another            
one was a protestant? It is a sensitive audience out there  
(Baker, 1996, pp.123-124). 
As Elliott concluded from his analysis of reporting in the early 70s, ‘the 
tendency of the British media was to report violent events as simply irrational 
and horrid ... Such events were irrational because they were horrid’ (cited by 
Spencer, 2000, p.21, original emphasis). The Omagh bombing of 1998 can be 
seen as the pinnacle of this horrid, irrational violent events, the last major 
spectacle of the Troubles, and a significant moment in moving beyond a 
contested media atmosphere.   
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Omagh 
Al-Qaeda attained American public awareness for the first time in 1998, 
following the dual bombing of US embassies in the Southeast African cities of 
Dar es Salaam and Nairobi. The two attacks were symbolic strikes, on the 
eighth anniversary of American forces arriving in Saudi Arabia, likely at the 
direction of Osama bin Laden (Gunaratna, 2002. p.46).  
These attacks, and the subsequent public and political response, can be 
recognised as influencing American reaction to the Omagh bombing eight 
days later: ‘especially swift and strong, emotions and sentiment being 
heightened’ (Dingley, 2000, p461). Existing as the highest death toll from a 
single incident during the Troubles, the Omagh car bombing killed 29 people, 
including nine children, and injured/maimed 220 others. It was committed 
by the RIRA, a splinter group from the Provisional organisation, who viewed 
Sinn Féin acceptance of the Mitchell Principles, which involved commitment 
to non-violence, as a betrayal of Republican ideals and the struggle for a 
united Ireland.  
Omagh, county town for County Tyrone, is home to local studios of a BBC 
regional branch, guaranteeing immediate media attention for the act. 
‘Propaganda by deed as well as by media was thus ensured’ (ibid, p.459). An 
amateur video of the blast and the aftermath, the scale of the bombing, 
coupled with its unexpected nature (due to the Good Friday agreement) 
combined to raise the resultant (graphic) visual impact. 
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The main BBC news report on the day of the attack occurred at 10.20pm 
(15.08.98, a Saturday weekend broadcast). It opens with a close up camera 
shot of rubble and a pair of fireman using spades to clear debris. Their 
actions are repetitive and in sync, with the high pitched scrape of metal on 
the road surface a juxtaposition to the general quiet. As the camera zooms 
out, a voice-over narrative details the descriptive facts of the incident. The 
wide shot, and the nature of the attack on a main shopping street, is centrally 
framed, with a row of shops extending on either side to the distance. The 
facades and rooftops of many are damaged, with the street covered in debris. 
Multiple firefighters are now visible with two fire engines at the far end of the 
street providing a stark contrast to two khaki green armoured military 
vehicles in the foreground. Soldiers can be seen patrolling the edge of the 
frame. A series of static visuals provide a directed focus, with a clear intention 
being the creation of a specific iconic shot akin to Father Daly and his 
handkerchief. There is an extended pause spent on one shot showing the 
mangled metal of a vehicle, a single bright red fire extinguisher, standing 
upright in the centre of the frame, and an empty wheelchair on the left. The 
only other instance of colour is a provided by a yellow banner, torn and 
scattered across the frame. At the appropriate instant, the voice-over 
explains: “with people simply enjoying the final day of Omagh’s annual 
carnival week”. Whilst the connotations of the empty wheelchair and red 
extinguisher are particularly obvious, their power as an image cannot be 
denied. 
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Confusion over the bomb warning is detailed and there is a stylistic and 
emotional edit as it is revealed police “shepherded hundreds of people to the 
far end of the street [beat] and that is where the bomb went off”. At this beat, 
the sharp edit occurs, jumping from steady news footage of the aftermath to 
amateur video, low quality, grainy and unsteady footage of the actual 
explosion. Smoke can be seen rising in the distance, with general confusion 
and mayhem clear. The audio of the video is muted with flames beginning to 
form in the centre of the frame.  
An on the scene reporter, intriguingly framed on either side by an RUC 
officer and appended by a soldier  in the rear of the frame, is then followed by 
a second short sequence showing a nearby hospital and the injured. General 
confusion is again apparent. The camera follows a trolley being wheeled 
inside by a number of paramedics and there is a focus on the foot of the 
victim, the only visible aspect. It is covered in blood and the narrator explains 
‘many of the victims are horribly mutilated’. The report then concludes with a 
return to a static central shot of the street. The repetition of this visual would 
ensure it became a key short hand image for the attack. It is an immediate 
signifier of the violence, damage and destruction caused, is framed neatly by 
two rows of shops and extends to an official civil building dominating the 
distance.  
The repeated use of this shot over subsequent news broadcasts can be 
identified as serving two functions. That of signifier, as detailed above, a 
scene setting motif, but also as a contrast to the amateur recording, which 
 291
revealed the graphic aftermath. This too was played frequently, in an edited 
form on shorter news bulletins and on current affairs show including 
Breakfast with Frost, which was hosted by reporter Huw Edwards, and in 
detail on an extended edition main evening news the same day (16.08.98). 
The video opens with the blast and the operator initially zooms in to the 
scene. People are visible both running to, and away from, the blast site. A 
dust cloud envelops the area and footage zooms out as a woman moves 
towards and past the camera. She is guiding her son, bleeding from the ear, 
with blood flowing down his face. The deep red colour of the blood, and the 
vivid blue of his sweatshirt, are magnified against the washed out grey of the 
surrounding frame. The audio of the video footage has been playing 
throughout.  
As the camera progresses up the street, a number of injured people can be 
seen lying on the ground, with others crouching over providing assistance. A 
woman can be heard off screen: “hold pressure on it, hold pressure”. Another 
woman is shown being carried out of the frame and then, in the immediate 
environs of the blast radius, several bodies can be seen, covered with 
tarpaulins and blankets. This makeshift attempt captures the operators 
attention and they linger for several seconds as they pass over each. The 
narrator speaks up, explaining these images were “captured on video and 
seared on the minds of the survivors”. BBC News is then presenting these to a 
new re-mediatised audience. 
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Footage returns to the motif shot established in coverage the previous day, 
showing the street, centrally framed, and with some rubble cleared. It 
remains cordoned off, with blue police tape; a crime scene. Soldiers however 
patrol, with weapons raised and wearing battle helmets, visors and body 
armour. As before, there is a juxtaposition established, however here it is 
between the rule of law, of criminality, and the armed services, of terrorism. 
Report rhetoric then focuses on the human interest angle, using the death of 
three generations of one family as their lead avenue for coverage.  
Throughout regular news broadcasts, there is a focus on the event, with 
visuals utilised to provide “information”. Spotlight (08.09.98), fulfilled a 
form of investigative journalism as it sought to explore the schism in the 
Republican movement, with the three weeks since the explosion, allowing a 
window of reflection and period of analysis. It utilised what can be identified 
here as the second iconic image the BBC/media sought to create and 
disseminate and promote.  
One week after the attack, thousands of mourners gathered in the centre of 
Omagh for an act of prayerful reflection. This received significant media 
attention, with elevated camera shots framing the street identical to that of 
the attack aftermath. What dominates now however, is the sea of people, an 
amorphous mass of faces. In a series of extended shots, the passage of time is 
marked only by the continual, gradual illumination of traffic lights, flickering 
throughs its sequence as a satisfying symbol of change, progress and 
normality. This spectacle — deliberately constructed and promoted as such 
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by the media — can be seen as a book end to the Troubles on British 
television. What started in 1968 with unexcited violent protests, and a media 
unsure of a means of representation, had now become a calm period where a 
quiet majority stood up and asked for peace.  The BBC had now established a 
visual rhetoric, a language of motifs, symbols, shots and shorthand, that had 
combined to present “terrorism”, and its evolution, to a national audience.  
With the passing of the millennium, the Troubles would fall into abeyance, 
regional in character and no longer a significant threat to the British state. It 
could no longer be considered in the same category as the terrorism ‘that 
seems to be the prominent feature of the movement in the early twenty-first 







History only happens in the present…  
the media…exists…as flashes and images.  







Michael Griffin, in Camera as Witness, Image as Sign: The Study of Visual 
Communication in Communication Research, posits two trajectories for 
contemporary lens-based media, photography, film and television: realist and 
formative (2001). Positioning visual communications in relation to 
Benjamin’s mechanical reproduction of imagery that characterises the 
modern mass media, Griffin stresses that visual studies should concentrate 
on how media producers and viewing audiences use and interpret images.  
This thesis offers archival research and qualitative textual analysis in order to 
probe and interpret how the BBC as a media producer used images of 
domestic terrorism during a three decade period. The BBC receives such 
sustained attention because it occupies a central position in the media 
ecology of the United Kingdom, and holds a number of ‘structural and 
thematic interrelations with other phenomena and contexts’ (Jensen, 2002, 
239). Indeed, the BBC can be positioned as a ‘a microcosm of some larger 
system or a whole society' (Gomm et al., 2000, p.99); examination of their 
output is therefore important and necessary. 
A contemporary news report is corrupted by the online sphere of social media 
and “citizen journalists” (see Allan, 2013; Allan and Thorson 2014; Wall, 
2012). Previously, and for a large portion of this study, it was professional, 
preconceived shots, carefully considered and composed, that were utilised to 
construct a news story. To quote Griffin in detail, this standardised footage is 
gathered by: 
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an experienced videographer [who] knows the kinds of shots  
that will be needed in the editing process. In addition to framing  
the familiar “stand ups” of reporters “on the scene” and the “talking heads” of 
interview subjects, the camera person looks for establishing  
shots of the relevant scene or location, cut-ins that can serve to illustrate 
details, and cut-aways that will provide  a variety of camera angles, editing 
transitions, and cover shots necessary…These visual practices accomplish 
four goals: they furnish the newscast with widely recognised symbols of 
pertinent people, places and institutions, thus creating an impression of 
significance and access; they provide signs of “information” —  
location footage, interview testimony, and images of physical evidence  
that serve to corroborate the validity of the news report; they provide visual  
 segues for transitions and cover shots for continuity; and they provide a 
good supply of loosely associated imagery, cut-aways and visual details that 
both facilitate the construction of a narrative structure and contribute to an  
overall appearance of authenticity (1992, p.134, italics in original). 
Identifying these visual practices in the archival footage of the corpus allows 
clear patterns to be identified, leading towards an answer of the central 
research question.  
Arising in the post-WWII period, due to the technological development of 
light-weight, hand-held cameras allowing sound and pictures to be recorded 
on location (on the scene) with sound-sync, vérité style coincided with the 
birth of television news.  Film (in the abstract sense) could be captured 64
directly. With truth key — akin to photography’s notion of evidence — such 
cameras granted intimacy and immediacy. This direct access translated to an 
aesthetic style where a representation of reality (and revelation) was possible. 
Whilst, as detailed, every camera shot and set up involves consideration and 
consciousness, the composition of the vérité style — natural lighting, blurred 
 Within cinema, a distinction exists between cinéma vérité and direct cinema. Eric 64
Barnouw would classify direct as a more observational form (fly on the wall) and vérité as 
documentarian evidence of a provoked situation (1974). The use of vérité here refers to its 
stylistic and aesthetic tendencies. 
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and uncertain focus, accidental framing, harsh movement — carried a visual 
coding connoting authenticity. Just as (apocryphal) accounts of the Lumière 
brothers L'Arrivée d'un train en gare de La Ciotat herald astonished 
audiences unaccustomed to the moving image fainting, early video footage of 
the Troubles, including the October 5th march in Derry, revealed to the 
broadcast news audience real brutality and violence; a camera almost 
overwhelmed by visuals and uncertain where to look. 
Prominent across BBC reporting, the raw and unrestrained footage 
symbolises the commencement of the Troubles. Yet, caught unaware at the 
outbreak of violence and quite unsure how to contextualise events, the BBC 
were unable to provide the necessary framing or background to events. The 
Civil Rights march in Derry on 5th October 1968, Burntollet Bridge on 4 
January 1969, the Battle of the Bogside during 12–14 August 1969, and 
Bloody Sunday on 30 January 1972, therefore exist as incidents where 
graphic footage revealed the true nature of violence and the ultimate human 
cost. Footage exists as distinct from the aforementioned idea of carefully 
considered and composed professional shots, framed (in both senses) to 
capture events according to the journalist and institutions values. Instead, 
they were horrifically violent. Unpackaged by an institution unsure of 
precisely how to report on terrorism, conflict, and violence on home soil, the 
images held unmatched force; yet, to transpose the words of David Campbell 
regarding al-Jazeera's images of the Iraq War in 2003, they were ‘no more 
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than what appeared, in actuality, before [the] camera lenses’ (Campbell, 
2003, p.107).  
These initial events are central to an understanding of the representation of 
the Troubles and the patterns established. They remain visceral and shocking 
today — even in the context of contemporary images of violence — and show 
events as they truly took place. However, in the aftermath, and as the BBC 
was subjected to greater public and political pressure (whilst simultaneously 
reflecting internally on its own role and responsibilities within conflict 
reportage) there was an institutional form of self censorship initiated. 
Reporting was routed through the Northern Ireland controller and here can 
be identified the moment meaningless images became the dominant visual 
thesaurus of the Troubles.  
Bonfires and burning vehicles — the perverse fascination of the flame — 
became familiar. These symbols became signifiers across BBC news for the 
larger instances of terrorism and the Troubles, allowing a version of “reality” 
to be framed and represented, with a related removal and retreat from the 
presence of the body. The violence caught the BBC (and the population) by 
surprise; with time, with politics, and with ideology, they settled into a 
system of sanitisation, the obfuscation of violence, and signs and signifiers of 
terror-less terror.  
It is possible, and fruitful here, to identify parallels between the reporting of 
the 2011 London riots, and initial events in the Troubles. With both 
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originating as a form of protest — civil rights regarding housing, employment 
and politics in the latter; a response to the death of Mark Duggan, shot by 
officers of the Metropolitan Police in the former — Douglas Kellner situates 
events in London (and subsequently spreading across Birmingham, Bristol 
and Manchester) within the sphere of a spectacle of terror, arguing it is one of 
the branches of domestic terrorism and societal violence (2012). As he states,  
On Monday afternoon, rioters and looters fanned throughout  
the capital, robbing, trashing, and, in some cases, setting stores on fire,  
randomly attacking cars and buildings, and producing a  
perhaps unparalleled night of violence and terror in London…  
The event was truly a global spectacle; Al-Jazeera broadcast the  
London riots live and non-stop, and the BBC could barely keep  
up with the cascading reports of lootings, vandalism, fires,  
and terror spreading throughout London (ibid, p.19). 
The nature of events was unexpected and the BBC, unsure of how to report 
and frame coverage — whether it be anti-police uprising, social and economic 
protest, consumerist desire, Žižek’s ‘outburst with no pretence to 
vision’ (2008, p.63) — retreated to the same dominant signs of violence 
established throughout the Troubles. On the 9th of August 2011 the BBC 
opened the nightly news with a four frame split screen, each showing an 
aerial shot of a burning building, vivid plumes of red and orange flames 
streaming upwards against a black night sky. An arresting visual, and for 
those of a certain age, it conjured associated iconic images represented 
during the Troubles. 
The reportage of the Troubles would seldom reach beyond the signs and 
symbols initiated in the years after 1968. A shorthand for terrorism and 
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violence was established, and a shorthand for individual events was created 
through iconic images. The shot of Father Daly and his handkerchief is now 
representative of Bloody Sunday; footage of funerals and “soldiers” in 
fatigues and balaclavas stand for Catholic memory and Bobby Sands; footage 
organised around imagery of the armed forces stood for authority and the 
British state. Campbell’s notion of the media being ‘weaponized’ (2003, p.
108) applies, with both sides seeking to target the medium and warp 
McLuhan’s central idea. Massive bombings throughout the early 90s were 
immortalised through the lexicon of destroyed buildings, rubble and 
economic ruin. There was a preponderance of imagery of damage and 
destruction but still a removal of the body from incidents of death and 
murder persisted.  
Indeed when there was such acts, the narrative tended towards the 
descriptive and factual, seeking to universalise suffering. Long shots, from 
behind police tapes and revealing anonymous locations from afar, revealed 
what Chouliaraki calls ‘the management of visibility…“dots-on-the-map” 
news’ (2006, p.101). Without spectacular imagery, and without the visual 
thesaurus to represent the dead body, there was a profound absence. This 
framed terrorism through description but not explanation, corresponding to 
‘choices (not intentional but institutional and routine)’ (Chouliaraki, no date, 
p.6). Use of simple maps, for instance in the Bandstand attack of July 1982, 
represented suffering through ‘geographical terms, casting them [the human] 
in the abstract and decontextualised mode of chartography’ (ibid).  
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Such a fact placed a significant burden on traditional media to desperately 
devise standards for dealing with, and responding to, terrorism visually. If 
the media did ignore, or avoided reporting fully, an act of terror, Molotch and 
Lester’s concept of disruptive access would apply, with agents forced to 
‘“make news" by somehow crashing through the ongoing arrangements of 
news-making, generating surprise, shock, or some more violent form of 
“trouble”’ (1974, p.108). The IRA sought to deploy their own form of 
disruptive access through the Enniskillen bomb of 1988.  
So clearly media conscious, particularly evident during the Hunger Strike, the 
IRA conceived an attack on what was a literal and symbolic location and 
event. They believed that media organisations would be forced to visualise 
the reality of the event, moving away from tropes that say little, and towards 
powerful images of the dead. The end goal was one of British disengagement 
through attrition and propaganda. However, it was the availability of amateur 
footage — removed from the carefully planned images of a professional 
cameraperson — that acted as a mediating code, allowing the audience at 
home to mimic the role of the witness. Enniskillen was therefore another 
turning point in the Troubles, both for factions and organisations. It 
backfired on the IRA, with no representative even attempting justification in 
the aftermath. It moved away from the arbitrary codes of violence without 
violence and death without death, for the briefest of moments, holding 
extraordinary framing power for media and governmental ideology. It 
allowed the government to engender support for sustained military 
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involvement in Ireland, and it allowed (or rather forced) the media to 
visualise the true nature of terror framed through a neutral eyewitness.  
Occurring between the graphic nature of 1968-1972 and the fragment of 1988 
exist ten men. With death, destruction, ruin, and terror dominating the 
preceding ten years, yet a repetition of familiar coded images failed to 
accurately represent events, the Hunger Strike returned the Troubles to a 
headline story, encompassing a wealth of news values. Indeed, with the 
election of Bobby Sands to parliament on the 9th April 1981, five weeks after 
first refusing food, he entered the elite person sphere. The stark visualisations 
created by the IRA, and deployed by a willing media, became coded as 
ideology and performance. Adopting and subverting the popular military 
codes of order, honour, and ritual — including adorning the casket with a flag 
akin to the ceremonial rite of military honours, coded and directed towards 
an international (i.e. American) audience — the funerals became symbolically 
romantic and myth forming. The emotional charged images then, very briefly, 
mark a moment when the BBC attempted to represent the Troubles in an 
alternative manner, away from the empty imagery and myths they formed 
and disseminated. However, in again failing to provide the necessary 
contextualisation to the hunger strike, these images became powerful codes 
for the framing of Irish Nationalism and freedom fighting. Fierce criticism, 
similar to that faced in the early years of coverage, and the ultimate self-
consuming nature of visuals, led to the BBC returning to their existing 
thesaurus for another seven years, until the events of poppy day. It would 
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then be another ten years before the image of death reappeared. Again 
though, this was not through a deliberate act of the BBC. Rather, the 
availability of powerful amateur footage forced them to engage with these 
visuals and move away from the economic imagery of Bishopsgate (1993), 
London Docklands (1996) and Manchester (1996). The dead could not be 
denied.  
With the satellite news gathering of the 80s leading to ‘the decade of the dish’ 
(Bell, 1995, p.137) conflicts around the globe became visible. ‘The media 
seldom cover more than one or two conflicts or catastrophes at any given 
time’ (Allern, 2002, p.141) and with modern warfare heading towards Der 
Derian’s notion of the MIME-NET — the military-industrial-media-
entertainment network, merging ‘the production, representation and 
execution’ of conflict (2009, p.xxvii) — images of burning cars, burning 
barrels and the throwing of stones, lacked power, intrigue, or sheer ferocity. 
The Troubles would only reappear during these large scale bombings when 
mass destruction was evident. Indeed, the IRA were acutely aware of their 
fading import in the globalised visual landscape, desperately seeking physical 
and abstract power. Hoskins and O’Loughlin’s statement is apt in respect to 
the Docklands bombing at 19.01 GMT, just in time to maximise coverage on 
the evening news; ‘In this way, the medium, in terms of its cycle of 
distribution or broadcast of news, will be more receptive to events occurring 
or reported at certain times of the day than others’ (2007, p.43). 
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As with this conclusion’s earlier analogy to the London riots of 2011, a second 
is appropriate: the “falling man”, itself existing as a singular symbol, and 
representative (including through literature, documentary film and art) of the 
larger event. The first ten years of BBC coverage of terrorism in Northern 
Ireland can be compressed down to the single twenty-four hour window of 
September 11th. In electing to jump to his death from the burning towers, the 
falling man was visible on live rolling news coverage and replayed frequently 
during the morning hours. So unprecedented was this, the act of (forced) 
suicide/homicide, that there was confusion about its representation amongst 
the media. Trapped in an ‘iconic impermissibility’, it gradually disappeared 
from coverage, whilst other alternative visuals flourished (Hamdy, 1999, p.
253). These alternatives removed the 3,000. Similarly then, beginning with 
vivid footage, amidst the riots on the Bogside and the shootings on “Bloody 
Sunday,” the BBC had no existing referents, nor no alternative means of 
representation. Consequently, initial coverage trended towards the graphic, 
shot on location vérité style, at the heart of the action. Gradually however, 
there was an overt movement away from this form; by 1974 and the UWC 
strike, reportage had settled into a model typified by superficial visuals, 
generic media templates and descriptive rhetoric.  
This form of reportage would dominate until the Hunger Strikes grabbed 
attention across the world, deliberately executed so there was a procession of 
dead and dying with the body physically present. With the exception of 
Enniskillen and Omagh, where amateur footage provided a method of 
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perception that occupied a disjuncture to established means, coverage of 
Northern Ireland by the BBC was dominated by the empty symbolism of the 
absent image, by the rhetoric of euphemism, and a concerted lack of context 
and analysis.  
The BBC would — and what can be argued, continue to — routinely draw 
upon past ‘images, video, phrases, people, places and events, as well as other 
media, to locate and to shape’ (Hoskins, 2006, p.455). Yet, when these 
images fundamentally (mis)represent the reality of three decades of violence, 
the present and the act of locating and shaping is dangerously affected.  
The attack on 9/11 can be recognised as discrediting the use of terror, making  
a return to violence in Northern Ireland seemed unlikely. The London 
bombings of July 7th 2005 further undermined the legitimacy of using terror, 
particularly in an environment where community support was vital. Within a 
month of the attacks, Sinn Féin leader Gerry Adams announced the 
decommissioning of weapons (Mockaitis, 2008, p.10).  
As violence in Ireland waned, homegrown terrorism of extreme Islam became 
the dominant threat, emerging in the aftermath of what can be demarcated as 
the post-Cold War, post-9/11 world; a world of new wars, diffused wars, 
virtuous wars. A world of mediatised conflict. Simultaneously, global 
economic recession and a series of circumstances culminated in an out-burst 
of violence across England, facilitated and documented across social media.  
The Transnational Terrorism, Security, and the Rule of Law Project has 
explored terrorism developments across Europe, including charting frequent 
words in media articles regarding the subject. At the turn of the millennium, 
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despite the Good Friday agreement, British, Northern Ireland, IRA, police 
and Adair all occur and clearly indicate importance and concern. Terrorism 
itself as a term is absent from the top ten. In the aftermath of September 11, 
all references to Ireland disappear, supplanted by a new lexicon: Afghanistan, 
terrorism, September, Bin Laden and the basket of Muslim, Islam, Islamist 
and Islamism. Just as imagery of Troubles faded throughout the 90s, the 
codes and symbols no longer powerful to engage, so too did its significance as 
a national and international event. For the next four years, such lexical terms 
were prevalent (including the addition of Iraq and Bush), indicative of a 
movement from domestic terrorism to global conflict and the War on Terror. 
7/7 reversed this trend, returning to internal terror and domestic homeland: 
police, security, Britain, British, London, Blair dominate, and Muslim, Islam, 
Islamist, and Islamism rise to the top of the discourse (anon, 2008, p.95). 
David Miller details the work of Ed Cairns, who examined the perceptions of 
children in Northern Ireland and Scotland. Shown simple line drawings of a 
train crash or house on fire, children from Northern Ireland 
were much more likely to mention bombs or explosions in stories than 
children in Scotland who “virtually never” mentioned such things. However 
Cairns and his colleagues found some groups of children in the West of 
Scotland who, at the time (1976-7), could only receive television from 
Northern Ireland. These children mentioned violence more often than the 
other Scottish groups. Cairns concludes from this that: “The evidence 
presented here thus appears to confirm the conclusions reached by other 
investigators — that television news can distort perceptions of reality — and 
to extend this finding to children as young as 5 years”  
(Cairns et al., cited by Miller, 1994, p.263). 
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Furthermore, Hoskins and O’Loughlin detail research (conducted since 9/11) 
which indicated that the ‘mainstream media, particularly the BBC, remain the 
primary source of news across all demographic groups in times of 
crisis’ (2010a, p.908). As such, precisely how the BBC continue to represent 
terrorism remains a central concern for students of the media. This research 
explored the images of the Troubles over three decades, identifying what 
images dominated, along with pinpointing precisely where, when, and why 
specific changes in reportage occurred. Analysing the organisation in this way 
is important; it is a search for the ‘descriptions and typologies which have 
implications for other, or larger, social systems’ (Jensen, 2002, p.239).  
Whilst focusing directly on the BBC as a key part of our media ecology is of 
importance, further insight into the nature of its coverage would be possible, 
and enhanced, through a comparative study with its commercial broadcasting 
rival ITV. Such a study would lead to generalisations, but the ‘analytic 
conclusions independently arising from two cases, as with two experiments, 
will be more powerful than those coming from a single case (or single 
experiment) alone’ (Yan, 2003, p.53). This process would have led away from 
the central research question and, in prioritising the BBC, subsequent 
scholarship has a substantial volume to initiate proceedings from. However, 
the possibility of ITV imagery further illuminating the BBC’s historical and 
evolving patterns of coverage, and the signs and symbols both organisations 
utilised, is ripe with potential and offers considerable excitement.  
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The connection between the media and terrorism has been well documented 
by academics. Precisely how entwined they are is evident throughout the 
examples detailed; terrorists seek maximum publicity for their conduct, 
moving towards the symbolic to attain maximum impact. The media — the 
BBC — utilise(d) a combination of code, symbols, signs and rhetoric to 
present these acts of terror within a particular discourse and framework. Yet 
each remained isolated in a series of decontextualised atrocities.  
As Schlesinger et al., note, ‘public knowledge of terrorism is founded upon 
the images, definitions and explanations provided by the media’ (1983, p.1). 
Amidst an increasingly complex media discourse, there is now a surfeit of 
information, downloaded directly to our pockets. These images, definitions 
and explanations, are directed by a number of parties at a number of 
audiences. The British media played a key role in building a consensus 
around the representation of Ireland and domestic terrorism during the 
Troubles. That consensus was closely aligned to the state’s explanation of the 
conflict. As society moves into what can be termed the age of (hyper)terror, 
the BBC continue to play a centrally mediating role. Precisely how their 
journalism seeks to engage, frame, represent, and symbolise the world — as 
the world responds to it — initiates a fascinating new era of reporting, social 
commentary and media studies. 
In exploring the past, it is possible to gain a better understanding of the 
present and imagine the future.  
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As John Corner succinctly states ‘an enriched sense of “then” produces, in its 
differences and commonalities combined, a stronger, imaginative and 









All television content is indicated within the text using a six digit date format. 
Programming was sourced from a number of archives, primarily the 
Northern Ireland Political Collection (NIPC) contained within Linen Hall 
Library Belfast, and The University of Ulster's Centre for Media Research at 
the Coleraine campus. Further material was obtained from several private 
collections.  
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